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1. INTRODUCTION  
In the last three decades, increased global competition, shortened product lifecycles and 
complexity in the development of technology have forced firms to rely not only on their 
internal research and development capabilities but also to bring in technology from outside 
(externally developed technology) in order to develop new products or to serve new markets 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997). Strengthening of intellectual property 
rights worldwide and changes in organisational dynamics have further boosted technological 
transactions and fostered the development of a market for technology that is often mediated by 
the exchange of intellectual property (Teece, 1986; Chiesa et al., 2008). Firms use many 
mechanisms, such as alliances, mergers and acquisitions, R&D collaborations and technology 
licensing, which is seen as one of the most important mechanisms that firms used to exchange 
technology (Anand & Khanna, 2000b; Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006; Tidd & 
Trewhella, 1997). 
Licensing of technology entails a transfer of intellectual property rights from a licensor (owner 
of the technology) to a licensee (buyer of the technology) (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). On the one 
hand, technological sharing through licensing enables firms to commercialise and capture 
value from their innovation (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Chiesa et al., 2008; Fosfuri, 2006; 
Megartz, 2002). On the other hand, licensing of technology enables firms to build relationship 
with partners and facilitates the emergence of ecosystems and networks, and it is through these 
networks that firms innovate and gain competitive advantage (Gulati, 1995; Lavie, 2006; 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017). Because of the 
importance of technology sharing and networking to firms' performance, there has been a 
considerable interest by scholars to understand mechanisms that firms use to exchange and 
capture value from their technology (Kim & Vonortas, 2006a; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; 
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Miguel & Dussage, 2017). However, despite the theoretical development that has taken place 
recently, our understanding of the collaborative strategy of firms – in particular their licensing 
strategies and resultant networks and ecosystems is not yet fully developed (Gulati et al., 2011; 
Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Miguel & Dussauge, 2017). To enhance 
our understanding of the cooperative strategy of firms, this thesis approaches the phenomenon 
through three theoretical lenses; governance modes (choice of licensing), ecosystems and 
networks. It develops three research questions from each lens to capture how the type of 
contractual agreements and networks and ecosystems that result from entering into these 
contractual agreements influence firms’ value creation and innovation performance. This thesis 
thus mainly constitutes three empirical studies (papers) with each responding to a specific 
research question. 
1.1. Research Questions and Gap 
This thesis mainly addresses the roles of knowledge or technology sharing (licensing of 
technology) and ecosystems and network formation on value creation and value appropriation. 
More specifically, it responses to three empirical questions: 
1. What are the conditions for high-tech firms to exchange technology through unilateral 
and cross licensing? 
2. How do focal firms’ technology and actor ecosystem complexity affect their value 
creation? 
3. How do the quantity and quality of direct and indirect network ties affect firms’ 
innovation performance? 
The first research question on the conditions under which high-tech firms prefer to exchange 
technology through either cross or unilateral licensing is addressed in the first study - paper 1- 
of this thesis. The question is motivated by the impact that the licensing choice selected by 
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firms to exchange technology has on the amount of value they appropriate from licensing 
(Chiesa et al., 2008; Megartz, 2002; Kim & Vonortas, 2006a). Licensing agreements are widely 
categorised into unilateral and cross licensing (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Nagoaka & Kwon, 
2006). Cross and unilateral licensing are structurally different, and firms use them for different 
strategic reasons as each of the licensing agreement brings rewards and a corresponding degree 
of risks (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Chiesa et al., 2008). 
In an attempt to understand firms’ licensing preference, earlier studies have concentrated on 
either the characteristics of licensors (Arora & Fosfuri, 2001; Fosfuri, 2006; Kim &Vonortas, 
2006a; Motohashi, 2006;  Somaya et al., 2010) or those of licensees (Athuahene-Gima, 1993; 
Lowe & Taylor, 1998, Laursen et al., 2010). However, more recently researchers argue that 
both the firm's and partner’s characteristics together determine the firm's licensing preference 
and call for a better understanding of these characteristics (Kim & Vonortas, 2006b; Nagaoka 
& Kwon, 2006; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2006; Siebert, 2012). To respond to this research 
gap, the first study - paper 1 - analyses firms' licensing preferences from both the firm and pair 
level characteristics and introduces new determinants for the preference of cross and unilateral 
licensing. Specifically, it focuses on the effect of the firm’s and the licensing pair’s technology 
and market diversification, their prior cross and unilateral licensing experience and size. 
The second study - paper 2 - of the thesis moves from the licensing modes that firms use in 
commercialising technology to investigating the networks and ecosystems resulting from 
licensing on firms' performance. A substantial body of research literature has acknowledged 
that ecosystem orchestrators/focal firms often experience considerable differences in their 
performance outcomes (Adner, 2017; Gawer & Henderson, 2006). Heterogeneity in the 
performance of focal firms has been explained in terms of either the nature of relationships 
among actors (agents who undertake activities) in ecosystems (Autio & Thomas, 2014; 
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Jacobides et al., 2015; Rong & Shi, 2014) or the structural aspects (activities that need to 
materialise for the focal offer to reach end user) of ecosystems (Adner, 2017; Adner & Kapoor, 
2010; Kapoor, 2018). The implicit assumptions that have driven prior research relate to the 
differences in the resources that partners bring to the ecosystem and the heterogeneity in focal 
firms' ability to coordinate activities within their ecosystems. Despite the rich insights gained 
from these studies, our understanding of why some focal firms’ outperform others remains 
incomplete (Adner, 2017; Thomas & Autio, 2014). The second empirical study - paper 2 - 
introduces the complexity theory to the ecosystem literature and uses it to provide new insight 
into the heterogeneity of the performance of focal firms. The complexity theory especially the 
NK stream enunciates that the number and degree of interactions between components of a 
system affect its performance (Kauffman, 1993; Rivkin, 2000). In most high-tech settings, 
ecosystem generally occurs within an industry or focal firm architecture or platform (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010). The architecture provides a ‘‘blueprints’’ for interactions among partners 
(Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009) and specifies way in which they can work together (Ferraro & 
Curses, 2009). It also provides the context in which strategies are set and how value is created 
and distributed within the ecosystem (Bremner et al., 2017).  
The ecosystem architecture constitutes two principal components – the actor and technology 
(Baldwin & Clarke, 2000; Baldwin, 2014). The degree of interactions or interconnectivity of 
the architectural components shapes the functionality and performance of ecosystems 
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1996; Rivkin, 2000). Ecosystems can thus be considered as complex 
systems as the richness of technological interconnectivity and the degree of interactions among 
components (actors and technology) affect the amount of value generated by ecosystems 
(Glassman; 1973; Weick, 1976). By using the complexity theory in the ecosystem context, the 
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study provides more profound insights that go beyond the actor-centric approach and 
technological or structuralist approach that have predominated the literature. 
Finally, the last empirical study – paper 3 – explores the collaborative strategy of firms from 
the demand perspective. In collaborative settings, where firms are involved in the exploration 
and exploitation of technology, the value that is created must be distributed in some way among 
the collaborative parties (Miguel & Dussage, 2017). Prior collaborative literature has heavily 
focused on the supplier side of the equation. In addition, in the network context, the literature 
has mainly explored the effect of the structural features – position of firms in networks and 
how the quantity of resources that firms accrue from the different part of their networks 
influences their innovativeness (Ahuja, 2000b; Paruchuri, 2010; Podolyn & Stuart, 1995; 
Powel et al., 1996;; Salma & Savies- Laura, 2005; Shan et al., 1994; 2005; Singh et al., 2016; 
Zaheer & Bell). Very little research has been conducted to understand how the quality of 
resources – relational aspect of network – that firm’s access from their direct and indirect ties 
contributes to their innovation performance (Gulati et al., 2011; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 
2009). Examining the effects of the quality of ties is very important as firms occupying similar 
structural positions in networks may inhibit heterogeneous levels of performance as a result of 
differences in their partner resources (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Wang 
& Rajagopalan, 2015). The third paper/study investigates licensees' performance based on the 
structural and relational aspects of their networks. Specially, it investigates how the quantity 
and quality of resources, information, knowledge and skills, which firms accrue from their 
direct ties (Ahuja, 2000; Podolny, 2001; Mor, 2010; Rodan & Galinic, 2004; Singh et al., 2016) 
and their indirect ties (Gulati, 1995; Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005; Parachuri, 2010) 
contribute to their innovation performance. 
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1.2. Thesis Purposes and Contributions of the Constituent Research Studies - Papers 
The principal objective of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of how inter-firm 
collaboration influences firms' performance, specifically their innovativeness. The first 
study/paper, on the determinant of licensing, and the second study on the heterogeneity of focal 
firms' performance both focus on licensors – supply side, cooperation strategy of technology 
suppliers, while the last study – the effects of the quantity and quality ties concentrates on 
licensees – demand side, and focuses on cooperation strategy of buyers. Despite the apparent 
differences at face value between the different constituent papers, strong interdependencies and 
great synergies exist between these three papers. The nature of inter-firm cooperation requires 
that we study the collaborative strategies of firms from both a supplier and buyer perspective 
(Laursen & Salter, 2004). Specifically, research needs to take into account the resources and 
capabilities of licensors and licensees and how partners' capabilities are coordinated across 
ecosystems and networks as these has a tremendous impact on firms' innovation performance 
(Adner, 2017; Gulati, 1999; Laursen et al., 2010; Lavie, 2006; Lowe & Somaya et al., 2010; 
Taylor, 1998; Venkatraman, Lee & Iyer, 2008). This thesis examines the collaborative strategy 
of firms from both a supplier and a buyer perspective, and in so doing; it provides a more 
complete insights into our understanding of the collaborative strategy of firms. 
The findings of the first study/paper on the determinants for cross and unilateral licensing 
indicate that in contrast to the firm size that has been examined in the literature, technology 
and market diversification may be a better predictor for licensors’ licensing preference. The 
findings also indicate that licensors’ technology market diversification and licensing 
experience along with differences in the licensing partners' market diversification and licensing 
experience, are critical determinants of licensors’ licensing preference. These findings enrich 
the knowledge and organisation learning and the competitive perspective of the licensing 
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literature (Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Gallasso, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Nagaoka & 
Walsh, 2009; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2010; Somaya et al., 2010). 
The findings of the second study/paper on the rationales for heterogeneity in focal firms' 
performance show that increased levels of technology and actor complexity enable focal 
licensors to generate superior value from their ecosystems. The joint effects of technology and 
actor complexity are also shown to augment focal firms' value creation. These findings 
contribute to both the structuralist or technology ecosystem-centric approach (Adner, 2017; 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016) and actor-centric approach (Autio & 
Thomas, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015; Rong &Shi, 2014) of the ecosystem literature. 
Finally, the findings of the last study/paper on the effects of network ties on the innovation 
performance of buyer firms (licensees) indicate that the quantity of partners that they license 
technologies from and the quality of these technologies have a significantly positive effect on 
their innovation. From a network perspective, this paper is closely related to the network theory 
on the structural and relational aspects of networks, particularly recent work by Sarkar, Aulakh 
and Madhok (2009), Gulati et al. (2011) and Madhavan and Prescott (2017).  
Overall, this thesis contributes to the broader collaboration literature on licensing, ecosystems, 
alliances and networks by focusing on value creation, value capturing and innovation 
performance of firms. The three constituent papers or studies of this thesis each make a 
substantial contribution to the overall objective of the thesis, however studies 1 and 2 mainly 
relate to the collaborative strategies of licensors and contribute to licensing and ecosystem 
literature, while study 3 explores the collaborative strategies from a licensee perspective and 
contributes to the network and alliance literature. 
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1.2.1. Relationship between Overall Thesis Objectives and the Constituent Studies  
 
Study I: Interfirm Technology Exchange Through Unilateral  
 or Cross Licensing: Evidence from Chipless Firms in the 
 Semiconductor Industry.                                                                                            Thesis purpose   I 
 
 
Study II: Do Focal Firms Technology and Actor Ecosystem  
Complexity Affect Value Creation? Evidence from the 
 Semiconductor Industry. 
 
 
Study III: Innovation Performance: The Effect of Quantity                                       Thesis purpose II 
and Quality of Both Direct and Indirect Network Ties  
 
Thesis purpose I: Explore the collaborative strategies of firms from licensors (suppliers) 
perspective and contribute to licensing and ecosystem literature.  
Thesis purpose II: Explore the collaborative strategies of firms from licensees (buyers) 
perspective and contribution to the ecosystem, network and alliance literature 
1.3. Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised around eight major chapters. Chapter 1 constitutes the introduction – 
offers an overview of the conceptual building block for understanding the thesis. Chapter 2 – 
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the literature review – provides the theoretical basis, Chapter 3 – the industry context in which 
the thesis is operationalised and Chapter 4 –the methodological consideration underpinnings  
the thesis. At the core of the thesis are three empirical-based studies, which are presented in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The three studies can be read independently of each other or as a block. 
Lastly, Chapter 8 revisits the main findings of the core studies and then discusses their 
theoretical and managerial implications. 
A key highlight of this thesis is its contribution to our understanding of the collaborative 
strategy of firms. All three constituent papers of the thesis have been accepted and/or presented 
at prestigious management conferences – British Academy of Management (BAM), European 
Academy of Management (EURAM), the Academy of Management (AOM) and Strategic 
Management Society (SMS) with the first paper winning the best paper award at the BAM 
















Title Interfirm technology exchange through unilateral or cross licensing: 
Evidence from chipless firms in the semiconductor industry. 
Purpose To investigate the implications of licensors' market and technology 
diversification, experience and size and differential in the licensing 
pair technology market diversification, size, and experience on 
licensors' licensing preference. 
Research  
Question  
What are the conditions for high tech firms to exchange technology 






Title How do focal firms’ technology and actor ecosystem complexity 
affect value creation? Evidence from the semiconductor industry. 
Purpose To explain how the level of technological interconnectedness and the 
degree of actors' interactions within focal firms' ecosystems 
influence the amount of value they generate their ecosystems. 
Research  
Question 
How do focal firms’ technology and actor ecosystem complexity 







Title Innovation performance: The effect of quantity and quality of both 
direct and indirect network ties 
Purpose To explain the extent to which the quantity and quality of firms’ 
direct and indirect network ties contribute to their innovation 
performance.   
Research 
Question 
How do the quantity and quality of firms direct and indirect network 








Table 1-1: Papers’ Specific Purpose and Research Question 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the frame of reference and theoretical building blocks for understanding 
this thesis. Academic research is grounded within theories and the way a particular 
phenomenon is conceptualised may vary from one academic discipline to another. This chapter 
begins by defining and explaining the key terms and concepts with objectives to provide 
insights into how they are used within the thesis. Next, it reviews the prior literature in each of 
the constituent study/paper of  the thesis, identifying gaps and some of the burning question in 
the areas of the literature. Then, it provides a rationale for why and how some of these gaps are 
addressed in the thesis. 
2.2. Operationalisation of the Literature Review  
Before defining the core concepts and how they are used in this thesis, it is imperative to 
explain how and where the information used in describing these concepts was retrieved. This 
literature review is based on a topic search in the Web of Science ISI Social Sciences Index 
database. This database is considered as the most comprehensive database for scholarly work 
on social sciences and includes thousands of journals, papers from conference proceedings, 
reports and dissertations. Although not all journals are included, the Web of Sciences database 
contains most leading management journals – Academy of Management (AMJ), 
Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), Organisational Science (OS) and Strategic 
Management Journal (SMJ), etc. 
To carry out the review, search strings (keywords) related to the key topics examined in this 
thesis - each constituting paper/study are generated. These keywords are then used to search 
through the Web of Science ISI Social Sciences Index database. The topic search identifies 
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words or phrases in titles, keywords, or abstracts in journals published in the business 
economics and management areas on the Web of Science database. Despite the fact that the 
search is limited to journals published on this database – which means that some scholarly 
works in the form of book chapters, and papers in other journals may be lacking – searching 
through journals in the Web of Science database identifies at least most essential works in the 
business and management field, and it is therefore used here to find the critical works in the 
areas of literature and their contributions. 
2.3. Description of Key Terms and Concepts  
2.4. Licensing of Technology 
In most high tech industries, to develop a new technology firms can use either their own 
internal research and development or external methods such as acquiring another company that 
already possesses the technology, or enter into a technology sourcing agreement with an 
outside party (Steensma & Corley, 2000). Licensing is considered as one of the most important 
business arrangements that firms use to transfer and capture value from their technology - 
intellectual property (Anand & Khanna, 2000b; Arora & Forfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006; Teece, 
1986). 
A licensing agreement constitutes a contractual arrangement whereby an organisation or 
individual (licensee) obtains the rights to use the intellectual property (patent or trademark, 
copyright, etc.) of another organisation or individual (the licensor). From a licensee 
perspective, through licensing a licensee can enhance its internal capabilities by bringing in 
technology from outside its firm boundaries. For example, when Microsoft realised it had lost 
precious time to Netscape and needed to get a Web browser to market fast, it licensed the 
software it needed to produce Internet Explorer from Spyglass Inc. Microsoft also brought in 
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technology from several companies including Vermeer Technologies, Colusa Software and 
eShop Inc. to provide other Internet utilities (Shilling, 2018).  
From a licensor perspective, licensing can enable the licensor to gain revenues in the form of 
fixed fee and/or royalty depending on the legal terms of the licensing agreement (Hagedoorn 
et al., 2008). Unlike selling of technology, in licensing the licensor still has control over its 
technology and can impose restrictions on how the licensee (s) uses its technology.   
2.4.1. Motivation for Licensing  
2.4.1.1. Inward Licensing – Licensees’ Perspective 
A firm or licensee can license in technology from outside for many reasons. Inward licensing 
can enable the licensee to reduce the cost of developing new technology. Developing a new 
technology using internal capabilities can be an expensive and risky process (Hill, 1992; 
Schilling & Steensma, 2002). Through inward licensing, a licensee can rapidly obtain a 
technology that has already been technically or commercially proven (Hill, 1997; Teece, 1986). 
Although  inward licensing in itself may not be a source of sustainable competitive advantage 
– because a technology that is available for licensing is typically available to many potential 
licensees (Tsai & Wang, 2007), access to a needed technology, however, can substantially 
reduce the risks (Lowe  & Taylor, 1999) and the time required to develop a new product (Leone 
& Reichstein, 2012), allowing the license to diversify into new markets (Killing, 1978), and 
exploits its own advantages more efficiently (Gold, 1987).  
However, the licensee’ rights to the technology can be restricted by licensing agreements 
inward licensing (McDonald & Leahey, 1985), which may affect certain strategic decisions on 
the use of the licensed technology. In addition to the lack of control, bringing in technology 
from outside may also affect the morale of the licensee’s internal R&D staff (Atuahene-Gima 
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& Patterson, 1993; Sen & Rubenstein, 1989). When a licensee licenses in technology, it 
typically receives highly compartmentalised technology and its internal staff may not fully 
comprehend the knowledge used in developing the technology (McDonald & Leahey, 1985). 
As a result, they may grow increasingly dependent on the licensor for maintenance (Steensma 
& Fairbank, 1999), which may have a negative impact on their morale. 
However, despite these downsides, licensees may gain valuable knowledge from working with 
externally acquired technology, which may enable them to develop their own proprietary 
technologies in the long-term. For example, Procter & Gamble's, through its ‘‘Connect and 
Develop’’ initiative, sources a huge amount of ideas and technologies from outside and uses 
them as a foundation for new products and technologies development. The firm has been able 
to stay innovative and competitive in multiple markets using this approach, conceptualised in 
some strategy literatures as the open innovation approach (Chesborough, 2003; Schilling, 
2018).  
2.4.1.2. Outward licensing – licensors’ perspective 
A firm can generate value from its technology not only by embedding it in a new product and 
process but also by generating fees from outward licensing (Grindley & Teece, 1997). Outward 
licensing can enable the licensor’s technology to reach a large number of customers and 
markets than it could have done on its own (Lei & Slocum, 1991), yielding greater returns on 
its investment (Kollmer & Dowling, 2004; McDonald & Leahey, 1985). For example, Delphi 
Automotive, a supplier to the automobile industry develops a software program that can 
simulate various aspects of machining, including turning, milling and drilling. The company 
initially developed the software for its own use, but later realised it could make more money 
through licensing. By licensing the software to many automobile firms, its technology 
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penetrates a broader market than it could have done if the company purses the venture alone 
(Schilling, 2018). 
Outward licensing can also enable a firm to access complementary resources and capabilities 
of partners. Sometimes a firm may develop an innovation but does not possess the 
competencies, facilities, or scale to take the innovation to market. Through outward licensing, 
a firm can use partners’ capabilities to perform all the value chain activities for the innovation. 
For example, in the biotechnology market, small and start-up firms generally license their 
technology to big pharmaceutical firms with marketing and distribution capabilities in order 
take their technology to market quickly.  
Outward licensing can also serve a means to commercialise unattractive technology. By 
licensing out technology that is not core to the firm’s business, it can restructure its business 
and focuses on its main projects (Bianchi et al., 2010; Kollmer & Dowling, 2004). For example, 
data shows that in 1994, IBM was able to restructure its business and made almost 100 million 
dollars from licensing fringed technology to other firms (IBM Annual Report, 1994, Grindley 
& Teece, 1997; Rivette, & Kline, 1999) 
Outward licensing can also serve as a precursor to engage in mergers and acquisitions,  
alliances and joint ventures especially international joints ventures. Omnibus IP licensing 
agreement that combine patents, trademarks, and know-how is considered a key component of 
trade secret (Grindley & Teece, 1997) and plays an important role in international joints 
ventures (McDonald & Leahley, 1985). From outward licensing, a firm can also evaluate and 
learn more about the strength of partners’ capabilities. O’Keeffe (2006) describes how Arm 
limited enters into a joint venture with Texas Instruments (USA) and Nokia (Finland) after 
initially licensed its CPU technology to TI and Nokia in 1993. The initial licensing deal 
provided TI and Nokia with an opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of Arm’s 
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technology. From the licensing arrangements, Arm, TI and Nokia found that working together 
would enable them to meet their priorities and customer needs more effectively and set up a 
joint venture in 1995. The joint venture led to the development of a new architecture known as 
the “Thumb” architecture. The new architecture made it possible for TI and Nokia to use Arm's 
processor as a programmable tool to produce System of Chip (SoC) products that were 
different and superior to competing products in the market (O’Keeffe, 2006). 
Outward licensing may also be motivated by the desire to shape competition in the industry, 
that is, choosing rivals and extending the firm’s dominant position in the market (Rockett, 
1990). A firm can stimulate demand and prevent competitors from developing competing 
technologies by offering them a licence to its technology (Gallini, 1984). This strategy works 
well when competitors can easily imitate the primary features of the technology or when there 
are strong incentives to adopt a single technology as the dominant design in the industry. By 
licensing its technology to competitors, the licensor may prevent its technology from 
competing with other technology for market dominance. Although, by using this strategy, the 
licensor may forgo the opportunity to earn monopoly rents, doing so however may prevent 
potential competitors from developing their own proprietary technologies, thus enabling the 
licensor to gain greater revenues in the long term from a steady stream of royalties  
In addition, outward technology licensing can also facilitate the diffusion of technology and 
enable the firm (licensor) to establish its technology as the de facto standard, especially in 
industries where externalities are important for commercialising technology (Shepard, 1987). 
For example, in the semiconductor industry, Arm Limited, a leading intellectual properties 
supplier was able to establish its technology as the defacto standard in the mobile and 
smartphone market by licensing its technology broadly to partners operating within and outside 
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the industry. Arm’s has been able to make huge profits as its chips account for more than 80% 
of the market share in smartphones and smart devices market (Arm’s Annual Report, 2017).  
However, although outward licensing may offer the licensor with a wide range of advantages, 
a licensor also faces risks of increased competition from licensing its technology to many 
partners. Increased competition results from partners gaining valuable knowledge from using 
licensed technology and developing their own proprietary technologies over time, which 
increases the number of players with similar technologies in the market. Outward licensing 
thus entails a trade-off, as revenues gained from licensing must be balanced against the lower 
price-cost margin and/or reduction in market share resulting from increased competition in the 
market (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Bianchi et al., 2011; Fosfuri, 2006). Firms use different 
licensing types (cross and unilateral licensing) to manage these trade-offs. Depending on the 
degree of competition in the market, each of the licensing types brings reward and a 
corresponding degree of risks to licensors (Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). In addition to the 
licensing choice, firms’ ability to generate value from licensing also vary across industries 
(Arora & Forfuri, 2003) as industries vary in function of their technology, complexity and 
appropriability regimes (Teece, 1998), which influence the amount of value they can 
appropriate from licensing. The next section builds on the growing importance of licensing in 
the semiconductor industry and the different types of licensing modes that semiconductor firms 
use to innovate and appropriate value from their innovation.   
2.4.2. Importance of Licensing in the Semiconductor Industry 
The importance and rate at which firms engage in technology licensing vary across industries 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000; Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Hagedoorn, 1983; Nagaoka & Kwon). Based 
on the nature and complexity of technology and the appropriability regime, firms in certain 
industries engage more in licensing than others (Grindley & Teece, 1997). Because of 
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cumulative and complex nature of the semiconductor technology, licensing is more prevalent 
in the semiconductor industry than in less cumulative industry settings such as the 
pharmaceutical, chemical and telecommunication industry (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). In the 
semiconductor industry, technological development builds upon one and another and a large 
number of firms holds patents that constitute the “state of the art” of the industry technology 
(Grindley &Teece, 1997). The complex nature of the industry technology and richness of its 
patents entails that to innovate and capture value from innovation firms need access to other 
firms’ technology/patents, which is not the case in industries that are not characterised by 
cumulative system technologies.  
In addition to the patent thicket of the industry, the technology of the semiconductor industry 
is a key component of the electronics and computer industry. Advancement in technological 
development in these industries has accelerated the pace of technological development in the 
semiconductor. This has shortened the lifecycle of semiconductor products making it more 
difficult for firms to keep up with the pace of technological development, which entails that to 
stay competitive firms have to bring in technology from outside. These technological and IP 
dynamics have increased the incentive for firms to engage in licensing.  
From a historical perspective, licensing is not a new phenomenon in the semiconductor 
industry; it goes back to almost the beginning of the industry. At the early stages, pioneering 
firms such as AT&T, IBM, Intel, and Texas Instrument engage in licensing either because they 
were forced by antitrust consent decree or by deliberate action to understand the sort of 
technology that other firms were developing (Grindley & Teece, 1997). These days, licensing 
and IP management are keys to competitiveness as fierce competition among players has put a 
premium on innovation. Unlike the passive nature through which licensing takes place in other 
industries, in the semiconductor industry licensing is at the cornerstone of firms’ strategy. 
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Semiconductor firms use a wide range of licensing agreements and models to collaborate, 
learn, innovate and capture value from their innovation efforts.  
2.4.3. Licensing Types and Models 
Firms in the semiconductor widely used unilateral and cross licensing as mechanisms to 
collaborate, innovate and capture value from their technology (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Grindley & Teece, 1997; Linden & Somaya, 2003). Unilateral licensing constitutes a one-way 
transfer of technology from a licensor’s (owner of technology) to the licensee (s) (acquirer of 
technology). It enables the firms – licensors to gain revenues in the form of a fixed fee and/or 
royalty depending on the codified legal term of the contract (Hagedoorn et al., 2008).  
Unilateral licensing can be classified into non-exclusive – with no restriction or exclusive – 
restricted to a specific product or process or a particular geographical location. Exclusive 
licensing can lead to a situation of mutual hostages (Somaya et al., 2010). Firms can use 
exclusivity as a contractual hostage to safeguard licensee (s) investment in complementary 
assets especially when they are contracting early stage technologies (Somaya et al., 2010). 
Commercialising early stage technologies is full of uncertainties as firms can’t determine in 
advance the market and demand for the technologies.  When a licensor licenses its technology 
exclusively to partners, although licensees may face transaction hazard due to uncertainties 
associated with early stage technologies, they are more likely to make technology-specific 
complementary investments when they engage in exclusive licensing than in non-exclusive 
licensing. Exclusive licensing induces the licensee (s) to participate in and contributes toward 
the commercialisation of the technology even in the face of transaction hazards, thus creating 
a contractual hostage (Williamson, 1993). For example, in 2010, Toys ‘‘R’’ entered into an 
exclusive licensing arrangement with Amazon.com to sell toys online. The agreement 
prevented Amazon from selling toys of other vendors. Although, this condition benefited Toys 
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‘‘R’’ more than Amazon, Amazon still continues to invest in the deal for almost two years 
before terminating it in court.  
Exclusive licensing is widely used in many high–tech industries such as the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, aircraft and spacecraft and machinery and equipment industry but is rarely used by 
firms in the semiconductor industry. This is partly because of antitrust concerns as well as 
historical practices of non – exclusivity that leaves very fewer innovations that could be treated 
as exclusive (Grindley & Teece, 1997).  However, in some exceptional circumstances, firms 
in the semiconductor do use exclusive licensing agreements. In these cases, the licensing 
arrangements prohibit any sublicensing, as licensors can easily lose control of their technology 
if sublicensing rights are permitted.  
Non-exclusive licensing, on the other hand is widely used by firms in the semiconductor 
industry as a key mechanism to collaborate, learn and to capture rents from their innovation. 
Because of important of externalities and standardisation in innovating and commercialising 
technology in the semiconductor industry, most collaborative relationships either begin or 
incorporate some degrees of non-exclusive licensing. When semiconductor firms engage in 
R&D collaboration or join venture, they usually use non-exclusive licensing as a mechanism 
to assess partners’ patents and capabilities.  
Through non-exclusive licensing the firm can also institute its technology as the defacto 
standard in the industry. By licensing its technology non-exclusively to partners, a firm 
technology can reach a large number of customers quickly and becomes the defacto standard 
in the industry. From broad licensing, the firm can collaborate with a large number of partners 
and gain access to a large amount of new information, knowledge and resources, which it can 
use to innovate. Thus, from broad licensing the firm can gain a superior value from its 
technology. 
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Semiconductor firms use many different variances of non-exclusive licensing: single, multiple 
uses and perpetual licensing model. The single-use licensing model occurs when a licensor 
offers the licensee the rights to use its IP (single or bundle) in only one product. The single-use 
model offers the licensee the right to a single version of the licensor technology and if the 
licensee needs another version of the same technology, it may have to pay extra fees. This 
model of licensing is used in very limited cases.  
A multi-use licensing model occurs when a licensor offers a license the rights to use its IP 
(single or bundle of IP) in multiple products. The multi-use licensing model provides the 
licensee with an unlimited number of designs for the licensor’s IP. The multi-use licensing is 
often restricted to a specific time usually 3 years (www.fsa.org). The perpetual licensing model 
is when the licensing contract is not limited by a time that is the licensee has unlimited access 
or rights to the licensor IP.  However, although the perpetual licensing model offers the licensee 
with unlimited access in terms of products and time, licensees may have to pay an extra fee if 
they want to access an updated version of the same technology. Most licensors especially 
chipless firms prefer to use the perpetual licensing model as it enables them to collaborate with 
partners for a longer period and gain maximum returns from their innovation efforts 
(www.fsa.org). 
In addition to the fixed licensing fees, in all three licensing models above, licensees may also 
be required to pay royalties depending on the term of the licensing deal. The royalty payments 
are generally negotiated based on the percentage of products that the licensee produces using 
the licensor’s technology (% of ASP).  The % of ASP is seen as a standard for negotiating 
royalty rate in the semiconductor industry. The ASP range offers flexibility to both parties 
(licensee/licensor). In technology licensing, since the licensor cannot predict beforehand the 
contribution of its technology to the licensee products and the licensee cannot also predict prior  
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to the negotiation the number of products it will produce using the licensed technology. The 
ASP range offers both parties the opportunity to negotiate a royalty term based on mutual risks 
and benefits. Licensors also sometime use a fixed and a flat rate royalty model. The flat rate 
royalty model is seen as the less preferred option for most chipless firms operating in the 
semiconductor and they only use the flat rate in exceptional circumstances.  
 
 
Cumulative Volume of the Licensee Product Royalty Rate as % of ASP of a Packaged Device 
1 - 500,000 4.0% 
500,001 - 10,000,000  3.5% 
10,000,001 - 50,000,000 3.0% 
50,000,001 - 100,000,000  2.5% 
> 100,000,000  2.0% 
Minimum royalty per Device $ 0.15 
Source-www.fsa.org 
 
Another important licensing model that firms used in order to secure their long-term survival 
in the semiconductor industry is cross licensing. A cross licensing agreement occurs when two 
firms grant each other the right to access the other's technologies (Gallasso, 2012). Because of 
the cumulative nature of the semiconductor industry technology, to successfully innovate, 
firms need to have access to other firms’ technology/patents. When a semiconductor firm needs 
access to a particular patent or portfolio of patents, it uses cross licensing to gain access to 
these patents. Cross licensing offers the firm first the freedom to operate – to generate new 
technology and new products/market without running the risk of infringing other firm patents. 
Cross licensing also enables the firm to generate revenues from its patents as it generally 
Table 2-1: Standard Royalty Rate in Semiconductor Industry 
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involves the exchange of a portfolio of patents between the licensing parties. The patent 
portfolios cover a designated "fields-of-use," including new patents developed within the 
timeframe of the agreement (Grindley & Teece, 1997). Depending on the relative strength and 
quality (value) of the partners’ patent portfolios, cross licensing can be accompanied by a fixed 
fee and royalties (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Linden & Somaya, 2003; Telsio, 1979). Royalty 
payments in cross licensing are negotiated through a competitive rebalancing process, whereby 
each firm patent portfolios are evaluated by estimating its contributions to its licensing partner, 
with net royalty payments going to the one with the greater contributions.  
Quality measures for evaluating a firm patent portfolio include the legal validity and 
enforceability of the patent; the technological significance of this feature to the product 
compared with other (non-infringing) ways of achieving the same end; and the similarity 
between the infringing features and the patent (Grindley & Teece, 1997). Based on these 
quality measures, each patent is assigned a weighting factor. For examples, a legally strong 
patent, which is hard to invent-around and is close to the infringing feature, is given a high 
relative weight. The value of each patent is arrived at by multiplying its quality weighting 
factor and the annual sales of the affected product base. The total value of the firm patents is 
the sum of the value for all the patents listed in its patent portfolios. The estimated royalty 
payments are the difference between the partners’ patent portfolios with royalty paid by the 
firm with the less valuable portfolio. This royalty payment applies to the firm sales during the 
term of the license agreement. When the agreement expires, a similar procedure is used to re-
evaluate royalty payments for the next licensing period. Occasionally, cross licensing is 
royalty-free when the contribution of both parties’ patent portfolios are either very close or 
difficult to assess. The net payment in this case is very small or equal to zero. 
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Firms in the semiconductor use two main types of cross licensing models: Capture and fixed 
period model. Depending on their strategic objective, firms can use the capture or fixed period 
model. In the capture model, both licensing parties have the rights to use each other patents - 
eligible to exploit all technological fields to which the patents applied during the licensed 
period, usually five years, and, importantly, they also retain "survivorship" rights to use the 
patents until they expired, up to 20 years later. The advantage of the capture model is that is 
offered the licensing partners a longer period to exploit each other technology. However, 
depending on the strategic importance a patent (s) to a firm, it can restrict or exclude the patent 
(s) from the cross licensing agreement.  
The fixed period cross licensing model offers both parties similar rights to use each other 
patents during the licensed period but partners do not possess survivorship rights after the 
expiration period. After the expiration period, if the licensing partners wish to engage in further 
cross licensing they must renegotiation the licensing contracts. The fixed model however offers 
the licensing partners the freedom to negotiate royalty terms that are closely related to the value 
of their patents as they can periodically adjust the licensing terms to take into account changes 
in competitive conditions and the value of the technology. For the above reasons, the fixed 
period model is more widely used by firms in the semiconductor industry.  
As seen from the discussion above, licensing is at the heart of strategy and collaboration in the 
semiconductor industry. Depending on firms strategic intend, they use different licensing types 
and models to collaborate, learn, innovate and capture value from their innovation endeavour.  
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2.5. Review of the Literature Relating to the First Constituent Study – Paper 1 
2.6. Licensing and Licensing Choices 
Licensing of technology as an important mechanism that firms use to create and capture value 
from technology has been widely studied. Scholars have examined the rational why firms 
engage in licensing from many different perspectives. One of key perspective from which 
licensing has been examined is as a governance mode – why firms use licensing to organise 
their activities and type of licensing arrangements that they use in this process. Licensing 
agreements are widely categorised into unilateral and cross licensing (Anand & Khanna, 2000). 
Unilateral licensing constitutes a one-way transfer of technology from a licensor to a licensee 
(s). It enables the licensor to raise revenue from its technology but also exposes its technology 
to many firms. Cross licensing on the other hand is a bilateral exchange between two firms; it 
enables the licensing parties to access each other’s technology and provide the licensor with 
the opportunity to curtail the number of firms with access to its technology. As specific 
governance mode, the licensing choice which firms select to exchange their technology 
influences the amount of value they appropriate from their research and development 
investment (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Kim & Vonotas, 2006a; Nagaoka 
& Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2008; Siebert, 2010).  
Consequently, a large number of studies have examined the rationales for firms to select a 
particular licensing choice to exchange technology (Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Hagedoorn 
et al., 2008; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2008; Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Kim & 
Vonotas, 2006a; Siebert, 2010). Earlier treatments on the determinants of licensing have relied 
on the firm level characteristics to explain firms’ licensing preference. In this view, the internal 
resources and capabilities that firms possess are considered the main drivers of their licensing 
preference (Fosfuri, 2006; Kim & Vonotas, 2006a). 
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In contrast, more recently, scholars have emphasised the importance of the pair level 
characteristics – this perspective accentuates the importance for incorporating the firm’s 
(licensor) characteristics as well as the partner’s (licensee) characteristics in the analysis of 
firms’ licensing propensity and preference (Kim & Vonotas, 2006a; Siebert, 2010; Nagaoka & 
Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2008). These studies thus suggest that studying the firm and pair level 
characteristics can advance our understanding of firms’ licensing decisions and its implications 
on value appropriation (Kim & Vonotas, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010; Siebert and Von Graevenitz, 2006; Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Motohashi, 
2008). 
This literature review begins by exploring the key theories that have been used to examine 
firms’ licensing decision. Then it explicates how insights from these theories have been used 
in prior literature to explain the determinants of firms’ licensing preference. This is followed 
by the rationale for the need for a better understanding of firms’ licensing preference. 
2.6.1. Theoretical Lenses for Understanding Firms’ Licensing Preference 
To understand firms’ licensing decision and licensing preferences, the most important and 
fundamental question that needs to be responded to by economic theories is: Why do firms 
select licensing or use a given licensing type to exchange technology? This question is related 
to the notion of governance mode or, in general terms, licensing as a way of organising 
economic activity. In this context, several organisational theories have been used to explain 
firms’ licensing decision such as the transaction cost economics, organisational learning, 
resources dependence, social relationships, contingency and game theory. However, among 
these theories, transaction cost and organisational learning theories have been particularly 
useful as it offered greater insights into our understanding of why firms prefer to license their 
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technology using a particular licensing arrangement (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003, Fosfuri, 2006; 
Kim & Vonotas, 2006a; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2008). 
2.6.1.1. Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
Traditionally, the transaction cost economics has been the standard framework for analysing 
why firms engage in licensing and licensing type that they use in organising their activities 
(Fosfuri, 2006; Kim & Vonotas, 2006a; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Somaya et al., 2010). 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) provides profound insights into how economics activities are 
organised. TCT places emphasises on the costs associated with organising an economic activity 
and uses the transaction cost as the unit of analysis (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1987; 
1996). According to TCT firms will select licensing or the licensing type that will enable them 
to appropriate the highest value from their R&D investment (Arora & Fosfuri, 2001; Kim & 
Vonotas, 2006a; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). 
This approach draws on the neoclassical economics conceptualisation of the market 
(transactional) and the firm (hierarchical) as governance modes (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975). TCT sees the market and the firm as an alternative mechanism for organising economic 
activities and argues that for a given set of transactions to be carried out within firms or markets 
depends on the relative efficiency of the organisation mode. Behind the TCT are two critical 
assumptions underlying the behaviour of economic agents – are bounded rational and 
opportunistic in nature. Transaction cost theory assumes that the behaviour of agents is 
boundedly rational, so when they engage in economic activity or a contractual agreement, they 
cannot pre-plan everything but have to resolve some things as they go along, which makes all 
contractual agreements incomplete. Because of the incomplete nature of contracts, economic 
agents can act opportunistically or in their own self-interest, which increases transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975). 
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In the licensing context, as a result of the complexity of the subject matter that is being 
transferred along with the risk associated to a small number of players bargaining, information 
symmetry, the uncertainty of innovation, technological interconnectedness, diffusion 
entitlement and the difficulties of contracting knowledge lead to increase in transaction costs. 
Specifically, transaction costs in technological licensing occur at the ex-ante (diffusion 
entitlement, costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding agreements) and ex post 
(monitoring, metering, dispute governance and maladaptation) (Contractor, 1981; Caves et al., 
1983; Teece, 1988). As result of the different stages at which transaction costs occur, TCT 
scholars argues that in licensing firms are formed as a choice of governance at the ex-ante stage 
to reduce opportunistic hazards at the ex post stage. In other words, in licensing firms use the 
market to coordinate interdependent activities, which mitigates low-powered incentives of 
hierarchy (Kapoor, 2013; Mahoney 1992; Williamson 1985) 
From a TCT perspective, licensing is seen thus to be a hybrid organisational mode between 
markets and hierarchies (firms). However, scholars have identified several weaknesses with 
transaction cost analysis of licensing decision (Arora & Forfuri, 2003; Forfuri, 2006) the first 
being from the analysis of the transaction cost itself. Transaction cost treatment of a licensing 
decision focuses solely on an isolated transaction or given licensing deal. It treats each 
licensing deal as an independent item with no link to previous or future transactions and does 
not take into account the contribution of the licensing deal to the rest of the firm’s activities 
(Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Nickerson, Hamilton, & Wada, 2001). A licensing deal may 
affect other value-creating activities within the firm, such as production, marketing or 
distribution. Because of the ramifications of licensing, a licensing deal may be selected, even 
though the transaction cost for operationalising the licensing contract outweighs the benefits, 
especially if it fits well within the firm’s overall strategy. 
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Second, as an economic activity, licensing may entail a continuous and enduring relationship 
between the licensing parties, which may results in the exchange of not just the licensed 
technology but also knowledge, information and other items that cannot be theoretically 
handled by transaction cost analysis (Fosfuri, 2006). These characteristics distinguish licensing 
from the market on the one hand and the firm on the other hand. In other words, licensing has 
distinct characteristics regarding the features of the items that are exchanged, which suggests 
the need for an additional theoretical lens for understanding the underlying mechanism of 
licensing and licensing choices (Klevorick et al., 1995; Kollmer & Dowling, 2004; Nelson, 
1995; Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
2.6.1.2. Organisational Learning 
As a result of the weaknesses of TCT, organisational learning theory has been used to gain 
further insight into firms’ licensing decision. In contrast to TCT, which analyses firms' 
licensing decision based on the costs and risks of licensing or licensing type, this perspective 
accentuates the importance of collaboration among firms. The approach highlights the benefits 
that firms can accrue from collaborating with each other (Klevorick et al., 1995; Nelson, 1995; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982), as firms engage in licensing or use a particular type of licensing for 
many different reasons (Kollmer & Dowling, 2004). Cooperation among licensing parties 
enables them to share knowledge and other resources that facilitate the development of new 
products and technologies or serve new markets and subsequently increases the total value 
resulting from the licensing deal (Argote & Epple, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Besides, cooperation between licensing partners also enables them to build trust, routines, and 
norms of communication, which, in turn, facilitates the flow of information and reduces the 
risk of opportunistic behaviours (Argote & Epple, 1990). Increased cooperation can also 
facilitate the coordination of the licensed technology enabling the licensing parties to capture 
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superior value from the technology (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Similar to the firm’s choice to 
engage in licensing, the extent to which a firm wishes to collaborate with partners may also 
influence the licensing choice that it uses to create and capture value from its innovation.  
However, as appealing as collaboration may sound, this literature has also identified risks 
associated with collaboration. The literature highlights that many alliances and collaborative 
agreements failed. The failures have been associated breakdown in collaboration (Kale & 
Singh, 2009). Breakdowns in collaboration may occur from failures in cooperation or 
coordination (Gulati et al., 2005; Gulati & Singh, 1998). Cooperation is the alignment of 
incentives or the extent to which partners are willing to work together. Cooperation challenges 
may occur when partners have different goals. Failure of cooperation may also occur if there 
is little synergy between partners' activities or if partners are each other's competitors. 
Coordination, on the other hand, is the alignment of actions from which partners who want to 
work together develop a way to do so. Coordination challenges occur when partners do not 
know precisely how best to work together or are unable to anticipate what the other partner 
will do. Failure in coordination is more likely to occur with new partners, that is, partners who 
are unfamiliar with each other or operate in different locations and/or time zones. 
2.6.2. Determinants of Firms’ Licensing Decision 
Drawing from one or all the theoretical lenses above, scholars have addressed the firm’s 
licensing preference from both the firm - specific effects and pair’s level effects (Ceccagnoli 
et al., 2010; Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Ruchman & McCarthy, 2016; 
Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2006; Siebert, 2012; Walter et al., 2012). 
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2.6.2.1. Firm’s Level Characteristics 
Many early studies on the determinants of licensing have concentrated mainly on the firm’s 
level characteristics and explored a number of factors that may influence the firm’s licensing 
decisions, including the appropriability regime – strength of IP protection (Hagedoorn et al., 
2008; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Somaya et al., 2010; Teece, 1986), the firm size (Hagedoorn 
et al., 2008; Kim & Vonotas, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2006; Ruchman & 
McCarthy, 2016; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2006; Siebert, 2012; Walter et al., 2012), potential 
competitors (Arora & Forfuri, 2003; Fosfuri, 2006; Motohashi, 2008; Siebert, 2012), access to 
complementary assets (Motohashi, 2008; Somaya et al., 2010; Teece, 1986), prior licensing 
experience (Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Ruchman & McCarthy, 2016), and products and 
technologies’ relatedness (Movery et al, 2006; Walter, 2016). 
2.6.2.1.1. Appropriability Regime 
In one approach to studying firms’ licensing preference, research has examined the industry 
dynamic within which firms operate and its implications on their licensing decision (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000; Arora &Merges, 2004; Hagedoorn et al., 2008). In this industry approach, 
scholars have explored the role of the industry appropriability regime – the strength of the 
industry IP protections. Anand and Khanna (2000) examine the relationship between the 
industry regime and firms’ licensing decision. They find that in industries where patent 
protections are stronger, firms engage more in licensing and tend to prefer arm’s length 
(unilateral) contracting rather than bilateral exchanges. In a similar vein, Arora and Merges 
(2004) link transaction costs associated with technology licensing to the strength of the industry 
appropriability regime. The authors show that in industries where licensees can easily invent 
around the licensed technology (weak appropriability regime) firms prefer to engage in 
bilateral exchange as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs. Bilateral exchange enables 
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licensors to build a closer relationship with licensees reducing the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour which in common with arm length licensing. Whereas, when firms operate in 
stronger industry settings, they are more likely to prefer unilateral licensing as the industry 
appropriability regime offers them sufficient protection against imitation. The critical insight 
from the stream of literature is that the nature and strength of IP rights in which firms operate 
influence licensees’ ability to imitate the licensed technology, which in turn, impacts on the 
transaction cost and licensors’ licensing preference. 
2.6.2.1.2. Firm’s Size 
Another important determinant that has been studied in the literature for the firm’s licensing 
preference is the firm size. The main reason for studying the firm size stems from the role 
played by the resources and capabilities that are available to a firm in the way it organises its 
activities (Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Motohashi, 2008). The size of firms critically affects the 
breadth and depth of their knowledge, resources and capabilities and affects the licensing type 
they used to collaborate with others (Cava et al., 1983; Ceccagnoli et al., 2010; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1987; Teece, 1986). 
According to this stream of literature, the firm is considered as a bundle of resources (Teece, 
1988) and its licensing decision is influenced by ownership of the critical resources 
(Hagedoorn, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In general, compared to smaller firms or start-
ups, larger firms are more likely to own more resources and capabilities (Teece, 1986), which 
enables them to take their technology to market alone (Shane, 2001). Smaller firms, on the 
other hand, must either incur substantial costs from capital investments or collaborate with 
competitors in order to access complementary asset stocks. In a longitudinal study across 
different industries, Kim and Vonortas (2006) found that small firms with fewer capabilities 
tend to license their technology unilaterally, whereas in contrast, larger firms seem to engage 
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relatively more in cross licensing. The central argument of Kim and Vonortas (2006) is that 
small firms use unilateral licensing more because it enables them to access critical resources 
needed to take their technology to market. Whereas, large firms engage more in cross licensing 
because of the additional advantages (potential learning and synergetic advantage resulting 
from partners’ resources) that they can gain from licensing their technology to partners with 
large patent portfolios. 
Along the line of resources dependency, some studies indicate that the size of firms is an 
essential source of market power (Schmalensee, 1989; Barla, 2000). Market power provides 
firms with legitimacy and other advantages such as economies of scope and scale. Smaller 
firms generally lack reputation and legitimacy in the marketplace (Barla, 2000), which can be 
mitigated by collaborating with more established firms (Teece, 1986). Because of resource 
constraints and lack of legitimacy in the marketplace, smaller licensors are more likely to have 
a higher preference for unilateral licensing as the licensing arrangement enables them to access 
complementary resources and also enhances their reputation in the market. Whereas larger 
licensors prefer to cross license their technology with other more significant players, as 
bilateral exchange enables them to broaden their technological base enhancing their ability to 
explore and exploit technology. The critical insight from this stream of literature is that 
ownership or access to critical resources is the primary driver for firms' licensing decision. 
2.6.2.1.3. Access to Complementary Assets 
Complementing the line of works on resources dependency, some scholars have explored how 
firms’ licensing decision may also be influenced by their desire to access a specific set of 
complementary assets. Complementary assets are generally divided into tangible 
assets/resources (e.g. plant equipment) and intangible resources/assets (e.g. knowledge). The 
nature of complementary assets that firms need may influence its decision to engage in 
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licensing and also impacts on the licensing type that they use to collaborate with partners 
(Teece, 1986) as tangible and intangible resources play different roles. Tangible resources 
facilitate the exploitation of technology, whereas intangible resources are mainly used for 
exploratory purposes. For example, if the firm objective is to exploit technology, then access 
to tangible resources such as marketing and distribution channels, manufacturing plants and 
financial assets would be more important to them. 
In contrast, if a firm wants to explore technology then access to intangible resources is likely 
to be more beneficial. Cross licensing engenders greater collaboration between partners and 
facilitates access to more intangible knowledge. Whereas unilateral enables the firms access 
tangibles assets of partners. Arora and Gambardella (1994) found that in the pharmaceutical 
industry established firms with limited knowledge in biotechnology increasingly engaged in 
collaborative agreements in order to access these capabilities. This suggests that the licensing 
decision of firms is influenced by their desire to access requisite complementary assets. 
2.6.2.1.4. Product and Technological Relatedness 
Scholarly focus on resources and capabilities has also led some researchers to study the 
implication of licensing partners' products and technologies relatedness, conceptualised as the 
degree of similarities between two firms' products, markets and technologies (Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991). 
The findings on the effect of product market and technology relatedness on licensing decision 
have been mixed. On the one hand, researchers have argued that when licensing partners' 
product and technology are closely related they are more likely to be competitors, which 
influences their licensing decision or the type of licensing agreement they use to exchange their 
technology. For example, Hamel (1991) argues that when licensing partners possess similar 
technology or operate in the same market, they are more likely to select the licensing type that 
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would enable them to curtail the level of competition in the marketplace. Siebert (2010) also 
found in his study of the semiconductor industry that when licensors and licensees operate in 
the same market or possess similar technological capabilities, they are more likely to use cross 
licensing as opposed to unilateral licensing. The rationale for using cross licensing is that it 
enables firms to reduce the degree of uncertainty and competition in the marketplace 
(Mcdonald & Leahey, 1985; Walter, 2016). 
On the other hand, other groups of scholars argue that products and technological relatedness 
may increase information asymmetry, making it easier for licensing partners to share and 
transfer skills and capabilities, thus facilitating their ability to realise the outcome of the 
licensing agreement (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Harrigan, 2002; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; 
Merchant & Schendel, 2000). Cohen & Levinthal (1990) illustrate that when a licensor and a 
licensee technologies are closely related; the licensee can easily absorb and integrate the 
licensed technology into its production structure, enhancing the licensor’s ability to capture 
value from the licensed technology. From this perspective, when licensing partners' 
technologies are closely related, the licensor may have a higher propensity to engage in 
unilateral licensing. Because of the ease with which partners can integrate the licensed 
technology, unilateral licensing to a large number of players would enable licensors to reap 
more value from their technology. 
Because of the mixed findings on product relatedness, Walter (2016) conducted a longitudinal 
study in the pharmaceutical and the chemical industry to resolve the debate on products and 
technological relatedness on firms’ licensing preference. He showed that when partners operate 
in a similar technological market, the risk of creating new competitors outweighs the potential 
benefits of absorptive potential and thus firms’ licensing decisions tend to be influenced by the 
magnitude of competition that they will face in the marketplace by using that type of licensing. 
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2.6.2.1.5. Prior Licensing Experience 
Another key factor that has been studied in the literature as a determinant for firms’ licensing 
preference is their prior licensing experience (Gambardella et al., 2010; Kani & Motohashi, 
2012; Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Motohashi, 2008). Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) argued that firms learned or built their experience over many years through 
repeated engagements in similar focal activity. Through cumulative involvements in a focal 
activity, firms develop highly efficient organisational routines and standard operating 
procedures (Pisano, 1996) and consequently gain specific knowledge and skills on how to 
execute the focal activity. The accumulated knowledge dramatically simplifies the 
coordination of the focal activity and reduces costs, especially in managerial attention and 
resources needed to carry out the focal activity (Hoag & Rothaemel, 2010). Because of the 
acquired knowledge, firms are more likely to draw on the accumulated experience for future 
engagements (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). 
Unilateral and cross licensing are considered distinctive focal activities and firms use each type 
of licensing agreement for specific reasons. The characteristics of cross licensing differ from 
that of unilateral licensing in many respects: the mode of governance, control of partners, long-
term risks and contribution to profit. This implies that as a specific focal activity, firms that 
engage extensively in cross licensing would have developed more in-depth knowledge of the 
licensing type and are therefore more likely to choose that licensing arrangement in the future. 
Kim and Vonortas (2006) found that firms, which frequently engage in cross licensing would 
have built the managerial capabilities and expertise needed to engage in the licensing type. 
They are more likely to have a greater cross licensing experience. When face with prospect in 
the future, these firms are more likely to prefer cross licensing than firms with less experiences 
of using the licensing type. 
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In a related study, Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) also showed that the probability of firms to use 
a particular type of licensing agreement increases with the experience they have for the specific 
licensing type. Licensors with huge cross licensing experience would have a higher preference 
for cross licensing, as they are likely to face fewer difficulties in coordinating the licensing 
arrangement in the future than licensors with less experience. In a similar vein, licensors that 
use unilateral licensing extensively would have a higher preference to license their technology 
unilaterally in the future. 
2.6.2.2. Pair Level Characteristics for Analysing Firms Licensing Preference 
Many earlier studies on the determinants of licensing have relied on firms’ characteristics to 
explain their licensing preference. However, more recently, researchers have started to 
challenge this rigid firm level focus by arguing that the firm and licensing partners’ 
characteristics together determine the firm’s licensing preference (Kim & Vonotas, 2006a; 
Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Siebert & Von Graevenitz 2006; Siebert, 2010). This group of 
scholars contends that scholarly understanding of the determinants of licensing is incomplete 
and potentially flawed without an appreciation of the underlying characteristics of the firm 
partners. They argue that to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying factors influencing 
firms licensing choice, it is imperative to examine not just the firm’s characteristics but also 
the pair-partner level characteristic. 
Siebert and Von Graevenitz (2006) and Siebert (2010), for example, examined firms’ licensing 
preference based on the effect of technological rivalry resulting from the degree of uncertainty 
in research and development. They show that with increasing rivalry in the technology 
marketplace, firms tend to prefer to cross license their technology as the mechanism enables 
them to alleviate the effects of competition and uncertainty in the long term. Nagaoka and 
Kwon (2006) studied the licensing preference of firms based on the size of the licensing pair 
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and the nature of IP rights covered by the contract. They found that the licensing contingency 
between two firms is mainly influenced by the size of the potential licensor, and the larger the 
licensor size in terms of its technological capabilities, the higher the licensor’s preference for 
cross licensing. 
However, despite the new insights gained from these studies they failed to examine a key 
contingency – the market and technology diversification of the firm licensing preference. 
Market diversification offers firms a different sort of advantage and is considered a more 
informative determinant for a firm’s licensing preference compared to the firm size that has 
previously been examined in the literature (Markides & Williamson, 1994). A large firm may 
operate in a single market (depth of knowledge in a single area) whereas multi-markets 
presence enables the firm to produce patents in a broad range of industries, enhancing the 
quality (breadth and depth) of its patents that can be used for cross and unilateral licensing. 
Further, the number of technology markets in which firms operate accelerates their learning 
potential, that is, the ability to absorb externally acquired knowledge and develop new products 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989), which enhances the time to market and competitive advantages 
vis-à-vis other players in the market (Gimeno & Woo, 1999).  For more information on how 
this gap is addressed see Study/paper 1 in chapter 5 of the thesis.  
2.7. Inter-firm Network 
Inter-firm networks are prominent features in most high- tech industries and play an important 
role in firms’ strategy (ability to compete and innovate) especially in the semiconductor 
industry. They are formed when two or more firms come together to achieve some common 
goals. These partnership agreements are typically voluntary – legal ownership agreements, 
informal know-how trading, etc. – involving the sharing and exchange of know-how, resources 
and capabilities (Ahuja, 2000; Teece, 1986; Mesquita, Ragozzino & Reuer, 2017). Licensing 
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of technology enables firms to transfer technology and share knowledge and resources among 
themselves, which facilitates the formation of networks. 
In the management literature, inter-firm networks have been defined in a variety of different 
ways. A common theme in these perspectives has been a particular aspect to which the network 
is associated to (Bremner et al., 2017; Oscan, 2006). For example, some scholars refer to 
networks as a business group – a cluster of firms that are bounded together by some formal or 
informal relationship (Ozman, 2006). Other scholars, like Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 
(1996) describe networks as innovation networks based on the learning that takes place 
between firms in these networks. These authors place more emphasis on organisation learning 
and see networks as a vehicle for learning and locus for innovation. 
Another group of scholars, for example, Ring and Van De Ven (1994) and Oliver (1990) define 
networks by the nature of inter-organisational relationships and the characteristics of members 
within the networks. Along this line of thought, many other terms have also been used to 
describe networks, including networks of innovators (DeBresson & Amesse 1991), networks 
of organisations (Miles & Snow 1986), strategic networks (Jarillo 1988) and inter-firm 
networks (Grandori & Soda 1995). Despite the variations in terminology, all these definitions 
of network refer to what Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) call a governance mode (way of 
organising activities), which is also the approach adopted in this thesis. 
2.7.1. Ecosystem 
Ecosystems are a distinctive type of networks. According to Moore (1993), a business 
ecosystem  is the network of organizations – including suppliers, distributors, customers, 
competitors, government agencies, and so on – involved in the delivery of a specific product 
or service through both competition and cooperation. A distinctive characteristic of the 
ecosystem is that partners within ecosystems generally come from different industry settings 
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and possess different business models and technologies. Unlike other network constructs, 
where partners congregate around either the consumer or the supply side, ecosystems may 
extend beyond the vertical and horizontal ties within a single industry or organisational setting 
(Bremner, Eisenhardt & Hannah, 2017). Ecosystems generally contain both the production 
(suppliers of focal firm (s)) and user side participants such as complementary assets providers, 
complementors and customers (Adner, 2017; Bremner et al., 2017). Another distinctive 
characteristic of the ecosystem is complementarity and interdependence between partners. 
Within ecosystems, there is a huge amount of interdependency and complementarity among 
partners’ activities. Interdependency results from the fact that to provide superior value for the 
end user, partners within an ecosystem must work together, which creates a high level of 
interdependency. Complementarity on the other hand results from the fact that partners’ 
activities within ecosystem complement each other, which enable them to create more values 
than would be generated by a single firm. These two important attributes of the ecosystem (the 
production and consumption side participants and complementarity and interdependency) 
differentiates the ecosystem constructs from other network constructs such as clusters, 
innovation and business networks, industry networks and alliances (Thomas & Autio, 2014; 
Adner, 2017; Kapoor, 2018). 
In most high-tech sectors, ecosystems generally occur within an industry or firms’ architecture 
and are orchestrated by a lead or focal firm(s). In management literature, the orchestrator has 
been described based on how members (the orchestrator(s) and participants) within the 
ecosystem are organised. Depending on how the orchestrator(s) is positioned within the 
ecosystem, scholars have used different terms to describe the orchestrator. For example, when 
the orchestrator is localised, it has been described as a focal firm (Anderson et al., 1994; Adner 
& Kapoor, 2010; Teece, 2007), a central hub firm (Isansiti & Levien, 2004b; Jarillo, 1988; 
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Moller et al., 2005) or a platform leader (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002) or lead firms (De Meyer 
& Williamson, 2012). 
2.8. Review of the Literature Relating to the Second Constituent Study - Paper 2 
2.9. Business Ecosystem 
In the management and strategy field, the team ecosystem was first introduced by Moore to 
invoke the notion that like biological system business organisations compose of  firms from a 
variety of industries that work together and coevolve over time with implications on their 
innovation and performance (Moore, 1993). The ecosystem constructs have gained huge 
traction recently in both the practitioner and academic sphere (Adner, 2017). The attractiveness 
of the concept arises from increased concerns by managers and researchers about the 
interdependence between firms and their activities (Isantiti & Levien, 2004). Many industries, 
especially high-tech industries, are dominated by an ecosystem or network of interdependent 
firms working together to provide superior value to customers, and competition in these 
industries occurs at the level of ecosystems (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Adner, 2017; Kapoor & 
Agarwal, 2016). For example, the smartphone industry is dominated by the Android and iOS 
ecosystems. The rival ecosystems include handset manufacturers, platform operators, software 
(apps) developers and network providers, with each component firm providing a unique 
solution that contributes to the overall value proposition of the ecosystem. Firms within the 
ecosystem thus co-specialised to deliver value to customers and co-evolved over time as the 
environmental conditions change. The ecosystem construct can hence enable us to explain in 
greater depth the outcomes of co-specialisation, value co-creation, co-evolution and co-
capturing between interdependent firms (Moore, 1996; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Thomas & 
Autio, 2014; Adner, 2017).  
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In the management literature, the ecosystem has been defined in a variety of ways (Thomas & 
Autio, 2012; Jacobides et al., 2016; Adner, 2017). For example, Moore (1993) describes the 
ecosystem as networks of companies working collaboratively and competitively to support 
new products, satisfy customer needs and eventually incorporate the next round of innovation 
(Bremmer et al., 2017). In a similar vein, Isantiti and Levien (2004) define an ecosystem as a 
set of interconnected firms organised around a focal or a keystone firm, who depend on each 
other for their mutual effectiveness and survival (Isantiti & Levien, 2004: 8). This way of 
defining the ecosystem, in which the production and the consumption side of participants are 
organised around a central firm is also echoed in many recent studies such as that regarding a 
platform (Cennamo & Gawer, 2002), a central hub firm (Jarillo, 1988; Rajala & Svahn, 2005), 
a lead firm (Williamson & De Meyer, 2012) and a focal firm (Hakansson & Johnson, 1994; 
Teece, 2007; Anderson, 2007). In addition to the participants’ location emphasis in these 
definitions, other scholars have taken a broader perspective. For example, Adner and Kapoor 
(2010) and Adner (2017) see the ecosystem as the alignment structures – set of activities or 
technologies – of the multilateral set of partners that need to interact for the focal value 
proposition to reach end users (Adner, 2017). The authors explicitly include upstream suppliers 
and downstream complementors in their description of the ecosystem, as their activities need 
to come together in order for the focal value proposition to materialise. 
Despite the variations in typologies used in describing the ecosystem, however, three core 
common and interdependent characteristics underscore the ecosystem: the value logic, 
partners’ symbiosis and locus of coordination (Wiliiamson & De Meyer, 2012; Thomas & 
Autio, 2014; Bremmer et al., 2017). 
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2.9.1. Core Common Characteristics 
2.9.1.1. Value Logic 
In an ecosystem setting, firms cooperate to create value and also compete to capture value from 
their collective efforts. Customer value is created from interactions among partners (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Isantiti & Levien, 2004; Jacobides et al., 
2015). Interactions facilitate the alignment of partners activities, enhancing their flexibility to 
respond to opportunities and challenges in the marketplace (Ianstiti & Levien, 2004). Increased 
flexibility enables ecosystem partners to meet customers’ needs quickly and also enhance their 
ability to deal with changes in their internal and external environments (Iyer & Davenport, 
2008; Thomas & Autio, 2012; Williamson & De Meyer, 2012). 
Another source of value in the ecosystem results from complementarity between partners’ 
activities, which lead to increase in efficiency. Complementarity between partners’ resources 
and capabilities within ecosystems leads to higher efficiency of scale and scope (Iyer & 
Davenport, 2008; Jacobides et al., 2014). The efficiency of scale enables ecosystem partners 
to gain competitive advantages relative to competitors operating outside the ecosystem (Jarillo, 
1998). Within ecosystem, partners specialised in specific activity, which increases 
cospecialisation. Co-specialisation among ecosystem partners leads to deeper learning 
enhancing the efficiency of scope. 
Value can also be created within the ecosystem from innovation benefits resulting linkages of 
partner activities. Access to partners’ resources within the ecosystem increases the potential 
for them to find relevant sources of knowledge from which they can use to innovate (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Another benefit that firms can accrue from operating within an ecosystem is 
network externalities resulting from lock-in (Williamson & De Meyer, 2012) and from the 
formation of industry standard (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986). The firm technology can become 
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an industry standard when it is used by many other players. An ecosystem offers the firm the 
opportunity for its technology to reach a large number of other firms and become the industry 
standard.     
In addition to value creation, another critical element of the value logic and the ecosystem is 
value capturing. When partners within ecosystem participate in creating customers’ value, they 
must also be able to capture a sufficient portion of the overall value from the co-creation 
process (Iansiti & Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Levien, 2004). Value capture plays an essential 
role in the stability and long-term survival of the ecosystem, as partners are more likely to exit 
the ecosystem when they are unable to capture a fair amount of value from their contributions 
(Cusumano & Gawer, 2002). Focal firms as orchestrators of ecosystems are sometimes 
entrusted with the roles of ensuring that the value that is created within the ecosystem is 
distributed equitably to all ecosystem partners (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Isantiti & Levien, 
2004). One of the ways they do that is through building a trusted relationship with partners. 
Trust among partners minimises the risk of opportunistic behaviour and facilitates the equitable 
distribution of value (Jacobides et al., 2014). 
2.9.1.2. Symbiosis 
Within the ecosystem, the success of a firm depends to some extent on the success of its 
partners, which creates mutualism or symbiosis between ecosystem partners. Symbiosis results 
from three elements. First, from co-specialisation, partners within ecosystems general 
specialise in a particular aspect of the system and provide specific input that contributes to the 
overall value proposition, which create interdependency between them. The second element of 
symbiosis results from complementarity between partners' resources. In the ecosystem settings, 
as a result of co-specialisation, partners’ activities usually complement each other leading to 
additional value being created from synergetic and cumulative interactions. Lastly, partners’ 
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symbiosis also results from co-evolution whereby partners co-evolve as environmental 
conditions changes to maintain the stability and health of the ecosystem. Co-specialisation, 
complementarity and co-evolution together lead to partners’ symbiosis and drive value creation 
and value capturing within ecosystems. 
2.9.1.3. Locus of Coordination 
In addition to value logic and partner symbiosis, the locus of coordination also plays an 
important part on the functionality of the ecosystems. The locus of coordination relates to the 
flow of activities within the ecosystem and the region/part where coordination challenges 
(bottlenecks) occur within the ecosystem. Ecosystems especially in high tech settings can 
generally occur within an industry or a firm’s architecture (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor & 
Agarwal, 2016; Jacobides et al., 2016). The architecture provides the ‘‘blueprint’’ for 
interactions among partners (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). Ecosystem partners usually come 
from different industry settings and have different technologies and business models, which 
complicates their alliance. The architecture links the various partners together and specifies the 
way in which partners can work together (Ferraro & Curses, 2009; Bremer et al., 2017). It also 
provides the context in which strategies are set and how value is created and distributed within 
the ecosystem (Jacobides et al., 2016). 
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Baldwin (2014), the architecture of an ecosystem 
constitutes a technological structure and an actor/social structure. The degree of interactions in 
the architectural components affects the flow of activities, the coordination, maintenance and 
stability of the ecosystem (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). It also affects the governance, trust and 
legitimacy of focal firms, which, in turn, influences the outcome of the ecosystem (Baldwin, 
2014; Thomas & Autio, 2014). 
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These three core pillars collectively characterise the configuration of activities within the 
ecosystem and highlight how value is created and captured by ecosystem members. To 
understand how ecosystems contribute to firms’ performance, scholars have studied the 
ecosystem based on these shared characteristics and drawn knowledge from other traditions 
including resource dependence (Gulati & Stych, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), resource-
based view, core competence and relational view (Barney, 1991; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 
1995; Prahalad & Hamel, 1998), industry structure, value chain and value appropriation 
(Teece, 1986; Porter, 1980, 1985), source of innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990, Von 
Hippel, 1998) and social embeddedness and network organisation (Burt, 1985; Coleman, 1990; 
Granovetter, 1995). 
Using these theoretical lenses, research has examined how value is created by addressing the 
risks and challenges of cooperation/interdependency between partners. Value capturing 
strategies of firms such as controlling the key components and architecture of the ecosystem 
has also been examined. In addition, inspired by the interaction of the ecosystem components, 
scholars have examined how actors (agents that undertake activities within the ecosystem) 
interact and how the nature and ease with which partner technologies interconnect (alignment 
of activities) affect firms’ performance. 
2.9.2. Different Theoretical Streams 
2.9.2.1. Value Creation 
When considering prior works on the ecosystem, the value creation stream has focused on 
understanding the dynamics of cooperation among partners as a positive-sum game that allows 
them to create joint value and realise greater opportunities than would be created by a single 
firm (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2016; Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Cooperation among partners 
facilitates the alignment of their activities, which enhances their flexibility and ability to 
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respond to changes and opportunities in the marketplace (Ianstiti & Levien, 2004). The critical 
insight from this stream is that an increase in the number of partners within an ecosystem and 
increased level of cooperation among them significantly enhances their performance. 
This stream of the literature, however, highlights that cooperation among partners can facilitate 
as well as constrain value creation. Scholars within this school of thoughts have investigated 
how collaboration among partners constrain value creation and provides ways through which 
partners can manage and deal with co-creation risks and hazards (Adner, 2012; Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010), what is described in the literature as bottlenecks. Bottlenecks have been 
conceptualised into three main types – component, adoptive and strategic.  Component 
bottlenecks occur when a partner or component firm(s) is unable to meet its production 
demand, which can constrain the performance of the entire system. Hannah et al. (2016), for 
example, found in their study of the residential solar system industry that partners producing 
inefficient and low quality solar panels limited the revenue growth and collective profit of all 
the ecosystem partners. 
In addition to component bottlenecks, joint value creation can also be inhibited by adoptive 
bottlenecks. Adoptive challenges occur when the technology for meeting customers’ needs 
exists but is not adopted by partner firms, which impacts on the collective value that is created 
by the ecosystem. Adner (2012) describes how adoptive risks impact value creation using the 
Michelin Pax Run-Flat tyre case in the automotive ecosystem. The author shows that 
Michelin’s inability to successfully commercialise Pax Run-Flat tyres was due to the slow pace 
of garages adopting the equipment needed to service the tyres. Although Michelin Pax Run-
Flat tyres provided superior performance to those of its competitors, the unwillingness of 
garages to adopt the system led to the commercial failure of the Pax Run-Flat tyre. 
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To overcome the challenges of joint value creation, scholars have also identified several 
strategies that firms can use to address co-creation risks. One strategy that has been examined 
in the literature is investing in the system’s constraining components. Ethiraj (2007) studies 
the PC ecosystem and describes how hardware manufacturers or focal firms generally invest 
around 8.5% of their R&D budget towards resolving components issues. The author indicates 
that investing in component constraining areas enables the focal value proposition to reach end 
customers quickly enhancing the overall performance of the ecosystem. 
Another strategy that focal firms use to deal with component issues is encouraging other firms 
or partners to enter and innovate in component constraining areas (Gawer & Henderson, 2007; 
Ethiraj, 2007). Gawer and Henderson (2007) examined the component strategy of Intel 
Corporation in the PC ecosystem and describe how Intel motivates partners to enter into 
components that constrain its core microprocessor business by first demonstrating to them that 
the components are commercially viable. Then it provides partners with IP relevant in the areas 
for free or at lower fees to enable them to innovate in the component area. Consistent with 
Gawer and Henderson’s work, Boudreau (2012) also found that in the PC ecosystem handheld 
computer manufacturers often motivate software producers to enter the ecosystem as an 
increase in the variety of software available in the ecosystem enhances its overall performance. 
Along the line of mitigating component challenges, other scholars have also highlighted that 
focal firms can alleviate component challenges by operating in all components or the entire 
value chain of the ecosystem (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2015). This system approach works well 
when products are highly sophisticated and the focal firm intends to change the ecosystem 
architecture rather than improve it. 
Further, providing incentives to partners has also been shown to play an essential role in 
addressing joint value creation since incentives encourage partners to invest or adopt a system. 
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Many scholars have focused on this strategy (Adner, 2012; Cennamo & Gawer, 2015; Gawer 
& Henderson, 2007; Kapoor & Lee, 2013). For example, Adner (2012), describes how in the 
e-book division, Amazon encourages authors and publishers to join its ecosystem over 
competing ecosystems by providing them with added incentives. In a similar vein, Kapoor and 
Lee (2013), show that in the medical health care system in the US, in hospitals where doctors 
were integrated within an ecosystem they had added incentives for the hospitals to adopt new 
technologies or software that improved performance than in hospitals where doctors were 
considered as staff or mere employees. 
In addition to these strategies, the timing of entry and the position of firms – 
components/complementors – within the ecosystem have also been examined as a mechanism 
for mitigating joint value creation. Adner and Kapoor (2010) investigated how the location 
relative to the focal firm where the co-creation challenge occurs affects innovation and value 
creation within the ecosystem. In a longitudinal study of the semiconductor industry, the 
authors show in multisided platform that greater upstream innovation challenges enhance the 
value that focal firms accrue from their ecosystems while greater downstream innovation 
challenges erode these benefits. The key insights from this study are that firms should innovate 
quickly when upstream innovation challenges occur and conversely, delay innovation until 
downstream complementors’ challenges are cleared (Bremner et al., 2017). Put differently: 
upstream innovation challenges represent opportunities for firms to get ahead of rivals and so 
favour fast innovation, while downstream challenges simply stifle value creations. 
2.9.2.2. Value Capturing 
The value capturing stream has sought to understand how certain firms or focal firms capture 
value from the ecosystem by exploiting their dominant position and bargaining power. The 
primary focus of this stream has been on how ecosystem orchestrators, also known as 
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‘keystones’ (Iansiti & Levin, 2004) or ‘kingpins’ (Jacobides et al., 2015) or lead firms 
(Williamson & De Meyer, 2012), emerge and why they capture a disproportionate amount of 
value from their ecosystem. From the stream of literature, focal firms generally possess the 
most valuable resources and are considered the least replaceable players in the ecosystem 
(Jacobides & Macduffie, 2013). Because of their dominant position and strong bargaining 
power, they can control and dominate other players and reap a disproportionate amount of 
value from their ecosystems. 
For example, in the smartphone ecosystems, Apple and Google occupy the most central 
position in the iOS and Android ecosystem respectively and capture the more significant share 
of the value that is created from the ecosystems (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016). Similarly, 
Jacobides et al. (2016) found that in the PC ecosystem, Microsoft reaps the most significant 
amount of value from the ecosystem because of its dominant position within the ecosystem 
(Jacobides et al., 2016). 
Besides bargaining power and dominant position, this literature has also identified other 
strategies that focal firms use to capture superior value from their ecosystems. One approach 
is by actively encouraging competition in other component areas while erecting barriers around 
their components (Jacobides et al., 2006). Barriers to entry generally result from innovation 
and technological upgrade. Kapoor and Agarwal (2016) illustrated in the smartphone 
ecosystem that one of the ways focal firms enhanced their value capturing is through technical 
upgrades. In a related study, Jacobides and Tae (2016) also showed that in the PC ecosystem 
focal firms enhanced the amount of value they appropriate from their ecosystem through 
innovation. Specifically, the authors show that focal firms that invest more in innovation 
capture more value from their ecosystem than those with a lower level of R&D investment. 
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Architectural control has also been studied as a strategy that enables focal firms to capture a 
disproportionate amount of the value from their ecosystem. For example, Ethiraj and Posen’s 
(2013) study of the PC ecosystem revealed that firms, which maintain greater control over their 
architecture, create more patents and capture a higher amount of value from their ecosystem. 
In a similar vein to Ethiraj and Posen’s study, Jacobides et al. (2015) also found that in the 
automotive industry, original equipment manufacturers (OEM) automakers, who had greater 
control over their architecture were able reap a disproportionate value from their ecosystem 
despite attempts at modularising the industry. Similarly, Fixon and Park (2008) also illustrate 
the role of architectural control in their study of Shimano and the bicycle drive train ecosystem. 
By introducing superior products architecture, the firm nullified the existing division of labour 
across the ecosystem to its advantage and captured a disproportionate amount of value 
(Bremner et al., 2012). 
2.9.2.3. Actor-centric 
Originating from the networking discipline, the actor-centric scholarly ecosystem literature 
focuses on the nature of interactions among actors who are agents that undertake activities with 
ecosystem (Autio & Thomas, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015). Social interaction among actors 
creates opportunities and constraints. Interaction among actors facilitates strategic alignments 
and enables partners to deal with the challenges of coordination that arise when strategic 
incentives are not aligned (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Autio & Thomas, 2014; Gulati et al., 2000). 
It also enables partners to build trust and act favourably vis-à-vis each other, which contributes 
positively to value creation and value capturing (Jacobides et al., 2006). 
This community stream emphasises access and openness between actors and uses network 
measures such as centrality, structural holes and density of the ecosystem to explain 
performance outcomes (Adner, 2017; Autio & Thomas, 2014; Jacobides & Tae, 2015). 
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Strategy in the stream tends to focus on the number of actors that the focal actor is linked to as 
that increases its centrality and the amount of value it generates from the ecosystem. 
For example, Jacobides et al. (2006) found that the number of actors to which focal firms are 
linked enhances their bargaining power and the value they capture from their ecosystems. An 
increase in the number of partners in an ecosystem increases the likelihood of serendipitous 
interactions between partners, which unlocks new interactions, and the combination of the 
interactions, in turn, increases the overall value creation of the system. The critical insight from 
the stream is that direct and indirect network externalities increase the amount of value that 
firms accrue from their ecosystems (Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016). 
2.9.2.4. Technology Centric – the Structuralist Approach 
The last stream of the ecosystem literature the structuralist approach explores the set of 
activities that need to occur for the focal value proposition to reach the end user (Adner, 2006; 
2013; Adner & Felier, 2016; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor & Lee, 2013). This activity focus 
stream places more emphasis on the flow of activities among partners and on the position of 
partners relative to focal firms, where coordination challenges occur within ecosystems. The 
alignment of partner activities is seen as the key to unlocking value creation (Adner, 2017; 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010). 
Strategy in the ecosystem structural approach realm tends to focus on coordination of 
activities/technologies within the ecosystem and ease with which the focal technology can 
interact with those of partners. The ease of technological interaction enhances the chance for 
the focal value proposition to reach a large number of customers quickly. In a longitudinal 
study of the semiconductor industry ecosystem, Adner and Kapoor (2010) show that the ability 
of complementor/component firms to integrate focal technology enhances innovativeness and 
increases the overall value of the ecosystem. 
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2.9.3. Rationale for an Additional Perspective 
The review above of the state of the art of the ecosystem literature indicates that the value 
creation and value-capturing stream offer complementary insights into the rationale for the 
differentials in the performance of firms. Although these streams have provided rich insights 
into how and why firms create and capture value from ecosystems, they do not incorporate in 
their analysis how the key architectural components of the ecosystem interact and the 
implications that this may have for value creation and value appropriation. The differentials in 
the amount of value that firms generate from ecosystems are influenced not just by how they 
motivate partners to join their ecosystem but also by the ease with which the focal technology 
interconnects with partner technologies and how knowledge, information and resources flows 
between the actors within the ecosystem. The degree of actors’ interactions facilitates the 
coordination of technologies and enables the focal technology to reach a large number of 
customers. Further, the ease with which the focal technology interconnects with partner 
technologies provides reassurance to partners that they will extract value from participating in 
the ecosystem, which can play an essential role in attracting other firms to join the ecosystem. 
Thus, increased levels of technology and actor interactions enhance focal firms’ bargaining 
power and position within their ecosystem (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
Furthermore, the review also highlights that the actor-centric and structural ecosystem 
approaches focus on the role of relationship building and co-specialisation among partners’ 
activities, but do not consider the role that the architecture of the ecosystem plays in shaping 
focal firms’ performance. These streams tend to assume that the amount of value that focal 
firms generate from cooperating with partners is the same regardless of the magnitude of 
technological and actor interactions within their ecosystems. Within an ecosystem, the value is 
only created when the focal firm technology interconnects seamlessly with that of partners. 
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Interactions among actors' harness learning and enable the focal firm to develop more efficient 
innovative routines and this reduces the cost of coordinating the partner technologies and 
enhances the focal firm value creation and value capturing. In this sense, the amount of value 
that focal firms generate from an ecosystem is contingent on the level of technology 
interactions and actor interaction within their ecosystems. 
In this thesis (study/paper 2) offers a slightly different explanation for the heterogeneity in the 
performance of focal firms, which hinges on the complexity theory. By introducing the 
complexity theory, we are suggesting that an ecosystem is analogous to a complex system, 
where interactions among the subcomponents affect the outcomes of the ecosystem (Glassman, 
1973; Weick, 1976; Kauffman, 1993). In his seminal work, Kauffman (1993) defines the 
complexity of a system as a function of the number of subcomponents in the system, N and the 
level of interactions among the subcomponents, K. The complexity of the system increases 
when N and K increase, which creates rich interconnectivity among the subcomponents, which 
together produce a higher outcome than would be achieved from a slightly lower variation in 
the activity sets (Cockburn & Henderson, 1996). Interactions among components create a 
system level interaction between the components such that an improvement in one component 
exacerbate or mitigate the constraints imposts by the other components, thus contributing to 
system performance. For more details on the study, see chapter 6 of the thesis. 
2.10. Review of the Literature Relating to the Third Constituent Study/Paper 
2.11. Inter-firm Networks 
In the last three decades, there has been a tremendous increase in the theoretical and empirical 
research on networks (Madhavan & Prescott, 2017). The rise is fuelled by the fact that firms’ 
networks of relationships enable them to access partners’ knowledge and resources, which 
when combine with their internal capabilities can significantly enhance their innovativeness 
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(Ahuja, 2000; Fleming, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Powell, 
2004; Powell, 1996; Tsai, 2001).  Firms network of relationships affect a variety of 
performance outcomes such as innovativeness, profitability and other measures such as 
learning and trust (Gulati, 2005: Koka & Prescott, 2002). This literature review focuses on the 
effect of network ties on firms’ innovation performance. To synthesise this stream of the 
literature, this review begins by examining what has been done in earlier studies. Next, it looks 
at the broad lessons that have resulted from recent studies and identified gaps in the literature. 
Then it ends with how third study/paper of this thesis addresses some of the gaps identified in 
the prior literature.  
2.11.1. Inter-firm Networks and Innovative Performance 
In the innovative stream of the network literature, earlier studies have mainly focused on 
structural aspects of networks and consider the structure of firm networks as the most critical 
element of their environment (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Walker, 
Kogut, & Shan, 1997;). According to this view, firms’ networks of partners embed them in a 
different structural position, and they benefit differently based on how they are positioned 
within their networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Porte, 1998). 
By contrast, most recent studies accentuate the importance of not just the structural features of 
networks but also how the attributes of firms’ partners’ affect and process consideration 
influence their innovativeness (Gulati et al., 2011; Lavie, 2007; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; 
Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009; Wang & Rajaopalan, 2015). These recent studies align 
closely to the relational embeddedness perspective, which holds that the structural elements 
and the contextual aspects of the network together play an important role in firms’ 
innovativeness (Durkheim, 1951; Granovetter, 1985). It argues that understanding the 
structural and relational context of firm networks can advance our understanding of how social 
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ties shape innovative performance (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, 
Aulakh & Madhok, 2009; Wang & Rajaopalan, 2015). 
2.11.1.1. Structural Embeddedness Logic 
A large number of earlier studies on inter-firm networks have focused on the structure of firm 
networks. This early strand of the literature underscores that the structure of firms within 
networks can explain performance outcomes, that is, by position of firms within networks, we 
can determine their performance (Portes, 1998; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1992). Using social 
network analytical tools, scholars from this school though have explained the innovative 
performance of firms based on a variety of structural network features such as structural holes, 
density, size, closure, and centrality (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). Below some of the critical 
studies and insights gained from these studies are explicated. 
2.11.1.1.1. Structural Holes and Network Closure 
In the structural perspective, an extensive amount of research has been devoted to the concept 
of structural holes (Burt, 1992) and network closure (Coleman, 1988) and how they influence 
a firm’s environment and its innovative performance. The rationale for studying this is because 
networks tend to be characterised by dense clusters of strong connections, which have been 
conceptualised in the network literature as network closure or structural holes. A structural 
hole is understood as a gap between two actors or firms that influence how they access partners’ 
resources or knowledge in a network. Burt (1992) argues that the performance of firms in 
networks depends on their ability to bridge structural holes between a dense groups of partners. 
Filling structural holes reduces the redundancy in knowledge flow, and firms that bridge 
structural holes have access to more novel information, which they can use to innovate. The 
critical insight from the structural holes’ perspective is that filling structural holes facilitates 
access to novel information, which enhances firms’ innovative performance. 
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On the other hand, Coleman (1988) takes quite a different view of network structure and its 
contribution to innovative performance. He argued that locating within a dense network confers 
firms with a competitive advantage. According to Coleman, a cohesive network resulting from 
repeated ties with stable partners engender trust and facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge 
required for innovation. From the network closure perspective, the ease of knowledge transfer 
resulting from dense and cohesive network ties leads to an increase in firms’ performance. 
These two competing views on the effect of network structure have attracted huge debates and 
provoked increased empirical scrutiny among scholars as seen below. Walker, Kogut, and Shan 
(1997), for example, explore the phenomenon of structural holes and network closure in the 
biotechnology industry. They argue that the position of firms within networks should determine 
their social capital, and social capital increases with the cohesiveness or strength of firms' 
network of ties and diminishes with structural holes (Ozman, 2006). The authors show that 
network closure was a better predictor of performance than structural holes in the 
biotechnology industry. In line with Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997), Ahuja (2000) examines 
how structural holes and network closure influence firms’ innovative performance in the 
chemical industry. The author argues that firms gain two main types of benefits from networks. 
First, networks enable firms to access tangible resources such as personnel, patents, distribution 
and marketing assets. Second, from networks, firms can also access intangible resources such 
as information about major technological breakthrough and failure in partners’ technological 
development. He found that the strength of firms’ network ties improves both access to tangible 
and intangible resources and enhances their innovative performance, whereas structural holes 
enhance tangible knowledge but also increase costs thus have an adverse effect of innovation. 
In a related study, Hite and Hesterly (2001) also examined the effect of structural holes and 
network closure at different stages in the evolution of firms. Specifically, the authors looked at 
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how structural holes and cohesiveness of start-up firms’ ties influence their innovativeness as 
they move from an emergent to a growth stage. They found that at the initial phase, cohesive 
network structure was more conducive for firms’ success while as firms moved towards a 
growth stage bridging structural holes contributed more to their success. 
Other scholars have also weighed in and explored different aspects of the debate. For example, 
Gargiulo and Bennassi (2000) focus on the trade-off between trust resulting from cohesive ties 
and the flexibility resulting from bridging structural holes. Koka and Prescott (2002) postulated 
that social capital constitutes four different elements – information, volume, diversity and 
richness – and each of these dimensions’ influences firms’ innovative performance in a 
different way. Inkpen and Tsang (2005) broaden the single industry analyses that have been 
the focus of most studies by investigating networks in different settings such as strategic 
alliances, clusters and intra-firm cooperation. They showed that the efficiency of knowledge 
transfer is influenced by the nature of networks, and the different dimensions of social capital 
identified by Koka and Prescott impacts firms’ innovation differently in these networks. The 
key insights from all these studies are that the effect of network closure – the strength of ties 
and structural holes on firms' innovative performance depends mainly on the external 
environment in which firms operate. 
2.11.1.1.2. Network Density 
In the structural perspective, another important structural feature that has been examined by 
scholars is the density of firm networks. Network density has been conceptualised using a wide 
range of factors, including the composition of firm networks regarding the number of partners, 
size and diversity. Bae and Gargiulo (2004) investigated the performance of firms in the US 
telecommunication industry in terms of their alliance or networks composition and partner 
substitutability. The authors found that when firm networks are composed of large and 
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powerful partners (owner of critical resources), the cost of managing these partners may 
outweigh the benefits of the alliance. Under such circumstance, a dense network may have a 
more positive effect on innovation than a sparse network. Park, Mezias, and Song (2004) also 
found that compared to the market alliance, a technology type alliance contributes more 
towards firms' innovativeness as a measure of the number of patents than market-based 
alliances. 
In this line of literature, researchers have also examined the relationship between partners’ 
diversity and firms’ innovative performance. Beckman and Haunschild (2002) found that firms 
that are linked to partners with diverse technological and market experience outperform those 
with a less diverse set of partners. In the same vein, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) 
demonstrated that in the biotechnology industry firms that interact with a more diverse group 
of partners have higher performance than those that repeatedly engage with a single partner. 
Similarly, Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) analyse the performance of start-ups with 
respect to their alliance formation and show that diversity as a measure of network efficiency 
enhances start-up firms' performance. However, Goerzen and Beamish (2005) reached a 
different conclusion in the context of multinational cooperation. According to the authors, the 
innovative performance of multinational firms decreases when their portfolio of partners is 
composed of more diverse firms than when they are less diverse. The rationale for the 
difference in the outcome may be that managing diverse partners in an international context 
with different institutional conditions may lead to an increase in costs that may outweigh the 
benefits gained from interacting with diverse group of partners. Similar to the structural holes 
and network closure above, the conflicting results from these studies reveal that the effect of 
network diversity on performance is varied and depends on the context and environment of the 
firm. 
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Regarding partners’ size, researchers have also shown that firms’ innovative performance may 
vary depending on the size of their partners (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 
2002; Rogers, 2004; Singh & Mitchell, 2005). Among these studies, Singh and Mitchell 
(2005), Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002), Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) found a positive 
relationship between partners’ size and firms’ performance, whereas Rogers (2004) found the 
opposite result in the manufacturing industry. 
2.11.1.1.3. Centrality and Innovation 
Another important structural feature that scholars have linked to innovation is the firm’s 
network centrality. Centrality relates to the position of firms in the network. Firms occupy a 
central position in networks when they are connected to many other firms (Bonacich, 1987; 
Gulati, 1995a), and centrality increases with the number of partners to which they are 
connected (Ecols & Tsai, 2005). Inspired by the central property of the network, scholars have 
investigated the impact of centrality at the direct ties level – number of ties that firms have with 
others, and indirect ties – firms’ partners’ ties to partners. 
Ahuja (2000) showed that firms that occupy a central position in the network of direct and 
indirect ties in the chemical industry are more innovative when measured by the number of 
patents and new products they generate. The author attributes the positive effect to the fact that 
more centrally located firms are more likely to access a large pool of external resources that 
they can use to innovate. In line with the above studies, Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) 
and Hagedoorn et al. (2016) also showed that the number of biotechnology firms' partners at 
founding is positively related to their performance measure by the multiple indicators – 
revenues, R&D spending, and patent generation. The central insight from these studies is that 
the quantity of information and knowledge that firms gained from connecting with partners 
significantly enhances their innovative potential. 
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2.11.1.2. Relational Aspect as a Complement to the Structural Logic 
Although the structural features of the network contribute to firms’ innovation, the relational 
aspects are also an important facet of networks (Gulati et al., 2011). Relational aspects of 
networks relates to the attributes of the firm partners (Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, 
Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). Researchers have argued most recently that the innovativeness of 
firms within networks is affected not just by their structural position – quantity of resources 
they accrue from their partners – but also by the attributes of their partners – quality of 
resources that partners bring to the network (Gulati; 2007; Gulati et al., 2011; Lavie, 2006). 
Put differently, firms’ innovative potential is influenced not only by how they are connected 
but also with whom they are connected. The nature and source of resources they accessed from 
their network vary depending on whom they are connected to ( Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan 
& al., 2008). 
According to the relational embeddedness network perspective, because of the differential in 
the resources that firms accrue from their network, firms occupying a similar network position 
may accrue differential benefits from their networks based on the source of resources and 
knowledge (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009; 
Wang & Rajaopalan, 2015). Firms that are tied to partners with sophisticated resources or 
knowledge base are likely to benefit more from their network of direct ties than those that are 
linked to partners with a relatively weak resources base (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & 
Prescott, 2017). This suggests that research that focuses only on the structural features – 
quantity of resources – of networks without taking into account the implications of the richness 
of resources and knowledge that firms gain from the different parts of the network may not 
capture the full effects of network ties on innovation. Study/paper 3 of this thesis attempts to 
address this gap by examining how the quantity and quality of the firm direct and indirect 
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3. INDUSTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter builds on the arguments expounded in the literature review section providing the 
context for understanding this thesis. The research gaps identified in the literature review and 
the three papers addressing these gaps are explored within the semiconductor industry. The 
market and technological dynamics in the semiconductor industry may be similar to other 
cumulative industries such as electronics, computer and software, but differs from those of 
other high-tech industries such as pharmaceutical, chemical and telecommunication industry. 
The industry and market dynamics within industries may influence the degree to which firms 
engage in collaborative relationships (Grindley & Teece, 1998).  
The chapter provides a general overview of the semiconductor industry through the lens of the 
industry and market structure. Firms in the semiconductor industry use different business 
models and strategies (organisational forms) to create and capture value from their innovation. 
Chipless firms use licensing and ecosystem to appropriate value from their technology. As 
specialised firms that depend solely on licensing and ecosystem formation, the sustainability 
of chipless firms’ strategy depends on both the threats and opportunities in their external 
environment and their ability to use their internal capabilities to overcome constraints in the 
market. The opportunities and constraints in the market result from interactions of exogenous 
shocks and responses by a variety of endogenous/industry players to changes in technological, 
market, institutional, regulatory and political factors. Thus, chipless firms’ cooperative strategy 
must take into account their competitors’ strategies, customers’ and suppliers’ needs and 
general dynamic within the semiconductor industry. This suggests that to gain a better 
understanding of chipless firms’ strategy, it is important to examine the industry or markets in 
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which they operate and how they position themselves within the competitive semiconductor 
industry.  
According to Johnson et al. (2017), an industry is a group of firms producing products and 
services that are essentially the same. Industries are often made of several markets or market 
segments. A market is a group of customers that buy similar products or have needs that are 
similar to each other. The semiconductor industry is made of many different market segments 
such as networking infrastructure and servers, embedded devices and microcontrollers, 
microprocessors and system on chips. Within these segments, there are also sub and sub market 
segments. Firms in the industry occupy different market segments and position themselves 
differently in these market segments.  
This chapter thus examines the industry and market structure of semiconductor industry from 
the perspective of the central actor - chipless firms and factors that shape their long-term 
survival including the number and power of their competitive rivals, customers and suppliers, 
potential new entrants and substitutes products. It begins by providing a brief history of the 
semiconductor industry. The history is examined through the lens of the evolution of the 
industry technology. In the semiconductor industry, firms use many different organisational 
forms to commercialise technology and the aggregate structure of the industry have emerged 
as an outcome of the evolution of the industry technology. A distinct feature of the industry is 
that although throughout its history there have been many different dominant technological 
designs (paradigms), the concentration of players in the industry has remained relatively high 
compared to other R&D and technology-intensive industries such pharmaceutical, chemical 
and telecommunication (Grinley & Teece, 1998). Since its creation in the 1940s, the industry 
has been dominated by a relatively small group of leading firms (large integrated firms) with a 
large number of small firms operating at the fringe of the market. However, more recently, the 
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market shares of these leading - large integrated firms has been dwindling with small and 
innovative start-ups (networked firms) using the networked business model gaining more 
market shares.  
Next, it examines the two main organisational forms - integrated and networked model that 
industry players use to commercialise their innovation. Competition in semiconductor industry,  
is seen as a competition between these two organisational forms. It  also examines  the market 
segments that key players occupy and their market shares in the different market segments. 
This enables us to capture how networked firms in particular chipless firms position themselves 
within the industry and the implication that this may have on their competitiveness. Then, 
ARM Holdings, a leading chipless firm is used as an example to illustrate how licensing 
through ecosystem formation has enabled chipless firms to gain a competitive advantage in the 
dynamic and fast moving semiconductor industry.  
3.2. Brief History of Semiconductor Industry 
3.2.1. Birth of the Industry  
The semiconductor industry is the aggregate collection of companies engaged in the designing 
and manufacturing of semiconductor devices (silicon chips). The industry has its origin in the 
electronics and computer industry. It was launched in 1947 with the invention of the transistors 
at AT&T Laboratories (Bell Labs). The first transistor was produced in 1952 and was 
commercially used mainly in products for hearing impairment and military equipment. In 1960, 
the integrated circuit (IC) was subsequently invented and was primarily used for the radio, 
communication and space programmes (Grindley & Teece, 1987).  
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Over the past six decades since the invention of the transistors, the pace of technological 
development in the industry has been astronomical and its products are now used in almost 
every electronics device that has an on and off switch button.  
3.3. Semiconductor Industry Technology and its Evolution 
Since the creation of the semiconductor industry in the 1940s, the technology of the industry 
has evolved in line with Moore’s law, which states that the number of transistors that can be 
inexpensively placed on a chip doubles every two years (Moore, 1965). Although Moore’s law 
may have stalled now, the technology of the semiconductor industry has evolved rapidly over 
the years with one dominant design replacing another (see figure 3.1 below). These changes 
have had a huge impact on the division of labour in the industry and strategy that firms use to 
create and capture value from their innovation (Linden & Somaya, 2003).  
 
From 1940 to 1980, Bipolar Technology (PCB) was the dominant design in the semiconductor 
industry. Under the PCB paradigm, the industry was mainly dominated by large integrated 
 
Figure 3-1: Evolution of Dominant Designs in the Semiconductor Industry from 1940-2010 
 
 




firms, who controlled their entire value chain. Using an integrated mode, they design and 
manufacture products using their internal capabilities and only bring in external knowledge 
when necessary. In PCB paradigm, other organisational modes such as the networked mode 
was mostly absent (Linden & Somaya, 2003). Although the networked/licensing model was 
absent during PCB paradigm, that does not mean there was no licensing between firms, it 
mainly occurred within strategic alliances. It was typically passive and did not involve the 
sharing of know-how among firms (Grindley & Teece, 1997). 
From 1960 to 1980, a paradigmatic shift began in the industry with the invention of the 
complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology. In 1963, Frank Wanlass at 
Fairchild Semiconductor invented CMOS but the first commercial CMOS product was not 
introduced in the market until late 1970. Although CMOS technology was superior to bipolar 
technology, PCB remains the dominant technology in the industry until the early 1980s. This 
was because inventions that resulted from CMOS were far from clear, thus inhibiting the 
prospect of CMOS replacing PCB as the dominant design (Linden & Somaya, 2003). During 
this period, industry incumbents or leading large firms continue to elaborate on the PCB design, 
incrementally innovating, competing, and dominating the market with more reliable and better-
performing PCB based products. 
However, in the late 1980s, advancement in technological development led CMOS to replace 
PCB as the dominant design and ushered in a new era in the industry termed ‘‘the system on 
chips (SOC)’’. The system of chips facilitated the process through which a large number of 
transistors could be expensively placed on the same chip (Jiang, Tan & Thursby, 2011). Before 
the introduction of SOC, when many chips were placed on a PCB, it generated too much heat 
and consumed too much energy. CMOS seems to be more efficient in regulating and 
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transmitting energy when multiple chips were placed on it, which accelerated the process for 
CMOS replacing PCB as the dominant design.  
The development of the system on chips led to an increase in specialisation in the industry, 
which facilitated the entry of a large number of small and innovative firms. These new breeds 
of firms follow a slightly different model from incumbent large firms - IDMs traditionally 
design and use in-house manufacturing facilities to produce and market their chips. In contrast 
to IDMs, these start-up firms use a networked business model designing and 
licensing/outsourcing their technology to other firms especially (OEMs) who use specialised 
manufacturers - foundries or their own fab (factories) to manufacture their chips. 
3.4. Organisational Modes   
Nowadays, firms operating within the semiconductor industry use two main organisational 
modes to create and capture value from their innovation. Competition in the industry can be 
seen in the eye of these two modes of organising and commercialising semiconductor 
devices/chips: An integrated mode and a networked mode. Each of this organisational mode 
has advantages and downsides.    
3.4.1. Vertical Integrated Mode (IDM) 
A vertical integrated mode is when a firm designs and manufactures chips or integrated circuits 
(ICs) in house with little or no external licensing (Linden & Somaya, 2003). Most large firms 
(in terms of revenues and number of employees) in the industry such as Intel Corp, Texas 
Instruments, Motorola, IBM, Micron, Samsung, Toshiba, Hitachi, NEC, Infineon, Philips, 
Mitsubishi and STMicroelectronics adhere to this mode (see table 3.1 below for more 
information about these firms).  
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In this organisational mode, firms place more emphasises on designing and manufacturing 
integrated circuits internally, taking advantages of external capabilities only when necessary. 
Firms using this organisational mode generally host most of their technologies and capabilities 
in house. Rather than engaging in full blow licensing (engage in some sort of licensing here 
and there), they usually prefer to bring in new capabilities from outside through mergers and 
acquisitions (Somaya & Linden, 2003)  
 
 
Source: IPnest (May 2018).                                             Revenues and employees’ number in 2018 
 
The integrated organisational model has many advantages. Through an integrated mode, a firm 
can economise on many transaction costs that result from licensing or external sourcing of 
technology. The development of an integrated circuit requires extensive coordination and 
Table 3-1: Firm Size and Establishment Date of Top 10 Integrated Firms 
Integrated  Mode 
Integrated Device Manufacturers  
Firm Est. date Rev. 
Billion 
No.  Emp. 
Samsung 1938 210.90 320,671 
Intel 1968 70.80 107,100 
SK Hynix 1983 35.27 22,225 
Micron 1972 20.32 34,100 
TI 1930 15.78 29,714 
Toshiba 1890 10.7 141,256 
NXP 1953 9.41 31,000 
Infineon 1999 7.59 40,100 
Sony 1964 6.54 117,300 
Mitsubishi 1970 154 88,744 
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communication across different and interdependent stages of production (Adner & Kapoor, 
2010; Kapoor, 2013). The integrated mode can enable a firm to benefit from coordination 
advantages especially when there are complementarities and synergies between the design and 
production functions (Monteverde, 1995). Although, by partnering (networked mode) with 
other players a firm can develop advanced technology, such organisational arrangement is 
unlikely to match the extensive internal (intra-firm) knowledge sharing and coordination that 
an integrated mode offers in organising interdependent production tasks (Kapoor, 2013).  
In addition, an integrated mode can also offer advantages in terms of flexible as in this mode 
the firm mainly uses intra-firm design and manufacturing interfaces. Unlike in the networked 
and licensing mode, which are based on standardisation (slow and inflexible industry-wide 
standard), intra-firm interfaces can easily be adjusted to meet design and manufacturing needs.    
However, despite the apparent advantages, the organisation mode also has some drawbacks. 
First, an integrated mode assumes that the firm has all the prerequisite technology in-house to 
design and manufacture a complete integrated circuit (chip). Even when a firm can develop an 
entire chip/technology in-house without infringing the intellectual property rights of other 
firms, the inefficiencies resulting from intra-firm coordination (duplicative re-engineering) 
may still be costly and time-consuming (Kapoor, 2013; Somaya & Teece, 2001). Second, an 
integrated mode sacrifices the benefits of modularisation (well-defined design rules), and 
experimentations that may result from accessing technology from other firms and using 
alternative approaches to develop new technology. Last, the internal stability and political 
status quo that underscore coordination across design and manufacturing domains in the 
integrated mode can become a liability in the long term, especially if managers and engineers 
are not in harmony with each other. This may block the adoption of best-in-class design 
elements from outside, which have a negative impact on the firm’s performance. 
 81 
3.4.2. Networked Mode 
The networked mode consists of using the market to coordinate interdependent activities 
among partners. It enables firms to mitigate low-powered incentives of hierarchy associated 
with the integrated mode (Kapoor, 2013; Mahoney 1992; Williamson 1985). Most specialised 
firms in the semiconductor industry use the networked mode. They do not engage in 
manufacturing (do not own manufacturing facilities (fab)) but mainly use a network of partners 
to develop and commercialise their technology.  
The networked mode offers firms with many advantages. Compare to the integrated mode, the 
networked mode enables firms to invest relatively less in terms of research and development 
(R&D) to develop an integrated circuit (IC). In a network mode because each partner 
specialises on a specific aspect of the value chain, this reduces the cost of R&D required to 
develop a complete silicon chip. In addition, similar to the cost of R&D, firms draw upon a 
broader set of capabilities (designing and manufacturing) from partners to manufacture chip 
(ICs) in the networked mode, which leads to a reduction in the cost of production (Langlois 
1992, Kapoor, 2013; Sarma & li Sun, 2016; Sturgeon 2002).  
However, the network or licensing mode is also plagued with many constraints resulting 
mainly from transaction cost associated with coordinating cooperative/licensing activities 
among partners. The first source of transaction cost results from technological 
interconnectedness. In a networked model, to produce a functional product requires partners to 
adapt and integrate each other technologies. When a firm licenses its technology to partners, 
they cannot foresee in advance all issues of integration that may occur in the licensing process. 
Despite modularisation and standardisation efforts that have taken place lately in the industry, 
technological interconnectedness risks resulting from incorporating partners’ technology are 
still likely to occur, which in turn increases transactional costs associated with licensing.  
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The second source of transaction cost results from diffusion entitlement. Diffusion entitlement 
arises from the unclear nature in which IP rights are allocated to inventions in the 
semiconductor industry. Because of the cumulative nature of the industry technology and the 
complexity of uncovering firms patent rights especially when the relevant patents have not yet 
been issued,  it is usually very difficult to identify beforehand all firms that own the IP rights 
to a given technology. The ambiguity in uncovering firms’ patents means that in an event of a 
litigation parties are exposed to substantial liabilities, which enhances the transaction costs 
associated with licensing.  
Another source of transaction cost relates to uncertainties associated with commercialising 
technology. In technology licensing, it can be difficult to determine in advance the true value 
of a technology as licensing parties may associate different value to the same technology 
(Merges and Nelson, 1990, 1994). The evaluation problem is even compounded in 
semiconductor because of the multi-invention nature in which innovation takes place in the 
industry - whereby a single product may contain technologies of many firms making it difficult 
to evaluate the contribution of a single or a firm technology to a product. 
Finally, transaction costs also accrue from monitoring and metering needs of licensing 
agreements, which exacerbate the evaluation and contracting issues highlighted above. In 
technology licensing, it can be difficult to determine in advance how partners may use the firm 
(licensor) technology. Although ‘field of use’ (i.e. application, region, etc.) in the licensing 
contract may impose a restriction to the use of the licensed technology, licensees may still 
invariably use the licensor technology, which can cause unanticipated losses to the licensor.  
Despite these drawbacks, in the last two decades, there have been huge efforts in the 
semiconductor industry to reduce transaction costs associated with licensing and make the 
networked mode works. Increased modularisation and standardisation efforts have led to well-
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defined rules in designing and manufacturing, which entail that firms can engage in other value 
chains tasks without requiring a significant adjustment in their production processes. These 
efforts have made it easier for firms to engage in licensing as partners can coordinate their 
licensing activities more efficiently and thus enhancing the viability and popularity of the 
networked mode.  
Within the networked mode, there are two main models: Fabless and Chipless mode. In the 
Fabless model, firms design and outsource their technology (IPs blocks) to foundries 
(specialised manufacturers) who manufacture the technology for them. Chipless firms in 
contrast design and license their intellectual properties (IPs) to partners, who combine chipless 
firms’ IPs with their own technologies to create a complete products (IC).  
3.4.2.1. Chipless Firms and Value Chain Members 
Chipless firms are principal innovators in the semiconductor industry. Compared to integrated 
firms, chipless firms are relatively smaller in size and younger as most of them entered the 
industry after 1980 when CMOS replaced PCB as the dominant design leading to increase 
specialisation (see table 3.2 below for more information). They do not engage in any 
manufacturing but mainly use licensing and ecosystem formation to create and capture value 
from their innovation. As specialised firms that do not possess manufacturing facilities, they 
invest hugely in R& D to innovate and develop new technologies. When chipless firms develop 
a new technology, they patent and license the rights to the intellectual property to other firms. 
Their partners then use chipless firms’ IP blocks alongside their technology to develop 
advanced products that are suitable for many consumer electronics such as smartphones, 
laptops, tablets, computers, and most smart and wearable consumer electronics devices.  
Licensing enables chipless firms to work with many partners and from the partnerships; they 
form an ecosystem of independent and interconnected firms (Moore, 1986). Licensing through 
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ecosystem enables chipless firms’ technology to reach a large number of customers/markets 
quickly. By working with a large number of partners, chipless firms access a broad range of 
market information and tap into complementary capabilities of partners. Accessing up-to-date 
market information quickly enables chipless firms to develop and maintain a valuable stream 
innovation. From their ecosystem of partners, they also gain insight into the unfolding 
technological roadmap in the industry, which in turn enables them to produce new product 
generations and also enable them to decide when and whether to shift into new technological 
areas.  
Rather than designing and manufacturing products alone, chipless firms partnership model also 
enable them to reduce the cost of developing and marketing technology. Chipless firm partners 
invest in other areas of the value chain, which reduce the overall cost of R&D and production.  
Leading firms (in terms of size as a measure of  revenues and number of employees) employing 
the chipless mode include Arm Limited, Rambus, Imagination Technologies, Synopsys, 
Mosaid Technologies, Virage Logic, Silicon Image, Achronix, Verisilicon and Ceva .  
Table 3-2 : Firm Size and Establishment Date of Top 10 Firms in Each Organisational Mode. 
Integrated  Mode Networked Mode 
Integrated Device Manufacturers Fabless Firms Chipless Firms 
















Samsung 1938 210.90 32,0671 Qualcomm 1985 22.73 11,750 Arm Limited 1993 1.61 6,250 
Intel 1968 70.80 107,100 Broadcom 
  
1961 20,84 35,400 Synopsys 1986 0.62 12,590 
SK Hynix 1983 35.27 22,2254 Novatek 1994 10.00 11,528 Cadence 1988 0.18 7,600 
Micron 1972 20.32 34,100 Nvidia  1993 9.71 7,000 Imagination 
Technologies 
1985 0.12 1233 
TI 1930 15.78 29,714 AMD 1969 6.48 10,100 Ceva  1999 0.07 313 
Toshiba 1890 10.7 141256 Marvell 1995 2.86 5,200 Verisilicon 2010 0.04 275 
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Revenues and employees number in 2018.        Source: IPnest (May 2018).       
Chipless firms value chain members include partners such as EDA software suppliers, system 
integrators, specialised manufacturers - foundries, fabless firms and some integrated devices 
manufacturers. Chipless firms and partners work together to provide superior value to 
customers  (see figure 3.2 below for information on chipless firms value chain). 
Chipless Firms Value Chain Members 
3.4.2.1.1. EDA Software Suppliers 
EDA software providers are considered principal suppliers to chipless firms. The EDA segment 
emerges in the semiconductor industry at the same time that the system of chip movement 
(SoC) took off in the late 1980s (Linden & Somaya, 2003). EDA firms supply chipless firms 
with software that automates chip designing, simulation, verification and manufacturing and 
have been at the vanguard of promoting design methodologies that support licensing in the 
semiconductor industry. Their software or tool serves as a pre-test design element (basic 
building block) on which an entire chipset is constructed. The software makes it easy for 
partners to manufacture chips based on specification.   
The early players in this segment include Mentor Graphics, Synopsys, Tality, and Cadence 
Design System. These firms are still the leading firms in the segment in terms of market share 
and mainly use licensing and subscription model to create and capture value from their 
innovation.  
NXP 1953 9.41 31,000 Xilinx 1984 2.53 4,014 Achronix 2004 0.02 200 
Infineon 1999 7.59 40,100 Realtek 1987 1.51 5,997 Rambus 1990 0.05 819 
Sony 1964 6.54 117,300 Dialog 
Semiconductor 
1985 1.44 4,000 eMemory 
Technology 
2000 0.04 500 
Mitsubishi 1970 154 88,744 Media Tek  1997 0.27 1,850 Waves 
Computing 
2008 0.04 254 
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3.4.2.1.2. Foundries 
Similar to chipless firms and EDAs, foundries are specialised manufacturing firms that entered 
the semiconductor industry in the late 1980s when complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 
(CMOS) and improvement in designed software facilitated licensing and manufacturing of 
standardised chip modules. Before the entry of foundries, early-networked firms depended on 
the vertically integrated firms, who only manufactured networked firms chips using their spare 
capacities.  
The entry of foundries in the 1980s changed the competitive dynamic in the semiconductor 
industry. Foundries provide tight process integration and manufacturing services to networked 
firms and partners. Foundries possess more advanced and cutting edge manufacturing 
technology than many IDMs. Foundries and networked firms’ partnership model has increased 
the competitive pressure of IDM firms as it takes away customers who might otherwise absorb 
IDMs extra manufacturing capacities or even buy IDMs technology (Fraone, 1999). These 
changes in market and technological landscape have driven some IDMs to use either fab-lite 
model (do not offer the full range of manufacturing services available from regular foundries) 
or create their own foundry services in order to stay competitive in the industry (Smith, 1999). 
For example, AMD has spun off a new foundry division as a stand-alone company under the 
name – Globalfoundries.  
Firms from Far East Asia dominate the foundries segment. Leading firms in the segment 
include United Microelectronics (UMC) and TSMC both from Taiwan, Hua Hong 
Semiconductor and Dongbu Hitek (China) Samsung (Korea), Globalfoundries, Powerchip 
(USA) – IDM’s and Foundries.     
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3.4.2.1.3. System Integrator Firms 
System integrators are firms that assemble and market electronics end- products to consumers. 
Although some system firms possess their IC design and manufacturing facilities, they also 
exploit opportunities emerging from the networked side of the system of chips. System firms 
access IPs and software from chipless firms and EDA and manufacturing services from 
foundries. As system integrators, they used networked firms’ services to save cost and to 
differentiate their products from those of other vertical integrated firms in the industry. Somaya 
& Teece 2001, describe how Quantum Corporation, the volume leader in hard disk drives 
(HDD) in 1999 licensed a microcontroller module from Arm, a DSP module from Rambus, 
and a ‘read-channel’ module from Lucent to create a single-chip solution for its drives. This 
enables Quantum Corporation to leverage its system-level understanding and dual-source 
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Figure 3-2: Summary of Organisational Forms in Semiconductor Industry.  
This figure summarises the two organisational modes that semiconductor firms use to develop 
and commercialise technology. In the Integrated mode, firms (IDMs) involve in the entire value 
chain (designing, marketing and manufacturing). The networked mode-partnership mode, 
firms either outsource manufacturing to foundries (fabless mode) or license IP to partners 
(chipless mode)    































3.5. Drivers of Growth and Market Segments in the Semiconductor Industry  
The demand for semiconductor industry products is mainly influenced by end-user needs. 
Increased global population and rising standards of living in many part of the world has led to 
growing demands for digital devices, which contain a vast amount of ICs. In addition, the 
increased pace of technological development in the electronics industry has further provided a 
rich and large market for semiconductor products. The desire for industry players to meet this 
growing demand has spurred innovation and led to the development of new products and new 
markets, which in turns has led to semiconductor firms generating more revenues. In 2017, the 
global semiconductor industry generated a revenue of over 463.41 billion U.S. dollars and the 
industry revenue is forecasted to be in the region of about 1trillion U.S. dollars by 2030.  
Based on end-user needs and products, the modern semiconductor industry can be broadly 
classified into four main product categories (Gartner, 2017):  
1. Memory: Memory chips comprises of chips that are used for information and data 
transmission. They are heavily used in industrial products such as power supply 
equipment, bar code scanners, medical devices such as patient monitors, ultrasound 
imaging. The memory market segment has consolidated over time, driving memory 
prices low such that only very large integrated firms such as Toshiba, Samsung and 
NEC are able to compete in the segment. 
2. Microprocessors:  Microprocessors are central processing units that contain the basic 
logic for performing computational tasks. They are found in many electronics products 
such as servers, computers, printers, cars, aircrafts and other related hardware. This 
segment is one the largest market segment in the semiconductor industry. It is 
dominated by Intel Corp. The domination of the microprocessor segment by Inter Corp 
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has forced most players out of the market or into different segments or small niches 
with the exceptions of Arm Limited, Advanced Micro Devices, Broadcom and 
Qualcomm  
3. Commodity Integrated Circuit: Sometimes called "standard chips", these comprise 
chips that are used in household appliances, LCD TVs and washing machines. Large 
Far East Asian chip manufacturers such as TMSC, Foxconn and United 
Microelectronics (UMC) dominate this segment. The segment offers razor-thin profit 
margins that only the biggest semiconductor companies are able to survive in this 
market.   
4. Complex SOC:  This market segment revolves around the growing demand for small 
size consumer electronics products requiring huge power and low energy consumption. 
The production of these products takes advantage of the system on chips capability 
essentially these products are created based on integrating many integrated circuits on 
a single chip. This market is considered a growing segment of the semiconductor 
industry and it is dominated by networked or chipless firms such Arm Limited, MIPS, 
Synopsy, Imagination Technologies and RAMBUS producing low power and high 
battery life chips (RISC technology), which are suitable for small and smart electronics 
devices.   
The semiconductor industry is a highly fragmented industry with firms occupying different 
market segments and positioning themselves differently in the market. Within each segment, 
there are sub and sub segments. Competition is fierce between players in the same segment 
and among firms operating within the semiconductor industry. Innovation is seen as a key 
source of competitive advantage and firms compete on technology rather than on price. They 
use R & D investment as a strategy to maintain their dominant position in their respective 
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market segment (s) and also a mechanism to move into other market segments. Chipless firms 
invest hugely in R&D and are constantly innovating with the objective to move into other 
market segments where they possess lower market share. For example, Arm Limited, a leading 
chipless firm in the semiconductor industry has a market share almost 75% in the smartphones 
market segment but less than 5% market share in the servers and microprocessors segment. 
Arm is investing hugely into the development of chips that can serve the servers and 
microprocessors segment (www.arm.com).  
The next section examines how chipless firms compete in the semiconductor industry. To 
capture how chipless firms compete, Arm limited is used as an example to illustrate how 
chipless position themselves in the different market segments. The rationale for selecting Arm 
is because it is the largest chipless firms in term size (employees and revenues) (see table 3.3 
below)). The table illustrates that Arm Limited is the most profitable chipless firms as its 
revenues in 2018 is almost twice that of it is closest rivals Synopsys. As the world's leading 
intellectual property supplier, Arm Limited licensing and ecosystem strategy is of particular 
interest as it plays an important role in its ability to innovate and compete.  
 
Ranking (2018) Company Employees Revenues (millions) 
1 ARM 6,250  1610,9 
2 Synopsys 12,590 629,8 
3 Cadence 7,094 188,8 
4 Imagination Technologies  1,008  119.7 
5 Ceva (ParthusCeva) 313 77.9 
Table 3-3: Top Ten Chipless Firms Based on Revenues in 2018  
 92 
6 Verisilicon 420 66.3 
7 Achronix 200 52.5 
8 Rambus 819 52. 1 
9 eMemory Technology 500 47.9 
10 Waves Computing 233 41.1 
 Top 10 Vendors  2,886.0 
 Other   716.6 
 Total  3602,6 
Source: IPnest (May 2018) 
3.6. Arm Limited 
Arm Limited is one of the early players in the chipless space. It was created in Cambridge – 
UK in 1993 as a spin-off from Acorn Computer. It designs intellectual property and related 
technology and software and licenses them to other semiconductor firms. Its partners include 
most of the leading semiconductor companies (see table 3.4 below). From large integrated 
firms such as Intel, LSI Logic, Micron, Toshiba and Renesas to prominent OEMs such as 
Samsung, Apple, Huawei and other networked firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Ceva, 
Rambus and Atmel, which entails that Arm’s technology is present in most consumer 
electronics and semiconductor application products (smartphones, laptops, computers, tablets, 
wearable devices, televisions, internet of things, cars, aircrafts,  etc). Arm’s partners use Arm’s 
IP blocks alongside their own technology to produce advanced electronics products. They pay 
an upfront licensing fees and royalties (that can go for up to 25 years) for each product that 
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they produce using Arm’s technology (see figure 3.4 below). The flexibility of Arm’s licensing 
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From five forces of competition perspective, players trying to compete with Arm limited face 
high barrier to entry. To develop a new chip (the sort of chips develops by Arm) requires a 
huge amount of capital investments, which may be very expensive even for large chip 
manufacturers such as Qualcomm, Intel, Texas Instruments, Toshiba, Infineon and behemoth 
consumer electronics companies such as Samsung, Apple and Sony. Because of the huge up-
front costs required to develop a new chip, rather than developing their own technology in-
house, semiconductor firms (partners) prefer to use Arm’s intellectual properties. The high cost 
for developing chips has made Arm to become almost a monopoly in the industry. As of 2018, 
Arm had more than 1650 partners and shipped over 130+ billion Arm-based chips 
(www.arm.com). 
Similar to other chipless firms, Arm invests a huge amount of its licensing revenues into R & 
D and works closely with partners who shoulder some of the cost of developing its technology. 
By collaborating with ecosystem partners, Arm shares knowledge about its current and future 
technology, aligning its technological roadmaps with those of partners. This makes it easy for 
Arm to develop technology that is compatible with those of partners, which in turn ensures that 
Arm and partners are able to continue to build technology that is suitable for most consumer 
electronics products in the future. Arm’s partnership model means that for an entrant to enter 
the market and compete effectively with Arm (chipless firms), the entrant needs to able to 
manufacture, advertise and distribute on a large scale, suggesting significant start-up costs for 
an entrant to gain a competitive position.  
The bargaining power of Arm suppliers can be considered as low to medium. EDA software 
suppliers are chipless firms or Arm main supplier. EDA firms provided chipless firms with 
software that automates the designing, simulation and verification of chips. These tools or 
software makes it easy for Arm and partners to manufacture chip based on specifications. 
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Although EDA software plays an important role for chipless firms’ ability to license their 
technology, EDA firms are seen as complementors that work collaboratively together with 
chipless firms to provide superior value to  customers. In the semiconductor industry, there are 
a large number of EDA suppliers and most of them are relatively small in size compare to Arm, 
which entails that Arm can easily switch from one supplier to another or even buy its suppliers 
if the need arises. 
In the last five years, Arm has been building its capabilities in the area of tools and software  
automation. It has mainly built it capabilities through acquisition. In 2015, it acquired Sansa 
Security and Offspark, both providers of hardware security IP and software for advanced 
system-on-chip components deployed in Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile devices. Arm also 
bought Apical, a provider of imaging and embedded computer vision IP products and Allinea 
Software, a leading provider of software tools for HPC in 2016 (www.arm.com), thus lessening 
the bargaining power of its suppliers. 
The bargaining power of chipless firms' customers is also low as there are a large number of 
customers for chipless firms and Arm low energy and high power technology, which provides 
Arm the leeway to determine its licensing and royalty fees. In terms of threats to substitute, 
although there are many copycat producers with the ability to introduce cheaper version of 
chips or alternative products into the market, however as a threat to substitute, this is mitigated 
by the short innovation cycle in the industry making it hard for these players to survive for a 
long time.  
For the degree of rivalry, competition among firms in the semiconductor industry is extremely 
fierce. Chipless firms do not just compete among themselves (firms in the SOC market 
segment) but also with large IDMs, foundries, fabless and other electronics firms. From a 
competition perspective, one would have expected Arm main competitors to be other IP 
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suppliers (chipless firms). However, Arm feistiest competitor is Intel, a large integrated device 
manufacturer (see figure 3.5 below). Unlike Arm and other chipless firms, who use a 
collaborative business model to develop and commercialise chips, Intel uses an integrated 





Arm competes with Intel in many different market segments of the semiconductor industry 
(see table 3.5 below). In the smartphones and smart devices segment, Arm it is a leader. It 
holds more than 75% of the market share in this segment as its low energy and high power 
chips seem to more suitable for these small devices.  Arm’s main rival, Intel holds less than 10 
Figure 3-4: Illustration of Intel and Arm Business Model. 
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% of the market share. Other licensing and ecosystem players (chipless firms) also compete in 
this segment, however, together these firms hold less than 10% of the market share.  
In the microprocessors segment, Intel is the run-away leader possessing more than 85% of the 
market share, with Arm and other players having less than 10% of the market share. The servers 
and microcontrollers markets are dominated by Intel and three other large firms AMD, 
QUALCOMM and Nvidia with Arm having less than 5% of the market share (www.arm.com).  
As we can see from the analysis, Arm is a leader in one market and a follower in another 
market. Strategic rivalry between Arm and Intel is likely to intensity in the future as each firm 
try to expand into the other market segment. However, because of locked-in syndrome and 
network effect – firms (customers) are less likely to switch to competing technology- Arm and 
Intel are likely to maintain their dominant position in their respective core market segments in 
the long term. That said, going forward Arm and other chipless firms may gain market share 
especially in the servers’ market. Most servers run on Intel x86 architecture, which is based on 
high energy and high performance technology and thus consumed a lot of energy. With 
increasing concerns over climate changes, Arm low energy and high performance chips are 
likely to be attractive for the servers and networking infrastructures market segment. If Arm 
can provide customers with a significantly better price/power/performance ratio in the future 
than Intel, Arm is likely to gain market share in the servers segment.  
Another market area that Arm may grow its market share in the future is in the internet of 
things and artificial intelligence segment. Internet of things and artificial intelligence are seen 
as potential growth areas. To operationalise internet of things requires the use of a broad 
portfolios of products from different firms. Arm’s and chipless firms’ collaborative business 
model seems to be more suitable for these new growth areas, and are more likely to grow their 
market share in the long term. However, Intel as a large integrated firm with huge capital 
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reserves has the innovative potential to compete head on with Arm. Intel is increasingly 
investing in the development of new processors (Atom) particularly targeting the smartphones 
market. It is also expanding into the wearable space with new chips, which are suitable for 
smart devices. Thus, how the rivalry between Arm and Intel  places out in the long term cannot 
be determined with certainty.  
 
 
3.7. Industry and Market Structure Conclusion 
The technology of the semiconductor industry has evolved rapidly over time. Changes in 
technological development (CMOS replacing PCB as dominant designs) have facilitated the 
entry of specialised and networked firms - chipless firms. These small and innovative firms 
mainly use the licensing and ecosystem model to create and capture value from their 
innovation. Their collaborative business model enables them to reduce costs and also benefits 
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Market share % % 
Smartphones 10 75 
Microprocessors  85 10 
Servers & Microcontrollers 30 4 
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from economics of scope and scale. Chipless firms mainly compete in the smartphones and 
smart devices market segments - where their low power and high performance technology is 
most suitable - in the semiconductor industry.  Through their collaborative strategy, chipless 
firms have built their capabilities over time, as a result are more likely to move into other 
market segments such as the servers and network infrastructure segment that are currently 
dominated by large integrated firms. Chipless firms collaborative business model also seems 
to be suitable for the smart devices, artificial intelligent applications and internet of things, 
which are seen as major growth areas in the semiconductor. They are thus likely to be major 















4. RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
4.1. Introduction 
At the core of this thesis are three empirical-based studies/papers with each study responding 
empirically to a specific research question. The research methodology used in each study is 
described in details in the constituent paper. This chapter provides a general overview of the 
methodology and the basic philosophical assumptions underpinning the dissertation as well as 
depicting the link between the overall methodology of the thesis and its constituent papers. It 
also provides an explanation for the appropriateness of the research strategy and research 
design employed in the investigation. 
In addition, it highlights how data for the research are collected and describes the analytical 
techniques and tools used for analysing the data. It annunciates the unit of analysis and 
observation, research setting and sampling mechanisms used in investigating each of the 
phenomena in the thesis. The different data sources that have been used by researchers to 
investigate similar phenomenon and the strengths and weaknesses of these databases are also 
discussed. 
4.2. Philosophical Considerations in Choosing the Research Methodology 
4.2.1.  Methodological and Design Considerations 
Before embarking on a description of the research method used in this thesis, it is essential to 
illuminate the methodological considerations that were taken in account in selecting the 
research method as that may affect the outcome of the study. According to Creswell (2014), in 
order to investigate a social phenomenon, the researcher requires a plan to guide him through 
the research process. Research approaches are detailed plans and procedures that incorporate 
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the underlying philosophical assumptions underpinning the research, including data collection 
methods and how the collected data are analysed and interpreted.  
Creswell (2014) and Bryman (2016) indicated that there are three main types of research 
approaches: quantitative, qualitative and mixed method. Unlike quantitative approaches, which 
are generally associated with measurements and statistical inference, qualitative approaches 
are broadly linked to research that does not use a statistical procedure or any form of 
quantification measure to produce findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). Qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are sometimes seen as rigid, distinct and polar opposing approaches; 
however, some social science practitioners argue that such classification may be too simplistic 
as both approaches have some commonalities. Mixed approaches, on the other hand, 
incorporate both elements of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Creswell (2012) argues 
that quantitative, qualitative and mixed approaches constitute a continuum with mixed 
approaches situated in the middle of the continuum. 
From a philosophical perspective, the quantitative research approach engenders positivist 
epistemologies and ontologies (Crotty, 1998; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Creswell, 
2012) and employs a deductive theoretical framework (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). It 
incorporates the natural science research doctrines for which studying the relationship between 
and among variables is considered central to answering research questions (Crotty, 1998; 
Creswell, 2012). In this perspective, hypotheses are generated from theories and variables are 
typically measured using numbers that are analysed with statistical procedures (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011). 
In contrast, the qualitative research approach employs an inductive lens, which places emphasis 
on theory building. The approach aligns with the interpretative philosophical doctrine. It rejects 
the objectivist principles and norms of natural science and emphasises the need for the 
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researcher to participate in the interpretation of the social phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). From 
this school of thought the research process, emerging questions and data are typically collected 
in the participant(s) setting with the researcher and participants playing an integral role in 
interpreting the meaning of the data. 
Mixed method research approaches incorporate both inductive and deductive features of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. The core rationale for a mixed approach is because 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches are plagued with flaws; combining both 
approaches eliminates some weaknesses of each approach and provides greater insights into 
the understanding of a social phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). 
From a philosophical point of view, the research approach is closely associated with the critical 
realist perspective. Critical realists believe that there is neither pure objectivism nor pure 
constructionism. Unlike positivists who hold the view that the scientific representation of 
reality truly reflects that reality, realists argue that scientific conceptualisation is just a way of 
knowing that reality (Bryman, 2012). Lately the mixed approach has grown in popularity in 
the social sciences research sphere; however, some authors argue that the mixed method 
approach dilutes the core attributes and practices of quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
They assert that the use of this mosaic approach does not add much to the rigour and 
consistency of social science research (Stacey, 2007; Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
In the field of social science, it is generally agreed that many factors influence the choice of 
research approach that the researcher employs to investigate a social phenomenon (Creswell, 
2012; Bryman & Bell, 2016). The researcher’s views on knowledge (epistemology or 
paradigms) and how he/she perceives the social world (ontology or world view) influence his 
choice of research approach. Other factors such as the nature of the research problem being 
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investigated, the researcher’s personal experience and values, and the research audience also 
play a role in the researcher’s choice of research strategy (Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2012). 
This thesis is strongly grounded in the positivist sphere adopting a quantitative research 
approach and deductive lens for testing theories. The arguments for the appropriateness of 
using a quantitative approach are based on factors that influence the researcher’s choice of 
research approach as highlighted above. The preceding sections describe the role of the 
researcher’s philosophical position, the implications of his/her personal experience and values, 
and the research questions and audience on the choice of research approach used in the thesis. 
4.2.1.1. The Researcher Philosophical Position 
The researcher’s philosophical worldview (Creswell, 2012) or what other authors describe as 
epistemological and ontological position (Crotty, 1998) or paradigmatic position (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Mertens, 2010) influences the choice of research approach that he/she 
uses to investigate a social phenomenon. A worldview is a set of beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and the social world that the researcher brings to the study. These beliefs are shaped 
by the norm of practices in the research field, supervisors’ inclinations and researcher’s past 
research experience (Creswell, 2012). 
From an epistemological and ontological perspective, the positivist and interpretative view are 
considered the two main philosophical positions, although within these two main stands are 
many other variances (critical realism, phenomenological, constructivist and pragmatist, 
feminist, transformative and postmodern perspectives) (Bryman 2012). The interpretative view 
is typically associated with the qualitative research approach (Creswell, 2012). It adheres to 
the assumption that social phenomena exist within a social sphere with the researcher and 
research participants engaging in sense-making of the social experience (See Crotty, 1998; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merten, 2010; Lincoln et al., 2011). The sense-making process is based 
 105 
on their historical and cultural perspective, as human beings are influenced by the culture into 
which they are born, which means that our views of the world vary depending on our life 
experience. This suggests that the research questions or questioning should be broad and 
general to enable participants to make sense of the situation. Often subjective meanings are 
formed through social interactions, which is influenced by their cultural norms and historical 
connections. The role of the researcher from this view is to address and facilitate the interaction 
process between participants. Hence, in this worldview, the researcher and participants are seen 
as co-creators of knowledge and the subjectivity of the researcher is paramount to explaining 
the social phenomenon being studied. Studies from an interpretative perspective are usually 
context specific and do not seek to generalise to a broader audience. Rather, the objective of 
the interpretive approach is mainly geared towards theory building (see for example, Fincham 
et al., 2002; Huxham & Vangen, 2003). 
The positivist doctrine, on the other hand, assumes that social phenomena are distinct from the 
individual (observer) who observes them (Huxham & Vangen, 2003). Advocates of this 
doctrine believe that knowledge should be gained in a way that is objective and free from the 
influence of the person or individual that conducted the research. This doctrine places greater 
emphasis on the natural sciences concept of control and uses nomothetic laws and cumulative 
evidence to examine social phenomena. Scholars with this perspective study a problem by 
identifying and assessing the causes that influence outcomes using a method similar to that in 
experiments. The knowledge that results from a positivist lens is based on careful observations 
and measurements (Creswell, 2012). Thus, from the positivist approach, the research process 
generally begins with theories, with the researcher developing hypotheses and collecting data 
to support or refute the theory, then makes necessary revisions and conducts a further test to 
confirm the final outcome (Hamel, 2000; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). 
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In this study, the researcher holds a positivist view and believes that the social world should be 
studied according to the same principles, procedures and ethos as that of natural science. He 
upholds the importance of testing theory as it provides materials and direction for the 
development of concrete and testable theories. These views stem from the fact that a large 
number of studies (more than 70% of published research) in the areas of knowledge sharing, 
ecosystem and inter-firm networks are positioned within the positivist sphere. Studies in these 
areas of management research are heavily influenced by doctrines from economics, in 
particular mathematical modelling, and the pure deductive approach used in industrial 
economics (contractual and governance) and behavioural economics (ecosystems and 
networks). This study is considered part of that same doctrine. 
From an epistemological stand, unlike studies that are positioned within the interpretative 
space, the researcher assumes that objectivity is vital for knowledge creation and sees 
knowledge sharing between firms, ecosystems and inter-firm networks as objective subjects 
that can be studied irrespective of the view of the individual that observes or perceives them. 
According to the researcher, the subjectivity and bias of the observer are largely irrelevant and 
play absolutely no role in the research process, which are important criteria in qualitative and 
interpretative approaches. 
In addition, in the inter-firm collaborations (licensing, ecosystem, alliance and network) 
research areas, extant literature is well developed as scholarly discourses have been unfolding 
for a long period. The links between the different constructs of technology/knowledge sharing, 
ecosystem and inter-firm network and performance outcomes – innovation, value creation and 
value capturing – have been formalised already, and the objectives of most current studies are 
geared towards testing of prior theories. The issues of theory development or theoretical 
diversity, which are important criteria of the qualitative approach, are almost inexistent in these 
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areas of research. The current thesis is considered as part of that conversation and makes an 
incremental contribution to the scholarly discussion. 
Furthermore, the inclinations of the researcher’s supervisors for the use of robust scientific 
research approaches in investigating social phenomenon, and the support received from 
supervisors on the operationalisation of quantitative methods had a bearing on the researcher’s 
choice of research method. In addition, the researcher’s prior scientific and technical academic 
experience and familiarity with statistics and computation related programmes also influenced 
his choice of research approach. Hence, the combination of points highlighted above swayed 
the researcher towards the use of quantitative positivist approaches in investigating the role of 
knowledge sharing-licensing and networking in ecosystem development in an emerging high-
tech industry. 
4.3. Quantitative Research Designs 
The quantitative research approach has naturally been categorised as either an experiment or a 
quasi-experiment design (Bryman 2016). Because a vast majority of variables cannot be 
manipulated, experimental research in social sciences has been considered as quasi-
experimental design. It embodies most of the characteristics of experimental designs except 
for the lack of random assignment requirements. Bryman (2016) identifies a number of 
different types of quasi-experiment designs. One form of quasi-experimental design is the 
cross-sectional design often referred to as a social survey design. The cross-sectional design 
has much relevance in management and business studies. It is mostly used when the researcher 
wants to collect data or examine a phenomenon that cannot be directly observed (Bryant, 2011). 
It involves the use of many cases and the way the researcher institutes the research plan 
(respondent selection, conceptual design, administration of research instrument and analysis of 
data) is vital to the outcome of the survey. 
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Survey design mainly uses a questionnaire and structured or semi-structured interviews to 
examine the relationship between variables at a given point in time. Unlike the experimental 
design that involves the manipulation of variables, survey design does not result in the 
manipulation of any variables; inference between variables is based on the pattern of 
association. For the above reason, this type of design is more suitable for the examination of 
naturally occurring phenomenon in real-life conditions. Survey designs only show variation 
between variables and it can sometimes be difficult to infer the causative association between 
the variables. From a survey design, the researcher may be able to recognise the relationship 
between variables but cannot determine the cause of the variation. This weakness reduces the 
internal and external validity of the survey design (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). 
Another form of quasi-experiment design is the longitudinal research design. Schvaneveldt et 
al. (1998) asserted that longitudinal design is an exceptionally suitable inquiry strategy for 
studying human development and social change. It typically takes place over a prolonged 
period, which enables the researcher to determine the pattern of change in business or 
phenomenon that is being investigated. The research design is very similar to classic 
experimental design as it involves pretesting and post-testing but without the manipulation of 
variables (experimental and control group). 
Unlike the cross-sectional design, longitudinal design can provide causal inference between 
variables. Data for the research design are collected on at least two or more occasions enabling 
the researcher to identify potential changes that have occurred over time on the dependent 
variables. This allows a causative link to be inferred between the dependent and independent 
variables providing greater insight into the understanding of social events. 
This current thesis (all the studies in the thesis) is modelled on a quantitative longitudinal 
research design with the main objective to investigate the causal relationship between 
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technological sharing, ecosystem/networks and performance. The rationale for using a 
longitudinal panel data design approach is because the licensing, alliance and network fields 
are areas of research rich in quantitative data sources. Publicly and privately owned research 
organisations (e.g. SDC Thomson, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) database, 
Dataquest, REUTER, etc.) have been collecting firms’ licensing and alliance data since the 
1960s. Scholars can access these data free from publicly owned organisations and for a fee 
from commercial bodies. The availability of these multiple data sources makes it easier and 
appropriate to carry out longitudinal studies in these areas of research. 
Using multiple data sources, especially combining multiple quantitative data sources, can 
facilitate the operationalisation of variables enabling the researcher to uncover some unique 
variances, which otherwise could not be captured from a single data source. In fact, many 
researchers have advocated the use of multiple data sources, commonly denoted through 
methods such as triangulation as this has the potential to increase the internal validity of the 
research (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Creswell, 2008). Using multiple sources for data can lead not 
just to more interesting results, but also more valuable insights as the finding from one data 
source can be used to complement another (Creswell, 2008). This thesis utilises various data 
sources – including licensing and alliance data, patenting data and firms' personal attributes 
data – in a complementary way. The data sources are described below and discussed in more 
depth in the constituent studies/papers. 
4.3.1. Hypotheses Development and Operationalisation of the Dissertation 
Although this dissertation takes a quantitative research approach, whereby hypotheses are 
developed and tested using quantitative data, the researcher recognised that information about 
firms, (social science data) are messy and data alone cannot provide a holistic picture of the 
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phenomenon being studied. Unlike the linear process described above, quantitative research in 
social sciences is often based on a set of interactive processes.   
The researcher began PhD or dissertation process first by carrying out in depth archival 
research on licensing. Next, the researchers discussed some key lines of inquiries (gaps on the 
topics) with the supervisory team. Then, he interviewed experts involved in licensing of 
technology. The interviewees constitutes seven licensing and corporate directors at Arm 
Limited and three at Imagination technology (two leading IP suppliers/chipless firms in the 
UK). The interviews mainly centred around the structure of semiconductor industry, chipless 
firms licensing strategy and how they manage their licensing contracts and partners. From the 
interviews, it was clear that nature of these firms’ technology, type of licensing that they use 
to exchange their technology, and the composition of their ecosystem play a vital role to their 
performance and long-term survival. These inputs provide a thick description of the effect of 
licensing and ecosystem formation on firms’ performance and reinforced the researcher desires 
to explore the phenomenon further. 
After establishing the boundaries of the research in particular that of the first two studies of the 
dissertation, the researcher carried out follow up interviews with the directors. The hypotheses 
and data sources were also discussed with the licensing directors to ensure that data collected 
could provide a valid response to the research questions. Another round of interviews was also 
carried out to explore the implications of the empirical results.   
4.4. Unit of Analysis and Observation 
4.4.1.  Unit of Analysis 
Before describing the data source, it is essential to ascertain the unit of analysis and unit of 
observation from which the research data is collected. The unit of analysis in this research is 
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the firm level rather than the network/ecosystem/industry level, as firms are the primary entities 
involved in technology sharing and ecosystem formation. Although cooperation between 
licensing firms led to the formation of ecosystems and it is through these networks that they 
innovate and generate value from technology, the dependent and independent variables are 
measured at the firm level. The variables constitute repeated measures of firms' data. 
Further, the dependent variable (performance outcomes) do not vary within firms in the same 
ecosystem but rather across networks. Thus, employing a firm level analysis is considered 
appropriate for the research as aggregating technology sharing at an industry or network level 
may disguise significant differences in strategies used by firms. The propensity for the firm to 
engage in technological sharing and ecosystem formation may vary across industries due to the 
nature of technology and the strength of IP rights (Teece, 1987; Arora & Fosfuri, 2001; Cohen 
et al., 2001; Gans & Stern, 2001). 
4.4.2. Unit of Observation 
For the three studies/papers constituting this thesis, the unit of observation is either the licensor, 
that is, the firm offering its technology to others (licensees), or the licensee, the firm acquiring 
the licensor technology (for more details on the unit of analysis and observation see constituent 
studies). 
4.5. Research Setting and Data Sources 
4.5.1. Research Setting 
The industry setting for this thesis is Chipless firms and partners operating within the 
semiconductor industry (SIC 3674). This setting is relevant to studying the implication of 
technology sharing and ecosystems and networks formation on firms' performance for the 
following reasons. First, the semiconductor industry is considered as a complex industry 
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whereby technological development builds on prior knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). The industry is also characterised by short product lifecycles 
with high levels of research and development (West, 2002), and patenting and innovation 
activities (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), which entails that firms have to cooperate with each other 
in order to create and capture value from their technology (Adner & Kapour, 2010). Licensing 
of technology is seen as an essential component of technological development (Teece & 
Grindley, 1987). It facilitates the formation of ecosystems and networks (Macher et al., 2007; 
Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), and it is through these networks that firms innovate and capture value 
from their innovation (Teece, 1989; Linden & Somaya, 2003). 
In addition to this competitive dynamic, in the last three decades, the semiconductor industry 
has also witnessed a significant shift from vertical integration to vertical disintegration (Macher 
et al., 2007), leading to increased levels of specialisation. Chipless firms are specialised firms 
at the forefront of the development of highly efficient microchips. Their low power 
technologies are essential core elements of connected devices such as mobile phones, tablet 
computers, flat screen monitors and smart television sets and play a significant role in the 
sophisticated car and aircraft industry and the internet of things. 
Furthermore, chipless firms are considered as principal licensors in the semiconductor industry 
(Linden & Somaya, 2003). They do not engage in any manufacturing but mainly create value 
from their technology through licensing and ecosystem/network formation (Moore, 1996). 
Chipless firms’ licensing choices and composition dynamic within their ecosystems and 
networks influence their performance. Hence, chipless firms and partners operating within the 
semiconductor industry provide us with a valuable setting in which to examine the roles that 
technology sharing, ecosystems and networks have on firms' performance outcomes. 
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4.5.2. Data Sources 
The data for this thesis were collected from multiple data sources. The primary data source 
used in all three empirical studies was the Thomson-Reuter Financial SDC Platinum strategic 
alliance and joint venture database. The database was mainly used to retrieve firms’ licensing 
and alliance activities. It is considered as one of the most comprehensive data sources for large 
base empirical studies (see Anand & Khanna, 2000; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2006; Siebert, 
2010 ; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011) and has been widely used in the licensing, alliances and 
networks literature with reliable results (Ahuja, 2000b; Sampson, 2007; Hagedoorn et al., 
2008; Parachuri, 2010; Singh et al., 2016).  
Scholars have also used  other databases such as MERIT- CATI, CORE, Recombination capital 
(RECAP), and BIOSCAN to investigate licensing and cooperative strategies of firms (e.g., 
Anand and Khanna, 2000; Beck- man, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004; Folta and Miller, 2002; 
Gulati, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 
1996; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothermael and Deeds, 2004; Sampson, 2005).  
Each of these databases has its own unique set of advantages and disadvantages that make it 
better suited to some types of research than others. It is very important for researchers to 
understand these advantages and disadvantages when selecting a database and creating a 
research design as this may influence the outcome of their research.   
The coverage and completeness, in term of patterns in sectoral composition, temporal trends, 
and geographic patterns in inter-firms’ activity vary across these databases. SDC, MERIT-
CATI, and CORE cover multiple sectors. Whereas RECAP and Bioscan databases mainly 
specialise on alliances in the biotechnology sector. SDC captures and reports a very wide scope 
of alliances, including joint ventures, strategic alliances, research and development (R&D) 
agreements, sales and marketing agreements, manufacturing agreements, supply agreements, 
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distribution pacts and licensing agreement (unilateral and cross licensing deals).  A strength of 
the SDC is that it is very searchable, with over 200 data elements, including coded fields and 
keyword searches. It is very user friendly (has a user-defined output), which makes it easy to 
use in large-scale analysis. Although the SDC collects inter-firm collaboration activities on 
wide range of industries, research and technology alliances (those that entail some aspect of 
joint research or cross-technology transfer) account for roughly half of the alliances reported 
on the database including many in less developed countries from 1990-2005. One weakness of 
the SDC is that some data elements have many missing values and it very Anglo-Saxon 
oriented.  
MERIT-CATI covers a fair number of sectors with the bulk of alliances being research and 
technology alliances. It utilises retrospective data collection method incorporating data as early 
as 1960. However, the database contains very limited information about the alliance deals and 
it is bias toward English-language source.   
CORE is another multiple sectorial database. It contains a large population of the agreement 
filed under the NCRA Act. and highly reliable for this population.  It is explicitly United State 
Focused. An advantage of the database is that if the researcher wants to cross check the 
information on the database with other sources it is possible to obtain the original documents 
filed with each agreement through the Federal Register. Although the data goes back to 1985, 
a disadvantage of the dataset is that NCRA collaborations are limited to very small subset of 
the collaboration activities struck between U.S. firms.  
Recombinant Capital (RECAP) focuses solely on biotechnology and provides a great deal of 
information on individual alliance agreements.  It reports alliances that go far back as 1973. It 
has a very searchability user-friendly interface with both keywords and coded fields. Some of 
the weaknesses of the database are that output options are limited, making it difficult to use for 
 115 
large-scale analyses. In addition, it is heavily focused on U.S. SEC filings, which may cause 
U.S. firms to be overrepresented on the database.  
Bioscan also focuses only biotechnology alliances.  It tracks activities of a stable set of firms, 
permitting better longitudinal assessments of the firm’s behaviour. It also provides a detail 
profile of each firm, including key employees, major products, business strategy, and stock 
history. Patenting data also available on the database, which is helpful when researchers are 
analysing the performance outcome of firms. A disadvantage of the database is that it is 
searchable only with key words (not codes) - makes searching less reliable. 
This dissertation uses the SDC database as main data sources. The database seems to be more 
appropriate for studying licensing as Anand & Khanna (2000) indicate that licensors and 
licensees are generally correctly identified in the database. Shilling, (2008) and Gilsing, 
Belderbos, & Jacob (2013) highlight that the SDC database codes more indicators on 
cooperative agreements and technology alliances than the MERIT-CATI and CORE databases. 
These indicators offer researchers with the opportunity to operationalise a large number of 
variables. 
Shilling, (2008) also conduct a comparative analysis of these databases from 1990 to 2005 
(similar to the period used in this dissertation), examining their coverage, trends in sectoral 
composition, alliance activities over time, and geographical participation of firms. She 
concluded these databases exhibit strong symmetries in factors and the results from these 
databases seem to be reliable for many—if not all—research purposes. The study also indicates 
that among these large databases, findings from studies especially those on technology 
alliances that use SDC seem to be more reliable. Empirical studies using the SDC as data source 
were most commonly published in top strategy journals (Academy of Management Journal, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Management Science, Organization Science, or Strategic 
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Management Journal) followed by Bioscan, MERIT-CATI and RECAP. From a data 
perspective, Shilling (2008) study provides thus some assurance that findings from this 
dissertation are more likely to be reliable.  
Another important source of data was the NBER patent database. The database was mainly 
used to retrieve firms’ patents. Patent has been widely used as an indicator for the firm 
innovation performance in the licensing and network literature (Abuja, 2003; Sampson, 2005; 
Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Griliches; Parachuri, 2010; Phelps, (2010); Singh et al., 2016; 
Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011; Lavie, 2007; Trajtenberg, 1987; 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993). The 
National Bureau hosts the NBER patent databases for Economics Research. The databases 
contain patent information from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European 
Patent Office (EPO), and other key patent jurisdictions in the world, such as Japan, China, 
South Korea and Australia. It provides information on the total number of patents granted to a 
firm, that is, the parent company including those of all its subsidiaries. It also reports the 
number of citation counts made and received by each patent, its technological class and 
subclass, as well as a wealth of other relevant information. For this thesis, the researcher mainly 
used the database containing patents’ information from the USTPO only to measure the 
innovation performance of firms. This database comprises detail information of almost 26 
million U.S. patents granted between January 1963 and December 2005, all citations made to 
these patents between 1975 and 2005 (over 36 million), and a reasonably broad match of 
patents to Compustat (the data set of all firms traded in the U.S. stock market). Many scholars 
have also used only US patents to capture firms’ innovation performance. Similar to NBER, 
scholars have also used commercial databases that compiled patents from USTPO records 
including TotalPatent -LexisNexis, PatBase - Minesoft, Orbit- Questel, Derwent Innovation – 
Clarivate, WIPS Global -WIPS, Patseer – Gridlogics, Ambercite, PatSnap.  Research has 
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shown that these databases exhibit strong similarity in terms of coverage, patterns of sectoral 
composition and number of firms and the results from these databases seem to be reliable for 
many—if not all—research purposes. Some scholars have created their own patent datasets 
from the USTPO. Retrieving patents from the USTPO patent database yourself is laborious 
process with high risk of errors and mistakes. Commercial databases retrieve and clean patent 
data using sophisticated search and analysis tools. They provide a more enhanced and 
improved classification/indexing systems, which make it much easier for researchers to count 
and visualise patents. 
In addition to central databases, firms' personal attributes data was also retrieved from 
DataStream, Compustat – Capital IQ, Amadeus, LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Bureau van Dijk, IHS 
Global Insight, Research Quotient and firms' websites, annual accounts and other web and 
business directories to complement the other data (for a detailed description of these databases, 
see the research method section in the constituent studies). 
4.5.3. Description of the Data  
The researcher initially retrieved 4,980 licensing deals of firms operating in the broader 
electronics industry (using the two digits SIC (36)) from 1985 to 2005. The researcher then 
refined the sample by focusing on licensing arrangements in which at least one of the principal 
participant lines of business is the semiconductor and related devices (SIC 3674) on the 
contextual description of the licensing deal. From this refinement, 3,231 semiconductor firms 
and 1,556 licensing agreements were obtained. From the list of semiconductor firms, the 
research focused on all licensing agreements signed by chipless firms and partners. From this 
selection, the researcher obtained 458 licensing agreements signed by 635 chipless firms from 
2005. Of the 458 licensing agreements, approximately 91% were unilateral licensing, while the 
remaining 9% were cross licensing.  
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The research also used searched through almost 26 million patents on the NBER database to 
identify  patents of  chipless firms and partners (For further information on how the data was 
collected and refined, see constituent papers).  
 
Table 4-1: Total number of Licensing deals and Patents Granted to Top 10 Chipless firms. 
 
Chipless Firm No of Licensing No of patents 1985–2005 
ARM Holdings PLC 30 1770 
MIPS  30 599 
DSP Group Inc 
 
25 321 
Rambus Inc 20 3152 
LSI Logic Corp  18 13132 
SRS Labs Inc  15 78 
General Instrument Corp 12 1796 
Silicon Storage Technology In 11 67 
Tessera Technologies Inc 11 248 
Synopsys Inc 10 659 
Aware Inc 10 142 
Cyrix Corp 10 209 
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Silicon Image Inc 9 67 
Atmel Corp 9 2048 
Integrated Silicon Solution 8 130 
 
4.6. Data Analysis Technique 
With regard to data analysis and interpretation, before collecting data it is essential for the 
researcher to consider the analytical approach/technique to be used in analysing said data as 
this could affect the interpretation of data and thus the outcome of the research (Bryman, 2016). 
Each of the empirical studies in this dissertation investigates a unique phenomenon in its own 
right and uses a specific statistical tool or analytical technique to make sense of the collected 
data. Analytical techniques are based on specific assumptions and procedures, which influence 
how data is analysed and results are interpreted. 
Study/paper 1 examined the conditions under which firms prefer to exchange technology 
through either cross or unilateral licensing. A logistic regression technique was employed to 
determine the likelihood of licensors choosing between unilateral and cross licensing to 
exchange technology. Other contingency techniques such as Probit could have been used to 
analyse the licensors licensing choices; however, Probit and Logistic models rest on similar 
assumptions and generally lead to the same outcomes. The Probit method was used to check 
the robustness of the research findings and results seem to be consistent with those of the 
Logistic regression model. 
Study 2 investigated how actors and technological ecosystem complexity influence focal firms' 
value creation. The random effects panel negative binomial regression model was used to 
analyse the data. Other count specific models, such as the Poisson regression models could 
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have been used to analyse the data but were not deemed suitable because of overdispersion in 
the dependent variable (resulting from excess zero in the independent variable) (Baltagi, 2005). 
Study 3 explored how the quantity and quality of ties affect the innovative performance of 
firms. It measured the innovative performance of firms using their citations weighted patent 
counts. As the dependent variable is count variable it uses the random effects panel negative 
binomial model to analyse the data. All the statistical analyses were carried out using 
procedures in Stata. The data collection mechanisms and analytical techniques are described 
in details in each empirical study, and a summary is provided in the following section. (For 














5. INTER-FIRM TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE THROUGH 
UNILATERAL OR CROSS LICENSING: EVIDENCE FROM 
CHIPLESS FIRMS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY1 
5.1. Abstract  
The characteristics of firm and those of partners are important factors for the firm’s preference 
for either cross or unilateral licensing. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the licensor’s 
absolute and relative technology and market diversification, past licening experience and firm 
size the licensor’s licensing preference. Using data of Chipless firms operating in the 
semiconductor industry from 1985 to 2005, we find that  with higher levels of diversification, 
licensors tend to prefer to engage in bilateral exchange rather than unilateral licensing. When 
licensors are less diversified than licensee, licensors are more likely to prefer to engage in cross 
licensing as the licensing mechanism enables them to alleviate the effect of increased 
competition. The study also shows that licensors’ experiences in cross and unilateral licensing 
are important determinants for the licensing agreement that licensors prefer to use for 
exchanging technology in the future. Moreover, the licensor’s licensing preferences is shaped 
by the magnitude of competition that it faces from licensing its technology to partners of 
different sizes. These findings have important managerial implications as the licensing choice 
that licensors use to exchange technology influences the amount of rents they can extract from 
their technology and the competitiveness or the very survival of licensors. 
 
1 As mentioned in the Introduction, the paper on which this chapter is based received a best 




Keywords: Technology licensing preference, unilateral licensing, cross licensing, partnership, 
learning, and competition. 
5.2. Introduction  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, firms (especially those in high-tech industries) used 
their technology in-house to gain competitive advantages vis-à-vis their competitor. In more 
recent decades, cost, complexity and speed of technology development have dramatically 
changed the way firms organised their R&D and related innovative activities (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). These changes have led an increasing number of firms to 
bring in new technologies from outside the firm boundary (Chesbrough, 2003) and have 
broadened the market for intellectual property (IP) (Arora & Forfuri, 2003). Firms increasingly 
use many third-party arrangements, such as mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures, and R&D collaborations but also licensing which is considered one of the most 
important business arrangement that firms utilise to transfer and generate rents from their 
technology through IP (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Teece, 1986).  
Licensing agreements are widely categorised into unilateral and cross licensing (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000). Unilateral licensing occurs when a licensor offers its technology to a licensee 
(s). It enables the licensor to raise revenues from technology, but also expose its technology to 
other firms. Cross licensing is a bilateral exchange between two firms; it enables both licensing 
parties to access each other's technology and provides both licensor with the opportunity to 
restrict the number of firms with access to its technology to a single partner. Given these 
options, from the licensor’s perspective, in order to maximise the value of its technology and 
to stay competitive, it is important to select the appropriate licensing agreement to exchange 
its technology (Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Teece, 1986). 
 123 
Given the risks and potential benefits of unilateral and cross licensing, several studies have 
empirically examined the determinants for firms to engage in the different types of licensing 
agreements (Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). Earlier studies explained the 
licensing preference of firms based on either the variation in the characteristics of licensors 
(Kim & Vonortas, 2006a; Motohashi, 2006; Somaya et al, 2010) or the characteristics of 
licensees (e.g Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Laursen et al, 2010; Lowe & Taylor, 1998). However, 
Kim and Vonortas, (2006b) argue that many of these earlier studies adopt a rigid firm level 
perspective, which assumes that the characteristics of licensing partners are constant across 
firms and have no effect on the licensor/licensee’s licensing preference. 
More recently, researchers have challenged this rigid firm level focus by suggesting that firm 
characteristics and licensing partner characteristics together determine licensing preference and 
call for a better understanding of these characteristics (Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Kim & 
Vonortas, 2006b; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006).  For example, Siebert and Von Graevenitz (2010) 
show that with increasing rivalry in the technology marketplace, firms tend to prefer to cross 
license their technology as this enables them to alleviate the effect of competition and 
uncertainty in the long term. Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) find that the licensing contingency 
between two firms is mainly influenced by the size of the potential licensor and the larger the 
licensor size in terms of its technological capabilities, the higher the licensor preference for 
cross licensing. 
In this paper, we extend these studies on pair level characteristics along the following 
dimensions. First, we investigate how the degree of diversification from the perspective of a 
focal licensor and the differences between the licensor and its licensee influence the licensing 
preference of a licensor. The degree of diversification offers firms a different advantage that is 
considered of greater importance and a more informative determinant for their licensing 
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preference than the firm size that has previously been examined in much of the literature 
(Markides & Williamson, 1994). A large firm may operate in a single market whereas a multi 
markets presence enable a firm to produce patents in a broad range of industries and enhance 
the quality (breadth and depth) of its patents that can be used for both cross and unilateral 
licensing. Further, the number of markets and field of technology in which firms operate 
accelerates their learning potential (ability to absorb externally acquired knowledge and 
develop new products (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989)), which shorten the time to market and 
competitive advantages vis-à-vis other firms (Gimeno & Woo, 1999). We argue that at the firm 
level (the licensor characteristics), the capabilities that firms accrue from operating in multiple 
markets and field of technology and the imperative to capitalise on the benefits of these 
capabilities determines their licensing preference. At the pair level, we highlight that 
differences in the licensing pair degree of diversification (in terms of markets and technology) 
determine the magnitude of competitive pressure that licensors face and subsequently the 
licensing type that they choose to capture value from their technology. 
Second, we examine the effect of the licensor’s prior cross and unilateral licensing experiences 
and differences in the licensing pair experiences for both types of licensing agreements on the 
licensor’s licensing preference. Earlier studies on licensing have traditionally conceptualised 
the firm licensing experience at a broader level (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kim & Vonortas, 
2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). Although this traditional characterisation of experience in 
terms of knowledge that firms gain from engaging in licensing is useful, it is incomplete as 
cross, and unilateral licensing are different focal activities and the experience that firms accrue 
from both licensing types varied. We provide an explicit explanation for the roles that the 
licensor prior cross and unilateral licensing experience play on licensing agreement that it uses 
in the future. Lastly, we re-visit the effect of the firm size to ascertain the findings in prior 
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literature (Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006), by adding a new dimension to the 
analysis, i.e., the implication of the licensor size relative to the licensee. In contrast to prior 
works, our study indicates that the licensor size vis-à-vis the licensee may be a better predictor 
for the licensor’s licensing preference than the licensor/licensee absolute firm size per se.  
We explore a set of hypotheses related to the above, using Chipless firms operating in the 
global semiconductor industry from 1985 to 2005. Chipless firms setting provides an ideal 
setting to examine the effect that the licensor’s characteristics and licensing pair differential 
contingencies have on the licensor’s licensing preference. They are considered principal 
licensors in the semiconductor industry. Chipless firms do not engage in any manufacturing 
but primarily use cross and unilateral licensing as the primary mechanisms to capture value 
from their innovation. As specialised firms that depend solely on cross and unilateral licensing, 
the licensing type that they select to exchange their technology is critically important. It 
influences the amount of value that they capture from their innovation and hence has a 
profound implication on their very survival. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly describes the major 
features of unilateral and cross licensing. Then we provide the theoretical background for 
explaining the effect that the firm’s characteristics and licensing pair or contract level 
contingencies have on the licensor licensing preference and formulate our testable hypotheses. 
The following section describes the empirical setting, data collection methods and statistical 
model used in analysing the data. The last section deals with the discussion of the results and 
conclusion with possible areas of future research. 
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5.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
5.3.1. Major Features of Unilateral and Cross Licensing 
In most high-tech industries, firms can choose either unilateral or cross licensing to exchange 
and capture value of their technology (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Arora, & Fosfuri, 2003; Arora 
& Gamberdella, 2010; Ruckman & McCarthy, 2016; Teece, 1986). Unilateral and cross 
licensing offer the licensor's the opportunity to capture value from its technology but also entail 
a certain degree of risks. The risk arises mainly from the possibility of licensees assimilating 
the licensor technology and developing products that can better serve the need of the licensor’s 
customers (Fosturi, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006; Sibert & Von Graevenitz, 2010), and from 
opportunistic behaviours of licensees (Teece, 1986). This has the potential of increasing the 
number of players with similar technologies and intensify competition in the relevant markets. 
However, as the nature of unilateral and cross licensing differs and they carry different degree 
of risks and benefits to the licensor’s, this impacts the amount of rents that a licensor’s can 
extract from its technology. 
Unilateral licensing constitutes a one-way transfer of technology from a licensor’s as the owner 
of technology to the licensee (s) as acquirer of technology. When a licensor unilaterally licenses 
its technology to a licensee, the licensing arrangement offers the licensor with the option to 
gain revenues in the form of a fixed fee and/or royalty depending on the codified legal term of 
the contract (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). As the supplier of technology, the licensor can opt for a 
fixed fee only option or it can choose a mixed licensing fee option containing a lump sum and 
royalties based on the sale of the licensee final product to which its technology has contributed. 
A firm may unilaterally license its technology to instate it as the defacto standard, especially 
in industries where externality is important for commercialising technology (Gallini, 1994). 
By working with many partners, the licensor’s can reap greater rewards and installs its 
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technology as the defacto standard especially in the industries where externality is important 
for commercialising technology (Gallini, 1994). By working with many partners, the licensor 
can reap greater rewards and install its technology as the defacto standard in the industry.  
However, unilateral licensing with a large number of partners has the downside of bolstering 
the technological capabilities of these partners (Movery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996). Through  
working with the acquired technology, licensees can gain valuable knowledge and develop 
new products and processes that can rival the licensor’s technology. This has the potential of 
increasing the intensity of competitive pressure in the relevant technology markets (Fosfuri, 
2006) especially if licensees operate in multiple markets or are larger players capable of quickly 
assimilating the acquired technology speedily. 
Cross licensing agreement occurs when two firms grant each other the right to access the other's 
technologies (Gallasso, 2012). Cross licensing usually involves the exchange of a portfolio of 
patents between the licensing parties. It can be a mutual exchange when both parties' patent 
portfolios are considered equal enough not to require any extra compensation or royalty fee. It 
can also be accompanied by a fixed fee and royalty depending on the relative strength and 
quality of the patent portfolio of the engaging parties (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Telsio, 1979). 
Cross licensing enables the engaging parties to broaden their technological base and enhances 
their knowledge of the state of the art of technology in the industry. In a complex industry 
setting, whereby technological development is based on fast-moving knowledge and diffusion, 
cross licensing is of strategic importance (Grindley & Teece, 1997). It provides both partners 
with the freedom to use their partners' technology, avoiding the risk of lengthy negotiation and 
costly litigation. In terms of competitive risks, unlike unilateral licensing that contains the risk 
of bringing in a number of new players in the market, through reciprocity in cross licensing 
agreement resulting in effect a situation hostage, each licensor’s can curtail the number of firms 
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with access to its technology through cross licensing (Fosfuri, 2006). Bilateral exchange of 
technology through cross licensing provides an equal chance for the engaging parties to learn 
from each other reducing the risk of the licensor losing out to its licensing partners. 
5.4. Determinants of Licensor’s Licensing Preference 
To disentangle the relationship between the licensor characteristics, the licensing pair 
characteristics and licensor’s licensing preference; we draw knowledge from the technology 
licensing literature, resource-based theory, and absorptive capability (AC) literature. In most 
high-tech industries, variations in firms’ licensing preference have been attributed to the 
characteristic of the firm (Gambardella et al., 2007; Kim & Motohashi, 2012; Kim & Vornotas, 
2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). In addition, the licensor internal resources and the absorptive 
potential of the licensee have been shown to influence firms’ licensing decisions (Arora et al., 
2003; Fosfuri, 2006). 
Regarding the licensor characteristics, larger firms and firms that operate in multiple markets 
benefit from several advantages such as a steep learning curve, substantial market power, and 
complementary resources, which enhance their ability to exploit technology (Walter, 2012). 
However, large firms also suffer from several disadvantages such as core rigidities, highly 
complex managerial control system and bureaucratic inertia that compared to small and less 
diversified firms can constrain their ability to successfully explore innovation (Gambardella et 
al., 2007; van Wijk, Walter, 2012). These advantages and constraints that are associated with 
firms of different sizes, different degree of diversifications and also diverse experiences 
influence the licensing preferences of firms.  
Based on a firm’s internal capability and absorptive potential, the licensee’s ability to absorb 
and utilise externally acquired knowledge facilitates the ease at which it can generate new 
technology from the licensed technology and enter the licensor’s market (Cohen & Levinthal, 
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1990). Whereas the licensor’s internal capabilities facilitate its ability to generate new products 
in a timely fashion, the speeds at which the licensor can generate new technology can mitigate 
the adverse effect of new players entering its market. Hence, the joint effect of the licensee’s 
absorptive capabilities and strength of the licensor’s internal capabilities determine the 
potential benefits and risks that the licensor’s will face through licensing.  Drawing on these 
insights in terms diversifications, size, and experience and its relative characteristics vis-à-vis 
its partners (licensor/licensee) play in shaping the licensor’s licensing preference. 
5.4.1. Licensor Absolute and Relative Technology Diversification 
Diversification is generally referred to as the number of technologies, product lines or markets 
that a firm operate in (Ansoft, 1966; Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Porter, 1985). Many prior studies 
in strategic management have highlighted the benefit that firms accrue from operating in 
multiple markets (Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1985). According to this body 
of literature, firms that operate in multiple markets can exploit synergies across markets by 
consolidating business activities in manufacturing, raw material purchases, marketing, and 
distribution, thus achieving both economies of scale and scope (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Rumelt, 
1982). In addition to cost saving and learning efficiencies, compared with single market firms, 
firms with multiple markets presence, generally possess superior market power and resources, 
which enable them to create new markets, manufacture and sell their products quickly (Amit 
& Livnat, 1988)  
From a technological perspective, Freeman and Hannan (1983) point out the advantages that 
firms gain from operating in multiple technological areas. Firms with diverse technological 
resources are more likely to develop more advanced capabilities and novel technologies than 
those operating in a narrow technological space. Merges and Nelson (1990) indicate that more 
technologically diverse firms often engage in riskier projects than those with a single 
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technological scope, which enriches their chances of developing new and innovative 
technology. 
Scholars have also highlighted that firms with multi-markets presence firms invest more in 
basic research than applied research, which enhances their possibility to develop the sort of 
advanced technology that other firms may seek to license (Ahuja & Lambert, 2001; Hill, 1992; 
Markides & Williamson, 1994). In a similar line of thought, compared to less diversified firms, 
more diversified firms engage in multiple networks and are often at the nexus of these 
networks. The network position or network structure of more diversified firms enable them to 
access a vast range of knowledge and information, which they can use to innovate (Freeman 
& Soefe, 1997; Miller, 2006). 
These different literatures suggest that firms accrue advantages from operating in multiple 
markets and using diverse knowledge and technology sources. Compared to less diversified 
firms, technology from more diversified firms is more likely to provide greater exploration and 
exploitation opportunities to licensing partners (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Merger & 
Nelson, 1990; Sears & Hoetker, 2014). In comparison, unilateral licensing from more 
diversified licensors to other firms will only help to strengthen the technological capabilities 
of these licensees and apart from generating additional income, will contribute little or no 
potential value to the licensor with multi-markets presence licensors. Cross licensing, however, 
will offer diversified licensors the opportunity to share and access new external knowledge and 
technologies that enhances their ability to reap more value in combination with their existing 
technology (Chatterji, 1996). Given the different benefits and potential damages of unilateral 
licensing and cross licensing, we expect more diversified firms that act as licensors to have a 
higher preference for cross licensing rather than for unilateral licensing. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 1a: The higher the levels of diversification for the licensors, the more likely these 
licensors prefer cross licensing to unilateral licensing. 
To understand how licensing pair technology diversification differentials affect the licensor’s 
licensing preference, we confine our analysis on the competitive risks that the licensor’s run 
when its partners assimilate its technology and enter into its market (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; 
Fosfuri, 2006; Motohashi, 2006; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006). According to Fosfuri (2006) and 
Nagaoka & Kwon (2006), the magnitude of the competitive pressure that the licensor will face 
in licensing varies depending on the absorptive capability of its licensing partners. In addition, 
Motohashi (2006) asserts that differentials in licensing pair’s absorptive capabilities shape the 
amount of the value that the licensor can capture from licensing.  
From an organizational learning perspective, the number of technologies and markets that firms 
operate in affects their learning and absorptive capabilities (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 
1991; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen et al., 2010). Increased levels of diversifications can 
positively affect new technology development or the firm’s absorptive potential in a number 
of ways. Increased levels of diversification can positively affect new technology development 
or the firm’s absorptive potential in a number of ways. First, learning from multiple sources 
and using the same knowledge repeatedly in multiple markets increases firms learning cyclical 
learning and enables them to develop more reliable routines and efficient innovative structures 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). By developing organisational routines that are more efficient, 
firms that are present in multi-markets can more easily assimilate externally acquired 
knowledge and later on develop their own proprietary knowledge (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
Second, using similar technology repeatedly in multiple markets enables more diversified firms 
to develop a deeper understanding of their knowledge base.  
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The above highlights that with increasing levels of diversification, firms become more efficient 
in absorbing and utilizing external acquired technology. It also suggests that when firms with 
different levels of diversification enter into a partnership, more diversified firms as licensors 
are less likely to suffer greater competitive risks from partners using their technology as a 
springboard to generate products and/or technologies that can better serve the needs of their 
customers (Laursen et al., 2010; Arora et Forfuri, 2003). In that context, a licensor and its 
licensee(s) are less likely to be in direct competition across the board (Tripsas, 1997). 
In an alliance context, the extent to which a firm’s technological resources are diverse may 
influence the behaviour of its alliance partner. It is argued that asymmetric learning between a 
firm and its partner about each other’s resources and technologies may increase uncertainty of 
partner behaviour and influence alliance performance (Khanna et al., 1998). For instance, when 
a partner can learn more quickly about a focal firm’s technological knowledge than the focal 
firm can absorb its partner’s knowledge, the focal firm is likely to be cautious about transferring 
its technology to its partner (Khanna et al., 1998). Hamel (1991) argues that the potential for 
increased competition among partners raises concern for firms to transfer their technology to 
partners for fear of making them strong competitors.  
When a more diversified firm is a licensor to a less diversified firm, we expect the licensor to 
face less competitive risk in the marketplace from unilateral licensing.  Although one-way 
technology transfer from a more diversified licensor to a less diversified firm may upgrade the 
licensee’s technological knowledge base, the latter may not be able to generate a broad range 
of new products from the licensed technology in a speedy manner because of its limited breadth 
in absorptive capability. When compared to its licensee, more diversified licensor has a greater 
incentive to engage in unilateral licensing, as before its less diversified licensee partner can 
integrate the licensed technology into its production structure, the more diversified licensor can 
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take full advantage of its technology (Zhang & Baden-fuller, 2010) and reduce the potential 
negative effect of unilateral licensing (Arora et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, unilateral licensing to a more diversified partner may be considered a riskier 
strategy for the licensor. A more diversified licensee can easily utilize the licensed technology 
to develop products and services that are similar to those of the licensor, enhancing competition 
in the marketplace.  Thus, to avoid the risk of creating a stronger potential competitor and 
losing out its competitive edge when the licensing agreement expires (McDonald and Leahey, 
1997), the licensor may be better off to enter into a cross licensing agreement. Unlike unilateral 
licensing, bilateral exchange provides equal opportunities for the licensing partners to learn 
from each other’s technological knowledge base, neutralising the risk for the licensor to lose 
out to the licensee. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1b: In the context of licensing pair diversification differentials, when licensors are 
more diversified than licensees, the more likely licensors prefer unilateral license to cross 
licensing. 
5.4.2. Licensor’s Experience with Cross and Unilateral Licensing  
In prior licensing literature, a firm’s licensing experience is considered as a critical determinant 
for its licensing preference (Gambardella et al., 2010; Kani & Motohashi, 2012, Kim & 
Vornotas, 2006; Motohashi, 2008; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006;). However, the analysis of the 
firm licensing experience has mostly been carried out in the context of licensing in general. In 
this study, we delve a bit deeper in analysing the impact of licensors’ prior cross and unilateral 
licensing experience on their licensing preference. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that firms 
learn or build their experience through repeated engagements in similar focal activity over 
many years. Through cumulative involvements in an activity, firms develop efficient 
organisational routines and standard operating procedures (Pisano, 1996) and consequently 
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gain specific knowledge and skills on how to execute a particular activity. The accumulated 
knowledge greatly simplifies the coordination of that activity and reduces costs, especially in 
managerial attention and resources needed to carry out the focal activity (Rothaemel & 
Thursby, 2005). Because of the acquired knowledge, firms are more likely to draw on the 
accumulated experience for future engagements (Cohen &Levinthal, 1989). 
Unilateral and cross licensing are considered unique focal activities and firms use each of the 
licensing agreement for specific reasons. As seen in the above, the characteristics of cross 
licensing differ from that of unilateral licensing in many respects: the mode of governance, 
control of partners and long-term risks and contribution to profit. As a specialised focal 
activity, this implies firms’ that engage extensively in cross licensing would have developed 
more in-depth knowledge for the licensing type and are more likely to prefer to choose the 
licensing arrangement in the future. For example, because of the complexity in assessing the 
value of different patent packages of partners, especially in complex technology industries 
whereby technological development builds on prior activities, firms that frequently engage in 
cross licensing would have built up managerial capabilities and expertise needed to assess 
partners’ patents. These firms are more likely to have a greater cross licensing experience as 
the licensing and when faced with the prospect of future licensing; these firms are more likely 
to use the licensing type for which they possess extensive experience.  
Licensors with greater cross licensing experiences would have a higher preference for that 
licensing type, as they are likely to face fewer difficulties in coordinating the licensing 
arrangement in the future than licensors with less experience. In a similar vein, licensors’ that 
have used unilateral licensing extensively would have a higher preference to license their 
technology unilaterally. Moreover, we expect that when licensors possess greater cross or 
unilateral licensing experience than their licensees, i.e. when the licensor is the more 
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experienced partner, these licensors are more likely to prefer the licensing type for which they 
possess greater experience. The above suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 2a: The greater the unilateral licensing experiences of licensors, the more likely 
licensors prefer unilateral licensing to cross licensing. 
Hypotheses 2b: The greater the cross licensing experience of licensors, the more likely 
licensors prefer cross licensing to unilateral licensing. 
Hypotheses 2c: In the context of licensing differentials, the greater unilateral licensing 
experience of licensors, the more likely licensors prefer unilateral licensing to cross licensing. 
Hypotheses 2d: In the context of licensing differentials, the greater cross licensing experience 
of licensors, the more likely licensors prefer cross licensing to unilateral licensing 
5.4.3. Licensor’s Absolute and Relative Size  
Extant literature suggests that firm size and in particular the differentials in licensing partners 
size, influence the type of the licensing arrangement that licensors’ prefer to use to exchange 
their technology (Ceccagnoli et al., 2010; Fosfuri, 2006, Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Motohashi, 
2008; Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006;). To understand how the size of firms shape their licensing 
preference, the resource dependence view and related perspectives in the licensing literature 
heavily emphasise the role of specialised downstream capabilities such as distribution 
channels, marketing capabilities and regulatory skills (Cavas et al., 1983; Ceccagnoli et al, 
2010; Teece, 1986). According to this body of literature, for firms to capture the highest returns 
from their proprietary assets, the licensed technology must be bundled with other 
complementary resources (Teece, 1986). These resources enable firms to take their technology 
to the market in a speedy manner. 
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In general, compared to smaller firms or start-up firms, larger firms are more likely to own 
more complementary assets (Teece, 1986), which enable them to take their technology to 
market alone (Shane, 2001). Smaller firms, on the other hand, must either incur substantial 
capital investments or enter into collaborative agreements with competitors or owner of 
complementary assets in order to build their complementary asset stocks. In addition to 
complementary assets, larger firms are also more likely to possess a more significant pool of 
managerial expertise, sales force and technical capabilities required for technological 
exploitation. Unlike larger firms, even the most technologically savvy smaller firms may not 
possess all the technical competencies and managerial resources required to take their 
technology to market (George, 2005). 
Furthermore, the market-based perspective of the licensing literature indicates that the size of 
firms is an essential source of market power (Schmalensee, 1989). Market power provides 
firms with legitimacy and other advantages such as economies of scope and scale (Stuart et al., 
1999). Smaller firms generally lack reputation and legitimacy (Barla, 2000), which they could 
mitigate by collaborating with more established firms (Teece, 19876). Due resource constraints 
and lack of legitimacy, smaller licensors are more likely to have a higher preference for the 
licensing arrangement enables them to access complementary resources. Unilateral licensing 
provides firms access to necessary complementary resources (Bianchi et al., 2010), thus, we 
expect that with decreasing size of licensors they are more likely to have a higher preference 
for unilateral licensing as the licensing type would enable them to gain access to 
complementary resources and also enhance their reputation in the market. On the other hand, 
because larger licensors generally own significant financial, marketing and manufacturing 
resources, they are better able to commercialize their technology (Lowe & Taylor, 1988).  
Hence, we expect that with increasing firm size of licensors, they are more likely to have a 
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higher preference for cross licensing, as bilateral exchange would enable them to broaden their 
technological base, enhancing their ability to explore and exploit their resources. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3a: With increasing firm size of licensors, licensors prefer cross licensing to 
unilateral licensing. 
Turning onto the licensing pair size differentials, it is argued in the literature that when firms 
of different sizes engage in technological exchange; the size of the licensor relative to the 
licensee can influence the degree of risks that the licensor faces from the partnership (Nagaoka 
& Kwon, 2006). It is suggested that the smaller the licensor’s vis-à-vis the licensee’s, the more 
likely the licensor’s would face increasing risks (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). This is mainly 
because larger firms are more capable of extracting value from externally acquired technology 
than smaller firms. Due to slacked resources and higher internal capabilities, larger licensees 
are able to quickly integrate and generate a new product from externally acquired knowledge 
(Cohen & Levin, 1989). 
Because smaller licensors face higher risks when they offer their technology to larger licensees, 
they would have a higher preference to cross license their technology. Unlike unilateral 
licensing, a bilateral exchange would enable licensing parties to mutually access each other's 
technologies, where mutual access to partner’s technologies mitigate the effect of smaller 
licensors losing out to larger partners. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3b: In the context of licensing pair size differentials, when licensors are smaller 
than licensees, it is more likely that licensors prefer cross licensing to unilateral licensing. 
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5.5. Method and Data  
5.5.1. Research Setting 
The empirical setting for this research refers to Chipless firms operating in the global 
semiconductor industry as the research context. The chipless firms' setting is hugely relevant 
to our study as they are considered leading licensors in the semiconductor industry. They do 
not engage in any manufacturing, but mainly use cross and unilateral licensing to capture value 
from their technology and to access the state of the art of technology developed by rivals in the 
industry. As specialised firms that depend solely on licensing, the licensing type that chipless 
firms select to exchange their technology is critically important. It influences the amount of 
value that they capture from their innovation and has a profound implication on their very 
survival (Davis, 2008; Linden & Somaya, 2003). 
In addition, chipless firms operating in the global semiconductor industry differ significantly 
in size, licensing experience, and technology market diversification (Linden & Somaya, 2003). 
These firms vary from smaller firms operating in a single market to large firms with multiple 
markets presence and licensing experiences. As principal licensors with unique characteristics, 
chipless firms provide us with an interesting setting to study the effects that the licensor’s 
diversification, size and licensing experience play on its preference for either cross or unilateral 
licensing. 
Furthermore, from chipless firms licensing activities, we can capture the effect that the 
licensor’s characteristics vis -à- vis the licensee has on the licensor’s licensing preference. 
Chipless firms license their technology to partners operating in a broad range of industry 
settings but are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of increased competition from partners, 
which are capable of entering their marketplace. Licensees that are larger and highly diversified 
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than Chipless firms can easily assimilate chipless firms' technology and develop products that 
can better serve the need of their customers.  
5.5.2. Sample and Data 
To test our hypotheses, we built a novel dataset from chipless firms licensing activities from 
1985 to 2005. The rationale for using the time frame was because a large number of Chipless 
firms operating in the semiconductor industry entered the industry in the late 1980's. The 
sample period coincides with a paradigmatic shift in the industry whereby complementary 
metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) replaced bipolar technology as the dominant design. 
Before the introduction of CMOS technology, bipolar technology or PCB generated too much 
heat and consumed too much power as more chips were added to transistors (Jian et al., 2011; 
Linden & Somaya, 2000). The introduction of CMOS made it possible for a large number of 
chips to be inexpensively placed on a single transistor (Garnsey et al., 2008). This 
miniaturisation of chips or system on chip (SOC) created a more significant division of labour 
in the industry and facilitated the entry of new and specialised firms (Linden & Somaya, 2000). 
We collected data on chipless firms licensing activities from Thomson-Reuter Financial SDC 
Platinum strategic alliance and joint venture database.  For every licensing agreement recorded 
in the database, SDC database reports information on the date the licensing deal is announced, 
the name of licensing partners participating in the licensing arrangement, licensor and licensee 
public status, partners' industry affiliations and countries in which they are headquartered. It 
also provides a brief description of the purpose of the licensing agreement, type of technologies 
involved in the licensing deal, mode of contracts (unilateral licensing, cross licensing and other 
contractual types) use in the technology transfer and primary SIC code of the engaging parties. 
To build our sample, we carried out the following steps. First, we selected from the SDC 
alliance database all licensing deals from the broader electronics industry using the two digits 
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SIC (36) from 1985 to 2005. From this data extraction, we obtained a sample of 4980 licensing 
agreements. We refined the sample by focusing on licensing arrangements in which at least 
one of the participant principal lines of business is the semiconductor and related devices (SIC 
3674) on the contextual description of the licensing deal. From this refinement, we obtained 
3231 semiconductor firms engaged in 1556 licensing agreements. From the list of 
semiconductor firms, we focused on all licensing agreements signed by chipless firms. 
According Linden and Somaya (2003) firms in the semiconductor industry use two main 
organisational governance modes to create and capture value from their innovations: integrated 
device manufacturers (IDMs) and networked firms (IP suppliers, fabless, foundries, EDA 
software suppliers). IDMs are firms that engage in the entire value chain designing and 
manufacturing integrated circuits in house using very limited licensing or external resources. 
Although IDMs may engage in some licensing, they mainly bring external technology through 
mergers and acquisition (Linden & Somaya, 2003).   
Networked firms on the other hand either outsource (fabless model) or license (chipless model) 
their technologies to third parties. Chipless firms are networked firms that design technology 
and license the right of their IP blocks to other firms. Their partners use chipless firms’ 
technology alongside their technology to develop advanced consumer electronics products (  
manufactured using their fab (manufacturing facilities) or external manufacturers – foundries)  
We identified chipless firm by checking on its website if it is exclusively mentioned that the 
firm is a chipless firm. We also searched news wires and archival sources on the internet for 
the firm’s history paying specific attention to its business model to confirm its status. Firms 
that we could not determine their status from both their website and other data sources were 
deleted from the dataset. From this selection procedure, we obtained 458 licensing agreements 
signed by 635 chipless firms from 1985 to 2005. Of the 458 licensing agreements, 
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approximately 91% were unilateral licensing, while 9% of all the licensing agreements were 
cross licensing agreements.  
Next, we compiled patent information for chipless firms – licensors and their partners in our 
sample. The patenting data was retrieved from the patent databases compiled by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). NBER databases contain patent information from the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office (EPO), and other key 
patent jurisdictions in the world such as Japan, China, South Korea, and Australia. The NBER 
databases provide information on the total number of patents granted to a firm - ultimate parent 
including those of all its subsidiaries. They also report the number of citation counts made and 
received by each patent, its technology class and subclass, as well as a wealth of other relevant 
information (for a detailed description of the databases, see 
http://eml.berkeley.edu//~bhhall/patents.html). For our study, we mainly used the information 
of firms’ patent technology classes to measure technology diversification (Sampson, 2007; 
Jaffe et al., 1993).  
Furthermore, based on the variables to be tested in the research, we complemented our dataset 
by collecting data on licensors and licensing partners’ size and age from multiple databases 
such as Compustat, DataStream, Amadeus, LinkedIn, and Bloomberg. For those that we could 
not find their age and size on these databases, we searched their company website, annual 
reports, the internet and other firm directories to confirm these details.  
5.5.3. Operationalisation of Variables 
5.5.3.1. Dependent Variable  
The dependent variables in this study are alternative licensing options (cross and unilateral 
licensing) that the licensor can choose from to exchange its technology. We construct a dummy 
 142 
variable and code it as 1 if the mechanism of technological exchange used in the licensing 
agreement is unilateral licensing and 0 if it is cross licensing. 
5.5.3.2. Independent Variables 
To gain a specific understanding of the effect of diversification on the licensing preference of 
licensors, we measured diversification in terms of both market and technology diversification. 
Following prior studies by Hagedoorn et al., (2008) and Sear & Glenn Hoetker, (2013), we 
identified licensor market diversification using the industry SIC code assigned to firm in the 
Thomson SDC Reuters database. To measure the licensor’s product market diversification, we 
counted all the SIC codes assigned to the licensor’s in the licensing agreement. 
We captured licensor absolute technology diversification using their patent technology classes. 
Similar to Jaffe et al. (1993), we measured licensor technology diversification as a count of the 
number of different technology classes of a licensor’s patents assigned to the observation year 
t. 
Licensor relative market diversification is measured as the difference in the number of SIC 
codes of the licensing pair. We captured this by using a dummy. Based on the licensing pair 
SIC codes differential, we identified a market diversification differentials dummy as 1 if the 
licensor operates in more markets than the licensee, 0 otherwise. 
For licensor relative technology diversification, we took the diversity of the licensing pair 
patents across their different technology classes (Rivkin, 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Sampson, 2007). 
In the NBER database, firm patents are categorized under different technology classes. 
Through partners’ patents technology classes, we can capture the similarities as well as the 
technology differences among their patents (Jaffe et al., 1993). Licensing partner technologies 
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are considered similar when their patents are allocated to the same patent technology class 
(Jaffe et al., 1993).  
To construct licensor relative technology diversification, we, first of all, generated the licensing 
pair patent portfolios. Then we computed the distribution of the licensing pair patents across 
the different technology classes using the multidimensional vector applied by Sampson (2007). 
This multidimensional vector takes the form (Fi) = (Fi1… Fis), where Fis symbolizes the number 
of patents allocated to partner firm i in patent class s (Sampson, 2007).  
 
 
  Technology diversity =  (Fi)        =                 1        -             (FiFj1) 
                                                                     √ (FjFi1) (FjFj1) 
 
 
Where i ≠ j.  Technology diversity varies on a continuum from 0 to 1 with a value of 1 
representing the highest possible level of technology diversification among partners (for more 
details on the operationalization of the vector, see Sampson (2007)) 
Licensor absolute cross and unilateral licensing experience are measured as counts of cross or 
unilateral licensing that the licensor’s has engaged in within five years before the licensing 
announcement date. A five years' window is used as the timeframe to operationalize the 
variable because prior research indicates that firms build their licensing experience over time 
and the benefit from the accumulated experience sharply depreciate over time, losing 
significant value within 3 - 5 years approximately (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
Licensor relative cross and unilateral licensing experience vis-à-vis its licensing partner is 
operationalised as the difference in the licensing pair experience for the specific licensing type. 
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To capture the impact of the licensor’s relative licensing experience for cross or unilateral 
licensing, we create two dummy variables (CR & UL). The variables are assigned a value of 1 
when the licensor possesses greater licensing experience for the specific licensing type than 
the licensee, 0 otherwise. 
Licensor absolute size is measured as the number of corporate employees that the licensor 
employed at a given time t (observation year). For the sample firms, the total number of 
employees fluctuates between 1 and 196200, following prior literature, we controlled for non-
linearity and statistical skewness by transforming the count variable using natural logarithm 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Walter, 2012). 
To measure licensor relative size, we followed the procedures used in prior studies by Barla, 
(2000) and Hagedoorn et al., (2008). The licensing pair size differential is measured as the 
difference between the number of employees employed by the licensor and licensee at given 
time t. Similar to other relative variables, we constructed a dummy variable to capture the 
impact that the licensor/licensee size differential has on the licensor licensing preference. 
Based on the number of employees of the licensing pair, we assigned a value of 1 when the 
licensor is larger than the licensee, 0 otherwise. 
5.5.3.3. Control Variables 
The technology licensing literature has identified a number of firm levels and pair level factors 
that can affect the choice of the licensor licensing preferences. We controlled for these effects 
by including the following variables. 
Following Hagedoorn et al., (2008) and Siebert and Von Graevenitz (2010), we used a time 
trend variable to account for the impact that variation in time may have on the licensor’s 
 145 
licensing preference. We assigned a value to each year for the time frame of our study and the 
time trend variable starts at 1 for the year 1985 and runs up to 21 for 2005. 
Licensor age is measured as the number of years that had elapsed from when the licensor was 
established to date of the announcement of the licensing deal. A logarithm form is used to 
remove the skewness in the data. 
To control for the impact that the licensing pair technology similarity may have on the 
licensor’s licensing preference, we constructed a technology market similarity variable. 
Following Hagedoorn et al. (2008); Karim & Mitchel (2000) and Markri et al. (2010), we 
operationalised the licensing pair technology overlap at the primary industry SIC codes level. 
We constructed a linearly ranked variable base on the similarity of the licensing pair primary 
SIC code. We assign a value of ‘4’ when the licensor and licensee operate in the same fourth 
digit SIC code, ‘3’ for similarity at the third digit SIC code level, ‘2’ for the second digit SIC 
code similarity and value ‘1’when there is no product market similarity between the pair 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). 
To control for cross-country heterogeneity and geographical explanations in the attitude of 
firms towards unilateral and cross licensing, we constructed a global licensing participant's 
distribution dummies. We partitioned the licensing partners into geographical regions and 
constructed six global, regional dummies. Each dummy captures the proportion of the licensor 
partners in its home region. We used the firm’s parent firm headquarter to classify the licensing 
partner into one of the following five regions: USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea, Other 
developed nations, Fast East Asia and Rest of the world. 
We also control for exclusivity in the licensing deals as prior research has indicated that scope 
restrictions (products & geography) may impact on licensors’ licensing choice (Kim & 
Vonortas, 2006; Somaya, Kim & Vonortas, 2011).   
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5.6. Econometric Specification 
We used the logistic regression model to estimate the likelihood that the licensor will select 
either cross or unilateral licensing to exchange its technology. The logistic model has been well 
established in prior literature as an appropriate approach for modelling firms' strategic 
decision-making based on binary alternatives (Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Siebert & Von 
Graevenitz, 2010, Walter, 2012; Kim & Vornotas, 2006). A fundamental assumption 
underlying this model is that any pairwise comparison is unaffected by the characteristics of 
other licensor partners other than the pair under consideration (Ruckman & McCarthy, 2016). 
We estimated the logistic regression specification using the logistic command in Stata 14. 
5.7. Findings  
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
market diversification (absolute and relative) variables and all the other explanatory variables. 
Table 5.2 reports similar descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients and includes the 
technology diversification variables. Given the high correlation coefficient between the 
licensor absolute and relative market diversification (0.4884) and the licensor absolute and 
relative cross licensing experience (0.5300), multicollinearity could have influenced our 
findings. We checked the influence of multicollinearity on our results using mean - variance 
inflation factor (VIF) scores. The VIF scores for all of the independent variables were all 
around 3.43, which is far below the critical value of 10 for multicollinearity to be considered a 
problem (Belsley, 1980; Cohen et al., 2003).  
 
                                     --------- Insert Tables 5.1 and 5.2 about here -------- 
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 display the logistic regression results with market and technology 
diversification variables in separate regressions. We used a stepwise procedure; whereby we 
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first introduced the control variables, followed by the licensor absolute characteristics and the 
licensor relative characteristic variables. In both tables, Model (1) contains only the control 
variables. In model (2) we incorporated two licensor absolute diversification, in model (3) we 
introduced licensor absolute cross or unilateral licensing experience. Model (4) contain 
licensor size and (5) include the licensing pair characteristics. The addition of the licensing pair 
variables greatly improves the baseline model (1), and the examination of the statistical 
difference in the pseudo R squared value for all the models suggests that model (5) provides 
the best fit for the data. 
                        ----------- Insert Tables 5.3 and 5.4 about here ----------- 
To report our findings, we organised the results in function of the order of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis (1a), states that with increasing levels of diversification, licensors tend to prefer to 
engage in bilateral exchange rather than unilateral licensing. In support of this hypothesis, 
licensor absolute market diversification (Table 5.3, models 2 and 5) and technology 
diversification (Table 5.4, models 2 and 5) have the expected negative (significant) signs (p < 
0.01 and p < 0.05). We also hypothesized that the more diversified licensors are relative to 
licensees, the higher the likelihood licensors prefer to engage in unilateral licensing rather than 
in cross licensing (hypothesis 1b). Both relative market diversification (Table 5.3, model 5) 
and technology diversification (Table 5.4, model 5) have the expected signs. However, while 
the relative market diversification is significant (p < 0.05), technology diversification is only 
marginally significant (p < 0.10). 
In hypotheses 2a and 2b, we stated that with increasing levels of licensors’ prior unilateral or 
cross licensing experience, they tend to prefer the licensing type for which they possess greater 
experience. Both hypotheses are supported (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, models 4 and 5) with 
significant values (p < 0.01 or p < 0.05). For the licensing pair experience differentials, see 
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hypothesis 2c, we predicted that when licensors possess more prior unilateral licensing 
experiences than licensees licensors prefer to engage in unilateral licensing. Hypothesis 2c is 
not supported as p > 0.05 in both Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, model 5. Hypothesis 2d proposes 
that when licensors have greater cross licensing experiences than licensees, licensors are more 
likely to prefer cross licensing to unilateral licensing. This hypothesis is supported with a 
highly statistically significant value p < 0.01 in Table 5.3 and p < 0.05 in Table 5.4, model 5. 
Tuning onto the hypotheses on the licensor’s size and licensing pair size differentials. 
Hypothesis 3a proposes that with increasing firm size, licensors are more likely to prefer to 
cross license their technology to licensing them unilaterally. In hypothesis 3b, we predicted 
that when licensors are smaller than licensees, licensors tend to prefer to cross licensing their 
technology as opposed to unilateral licensing them. Hypothesis 3a is not supported in either 
model (4) and (5), whereas hypothesis 3b is supported (p < 0.05 in table 3 and  marginal support 
of p < 0.10 in table 5.4). 
In addition to the core effects, we also examined the marginal effect. We estimated the effects 
that a predicted change in the probability of explanatory variables would have on the dependent 
variables (Green, 2003). The findings of the marginal effects are reported in Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6. The results indicate that each additional market and technology space that a licensor 
entered (i.e., increased in diversification) decreases the probability of unilateral licensing by 
19%. Also, an increase in the licensor’s cross licensing experience of 1% increases its 
preference to engage in cross licensing in the future by 31%, whereas an increase of the 
licensor’s unilateral licensing experience of 1 % leads to 25% increase for the use of unilateral 
licensing. 
                            ----------- Insert Tables 5.5 and 5.6 about here ----------- 
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5.7.1. Robustness Checks 
To confirm the accuracy of our finding, we carried out several sensitivity tests. First, for the 
hypotheses on the impact of licensor cross and unilateral licensing experiences, the variables 
(absolute and relative effect) are operationalised using a 5 years’ time window. We also 
estimated the models using 4 and 6 years’ window. However, using both timeframes yield 
almost similar results in terms of direction and significance, which reinforces the validity of 
our findings. 
Second, for the firms' size, we also transformed the size variable into a categorical variable. 
Information on size (in terms of the number of employees) for publicly owned firms was 
collected from Bloomberg, Reuter database and firms’ annual accounts. Size information for 
private firms was mainly retrieved from the Internet and other sources that might be less 
reliable. Following OECD classification, we considered small and medium size firms as firms 
with the total number of employee's equal or less than 500 and assigned a value of 0 to these 
firms, whereas large firms were considered as a firm with total number employees greater than 
500 and were given a value of 1. The estimated regression coefficients from the analysis using 
these dummy variables were qualitatively similar to those in the full model, lending support to 
our hypotheses. 
Further, in line with debate on the effect of firms’ size in the licensing literature, we also test 
the impact of the licensee’s absolute size on the licensor licensing choice. Similar to the 
licensor’s absolute size, the size of the licensee (alone) has no implication on the licensor’s 
licensing preference. 
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5.8. Discussion and Conclusions  
Our study extends prior studies and contribute to the literature on the determinants of the firm’s 
licensing preference from a pair level perspective (Kim &Vonortas, 2006b; Nagaoka & Kwon, 
2006; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2010). Its theoretical and 
empirical contributions lie in understanding of how degree of licensor technology and market 
diversifications and differentials in licensing pair diversification influence the licensor’s 
licensing preference. Our empirical study shows that diversification (in terms of both market 
and technology) is arguably the most important determinant for the licensor’s licensing choice. 
Our study also shows that the licensor prior in cross and unilateral licensing play an important 
role in the preference for either cross or unilateral licensing. In contrast to the assumptions in 
the literature on the firm size, the study also indicates that the size of licensor relative to its 
licensee may be a better predictor of  licensor licensing preference than licensor or licensee 
size per se. Our findings illustrates the importance of incorporating both the firm characteristics 
and pair level differential characteristics in the examination of firms’ licensing preference. 
Our study offers the following theoretical insights. First, the degree to which licensors are 
diversified influence the licensing agreement that they prefer to use to transfer technology. Our 
finding supports the view that the desire to exploit the advantages of capabilities that firms 
accrue from operating in multiple markets influence their licensing preference. As more 
diversified licensors engage in a number of technology market areas and they are generally 
multidimensional in scope (Freeman & Soefe, 1997), they tend to prefer to cross license as 
opposed to unilaterally licensing. Learning from partners is more important to diversified firms 
than just accruing revenue from arm length or market based transfer of technology. Bilateral 
exchange enables more diversified firms to access advanced technologies of partners, 
enhancing their ability to benefit from their technology (Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006) and also 
 151 
develop new knowledge they can exploit in the future. Licensors that operate in a single market 
are more likely to prefer to transfer their technology through unilateral licensing because they 
lack the technological competencies and patent stocks required for cross licensing. To the best 
of our knowledge, this relationship has not been formalised in prior licensing literature, which 
may be an important contribution of our study. 
Regarding the effect of licensing pair diversification differential, our research suggests that the 
degree to which the licensor is diversified relative to the licensee has a very significant effect 
on the licensor’s licensing preference. This supports  the view that increasing technology 
market diversifications significantly enhance the firm's learning and absorptive potential and 
more diverse firms are better able to absorb externally acquired technology (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Teece, 1986). When faced with licensees that are more diversified, licensors 
are more likely to prefer to use the licensing type that will shield them from the risk of 
increasing competition. The more diversified the licensees are, the more they can quickly 
utilise the licensor’s technology as a springboard to generate new products that can better serve 
the need of licensors’ customers, which enhances the degree of competition. This finding is 
concurrent with prior licensing studies from the competitive perspective (Arora et al., 2003; 
Fosturi, 2006; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2012), which showed that with increasing 
competition firms tend to be more cautious in their licensing decision and tend to select the 
licensing type that will guard them against the adverse effect of increasing competition. 
The second finding refer to the effect of licensors’ prior cross and unilateral licensing 
experience. In  earlier licensing literature, firm experience has been examined general licensing 
experience (Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Kim & Motohashi, 2012; Kim & Vonortas, 2006; 
Motohashi, 2006; Ruckman & McCarthy, 2016). Our result adds to these studies by examining 
the implication that licensors’ prior cross and unilateral licensing has on its specific licensing 
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preference. Our finding indicates that the knowledge that firms gained from engaging 
repeatedly in a specific activity dramatically enhance their ability to implement the activity in 
the long term (Pisano, 1996). It supports the view that the ease at which the licensor can 
orchestrate a specific licensing type significantly increases its preference to use that licensing 
type in the future.  
Turning onto the licensing pair experience, according to our theory, heterogeneity in the 
licensing pair experience for both licensing type is expected to influence licensors’ licensing 
preference. Our results indicate that while differences in licensor and licensee’s cross licensing 
experience is an important predictor for the licensor preference for cross licensing, this not the 
case for unilateral licensing. The positive relationship between licensing pair cross licensing 
differentials and licensor’ preference for cross licensing may be related to the latter’s need to 
be assured that their partners possess the relevant technologies and patent portfolios. Moreover, 
cross licensing is also used as a mechanism to deal with issues of patent infringement, which 
requires a considerable amount of specialized knowledge, which in turn implies that the sort 
of experience that firms gained from engaging in cross licensing may have a more profound 
impact on the licensor than the experience gained from unilateral licensing. 
Another important insight from this study relates to the effect of the licensor’s size and the size 
of the licensor relative to the licensee. Our findings suggest that the size of the licensor vis - à 
- vis its licensing partner may be a more important predictor for its licensing preference than 
the licensor or the licensee size per se. Some previous research (e.g., Kim & Vonortas, 2006; 
Nagaoka & Kwon, 2006) find that large firms are more likely to prefer to exchange technology 
through cross licensing, while other researchers (Gambardella et al., 2010; Kim & Motohashi, 
2012) find no effect or  the opposite on the implication of firm size on licensing preference 
(Motohashi, 2006). However, most of these studies did not examine the effect of the licensor 
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size relative to the licensee size. Our research provides some answers to this debate. It shows 
that when the licensor size is examined alongside the licensee size, the licensor size seems to 
have a significant effect on licensor’s preference. The finding supports the argument that the 
degree of competition that a licensor will face from licensing its technology to licensees of 
different sizes is the determining factor for its licensing preference rather that the size of the 
licensor or the licensee per se. With increasing size, firms generally tend to possess more 
resources and can use these resources to extract value from externally acquired technology. 
Larger licensees can readily use licensor technology as a catalyst to generate new products. 
When these products are somewhat similar to those of the licensor, these partners become 
direct competitors. When licensors are smaller than licensees, to minimise the adverse effect 
of increased competition, licensors will have higher preference for cross licensing as this 
licensing type protects them from losing out to larger partners. This finding concurs with prior 
licensing literature from the competitive perspective (see also Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Siebert 
& Von Graenenitz, 2010).  
Our study also have some important managerial implications. Given the risks and rewards that 
unilateral and cross licensing bring to licensors, understanding under what conditions firms’ 
managers should select a specific licensing agreement is of critical importance. Based on the 
licensor characteristics and licensing pair differential characteristics uncovered in this study, a 
licensor can optimise the amount of value of it captures from its technology by selecting the 
appropriate licensing agreement to exchange its technology. Our findings indicate that when 
operate in multiple markets, they should exchange their technology through cross licensing as 
that would enable them to capitalise on the capabilities  they accrue from operating in multiple 
markets. Licensor should consider how diversified they are relative to their potential partners. 
When the licensor operates in fewer markets than their potential licensee, they are likely to 
 154 
suffer more risk in partners who are able to assimilate their technology quickly. Under such 
circumstance, they should select cross licensing as a mechanism to exchange their technology 
as that would shield them from the adverse effect of increasing competition from new players 
entering their marketplace. 
Regarding the licensors prior cross and unilateral licensing experience, our finding indicates 
that, given the conditions mentioned in the above, licensors should also consider utilising the 
licensing type for which they possess greater experience. In this way, they are able to reap the 
advantage of efficiently implementing the licensing type with which they are most familiar.  
Our study is also subjected to some limitations that provides directions for future research. The 
first limitation of this study is related to its research setting. The study is operationalised within 
a single industry (semiconductor industry), which implies the findings may not be easily 
generalised. Although the theoretical background and hypotheses are not based on the 
distinctive features of the semiconductor industry, we are conscious of the fact that although 
the characteristic of licensors and partners in the semiconductor industry may be similar to 
those in other architecture industries such as computers, software, and electronics, they may 
vary significantly from those of other high-tech industries such as pharmaceutical, chemical, 
and telecommunications industries. A logical step forward to deal with the issue of 
generalisation is to broaden the scope of future studies by incorporating data from other high-
tech industries. Second, our data is based solely on publicly announced agreements, which is 
limited in terms of information on the licensor motives to use a particular licensing agreements. 
Understandably, more information is needed on the motives of firms in order to gain a full 
picture their licensing preference. Other research designs such as case studies and survey 
designs, which offer the researcher the potential to ask more in-depth questions, could generate 
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greater insight and broaden our understanding on the conditions under which firms’ prefer to 
engage in cross or unilateral licensing 
However, despite these limitations, we believe this study makes a significant contribution to 
our understanding of the preference of licensors for particular licensing types as they engage 
in the exchange of their technology in knowledge intensive industries amid fierce competitions 





Variable Description  Expected effect 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent variable 
Licensing choice 1 if the mechanism of technological 
exchange is unilateral licensing and 
0 if it is cross licensing 
Independent variables  Cross Unilateral 
Licensor absolute market   Number of SIC codes assigned to the  +  − 
diversification    licensor in licensing agreement 
Licensor absolute techno-   Number of different technology classes  +  − 
logy diversification    of the licensor patents 
Licensor relative market   Difference in the number of the − + 
diversification 
 
licensor and the licensee SIC   − 
 
 
             + 
 
  Licensor relative techno-   Difference in the number technology of − + 
Logy diversification 
Licensor absolute size 
licensor and the licensee patents 







 by licensor at time t   
Licensor relative size  Log difference in the licensor and the − + 
 
 
Licensor absolute unilateral 
licensee employees number at time t 







licensing experience deal engaged in within 5 years of 
the licensing announcement date 
  
Licensor absolute cross Number of cross licensing 0 + 
licensing experience arrangements engaged in within 5 
years of the licensing announcement 
  
 




Licensor relative unilateral 
Date 







Licensing experience  licensee unilateral licensing deals   
Licensor relative cross 
Licensing experience 
The difference in the number of 
licensor     and licensee cross-licensing 
deals 
0 + 




1985 and runs up to 20 for 2005 
Log number of years between licensor  
  
  date of establishment and date of            
announcement of the licensing deal 
  




primary industry SIC codes 





if the pair operates in USA and 0 otherwise 
Licensing partner parent headquarters, coded 1, 
  
   if the pair operates in Europe, and 0 otherwise.   














Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix - Market Diversification 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10      11 12 13 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Form of licensing .8682927   .3385855 
 
1Licensor abs size 3116.259     12063.75   1.000 
 
2Licensor abs market diversification   3.221951   2.447893     0.1735*   1.000 
 
3Licensor abs unilateral licensing 4.148148    5.781473   -0.0603   0.0940   1.000 
 
4Licensor abs cross licensing .191358    .6344146   0.0167   0.0794    -0.0765   1.000 
 
5Licensor rel size .1902439   .392973    0.1374   0.0805 -0.0388   0.0963   1.000 
 
6Licensor rel market diversifications .2942387   .4561693   0.0340    0.4884   0.1012   0.0344   0.2467*   1.000 
 
7Licensor rel unilateral licensing .2901235   .4542868   0.0121 -0.0268   0.1083    0.0228   0.2099*    0.1859*   1.000 
 
8Licensor rel cross licensing .5164609   .5002439   0.0400   0.0419   -0.0199     0.5300*   0.1237*   0.1522*   0.2663* 1.000 
 
9Time 11.51852     5.043999 -0.1366* - 0.0385   0.2389* -0.0917 0.0796   0.0932 -0.1879* -.00500   1.000 
 
10Licensor age 3.447144    .3332618   0.1982*   0.2644   0.0219   0.1709* 0.0463 0.1206*   0.0096   0.1355  -0.3608* 1.000 
 
11Technology market similarity 3.109053   1.195542  -0.0570 - 0.0789  0.1358* 0.0338  0.0559 -0.1069*-0.0783 - 0.1355*0.5008 -0.0114  1.000 
 
12USA .4053498   .4914655  -0.0103  0.0344 -0.0775  0.0704  0.2053  0.01268* .0022  0.1006* -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.1380* 1.000 
 





















Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix - Technology Diversification 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10      11 12 13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.----------- 
 
Form of licensing .8682927   .3385855 
 
1Licensor abs size  3116.259     12063.75   1.000 
 
2Licensor abs techn diversification     2.015464    .0955853   0.3622*   1.000 
 
3Licensor abs unilateral licensing 4.148148    5.781473   -0.0895   0.0416   1.000 
 
4Licensor abs cross licensing .191358    .6344146   -0.0666   0.1006* -0.3781* 1.000 
 
5Licensor rel size .1902439   .392973    0.1384*    0.1995* -0.0713   0.0359   1.000 
 
6Licensor rel techn diversifications     .6514515   .0198671   0.0059    -0.2901   0.0151   0.0373   0.0903   1.000 
 
7Licensor rel unilateral licensing .2901235   .4542868   0.0216 -0.0164   0.0808   0.0915*    0.2083    0.1954*   1.000 
 
8Licensor rel cross licensing .5164609   .5002439   0.0606   -0.0179   -0.01028*   - 0.0179   0.1241*   0.0278   0.2746* 1.000 
 
9Time 11.51852     5.043999 -0.1579* - 0.0236   0.2319* -0.2342* 0.0776   0.1287* -0.16793* -.00402   1.000 
 
10Licensor age 3.447144    .3332618   0.3136*   0.1874 * -0.0216 * 0.0527 0.0741 0.0859   0.0136   0.1180*   -0.0240* 1.000 
 
11Technology market similarity 3.109053   1.195542 -0.0605 - 0.0108 0.1313* 0.1355 * -0.0575 -0.1816*-0.1134 * - 0.1426 * 0.0203 0.0240 1.000 
 
12USA .4053498   .4914655 -0.0449   0.0930 -0.0567 0.0575   0.2082*   0.0007 0.0064 0.0771 0.0148 -0.0318 -0.1421* 1.000 
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(0.4755887) 
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Exclusive licensing  
 
   Included         Included     Included    Included    Included 
Japan and South Korea Included Included Included Included Included 
Other developed 
nations 
Included Included Included Included Included 
Far East Asia Included Included Included Included Included 
Rest of the world Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of obs 410 410 410 410 410 
Log likelihood -165.60786 -163.0082 -157.61322 -157.61222 -125.77245 
Pseudo R2 0.0463 0.0613 0.0662 0.1027 0.1427 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses *p < 0.10; **p <0.05; ***p < 0.01  
 
 
Table 5-3: Estimation Results of Logit Regression Predicting the Preference of Firms for 
Unilateral or Cross Licensing - Market Diversification  
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant  2.268797*** 
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    -0.1456965* 
(0.0584512) 
 




Licensor rel unilateral 
licensing 
    0.1998545 
 (0.0592345) 
 Licensor rel cross 
licensing 




































































Exclusive licensing Included Included Included Included Included 
Jap & S. Korea Included Included Included Included Included 
Other Dev. Nation Included Included Included Included Included 
Far East Asia Included Included Included Included Included 
Rest of World Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of obs 410 410 410 410 410 
Log likelihood -165.608 -131.134 -127.781 -111.763 110.567 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.0513 0.0532 0.0928 0.0938 
 
  Standard errors are in parentheses *p < 0.10; **p <0.05;  
 
 
Table 5-4: Estimation Results of Logit Regression Predicting the Preference of Firms for 






Standard errors are in parentheses *p < 0.10; **p <0.05; ***p < 0.01   
 
Table 5-5: Predicted Probability for the Licensor Prefer a Unilateral or Cross Licensing - 
Market Diversification 





















































































































Included       Included  Included Included Included 
Jap & S. Korea Included Included Included Included Included 
Other Dev. Nation Included Included Included Included Included 
Far East Asia Included Included Included Included Included 
Rest of World Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of obs 410 410 410 410 410 
Log likelihood -165.60786 -163.008 -157.61322 -157.61322 -125.77245 






Standard errors are in parentheses *p < 0.10; **p <0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 5-6: Predicted Probability that the Licensor Prefer a Unilateral or Cross Licensing - 
Technology Diversification 
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Included      Included Included Included Included 
Jap & S. Korea Included Included Included Included Included 
Other Dev. Nation Included Included Included Included Included 
Far East Asia Included Included Included Included Included 
Rest of World Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of obs 410 410 410 410 410 
Log likelihood -165.60786 -131.134 -127.7810 -111.7634 -110.567 




Hypotheses    Outcome Key Implications 
 Diversification 
absolute effects - 1a 
P < 0.05 -Learning with and from partners (Soet, 1997) 
-Cross licensing enables access to advanced knowledge 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2008) 
relative effect - 1b P < 0.05 -Springboard to generate new products (Teece, 1986, Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) 
-Cross licensing serves as a shield to competition (Arora & Fosturi, 
2006; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2012) 
Experience 
absolute cross and unilateral 
effect; 2a & 2b 
 
P < 0.01 
-Development of reliable routines and processes (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1987) 
-Facilitates the implementation of licensing in the future (Pisano, 
1996 
relative unilateral effect; 2c P > 0.05 -Licensor unilateral experience relative to partners have no impact 
on the licensor licensing preference 
relative cross licensing 
effect; 2d 
P < 0.05 -More specialised knowledge gained from cross licensing and has 
a profound impact on the licensor preference 
Firm size 
absolute size: 3a 
P > 0.05 -Has no significant effect alone (Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Nagoaka 
& Kwon, 2006; Kim & Motohashi, 2012; Gambardella et al., 2010) 
relative size: 3b P < 0.05 -Indicates that the degree of competition rather than the size per se 





Table 5-7: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
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6. HOW DO FOCAL FIRMS’ TECHNOLOGY AND ACTOR 
ECOSYSTEM COMPLEXITY AFFECT VALUE CREATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
6.1. Abstract  
In this paper, we investigate the heterogeneity in the performance of licensors in the context of 
contingencies that influence focal licensors' ecosystem complexity. We differentiate licensors' 
ecosystem complexity into technology and actor complexity, which are the key architectural 
components that determine the functionality of the ecosystem. We develop a set of measures 
for quantifying technology and actor complexity and develop a framework relating technology 
and actor ecosystem complexity to focal licensors performance. Using data of licensing and 
ecosystem activities of 115 Chipless firms from 1985 to 2005, we find that increased levels of 
technology and actor ecosystem complexity enable focal licensors to generate superior value 
from their ecosystems. In addition, we find that the joint effects of technology and actor 
complexity augment the amount of value that focal licensors generate from licensing within 
ecosystems. These findings contribute to the emerging ecosystem literature and have 







Keyword: Ecosystem, Ecosystem architecture, technological and actors’ ecosystem 
complexity, value creation, licensing performance 
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6.2. Introduction  
Increased competition and the rapid pace of technological development, however, have 
dramatically changed the way firms organised their R&D lately (Giachetti & Dagnino, 2014). 
Firms have engaged in the formation of ecosystem (Adner, 2017), as a strategy to create and 
appropriate value from technology (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Ecosystem enables the focal 
firm to share the risk and cost of developing new technology with partners(Jacobides et al., 
2015), or for its technology to interact with partners’ technologies (components and 
complementors), increasing the overall value that is generated  from focal firms technology 
(Adner, 2017, Jacobides et al., 2015; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016).   
Prior literature has acknowledged that focal firms or ecosystem orchestrators often experience 
considerable differences in their performance outcomes (Gawer & Henderson, 2006; Jacobides 
et al., 2015). Such heterogeneity in the performance of focal firms has been explained in terms 
of either the nature of relationships among actors within ecosystems (Autio & Thomas, 2014; 
Rong & Shi, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015), or the structural aspects of ecosystems (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor & Lee, 2013). Despite the rich insights gained from these studies, our 
understanding of why some focal firms outperform others remains incomplete (Adner, 2017). 
In this study, we offer a slightly different explanation for heterogeneity in the performance of 
focal firms, which hinges on the architectural components of their ecosystems. We base our 
explanation specifically, on the degree of interactions in key architectural components 
(technology and actor) that shape the functionality of the ecosystem. We argue that the number 
and magnitude of interactions among technologies and actors within focal firm ecosystems 
which we characterise as focal firms’ technology and actor complexity determine the amount 
of value they generate from their ecosystems. To theorise how the focal firm technology and 
actor ecosystem complexity influences its performance, we draw knowledge from complexity 
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theory, especially from Kauffman's NK model (1993). Complexity of a system increases with 
the number of unique subcomponents within the system, which creates a rich interconnectivity 
among them that together produces a higher outcome than would be achieved from a slightly 
lower variation in the activity sets (Cockburn & Henderson, 1996). Based on the number of 
unique actors and technologies within focal firm ecosystems, we contend that, at the technology 
level, as the number of technologies and interdependency among them grow, the bond between 
the partners’ technologies becomes more solid (Rivkin, 2000). This makes it more difficult for 
rival firms to access the focal firm partners and imitate its technology Kapoor & Agarwal, 
2016), enhancing for the focal firm’s ability to gain from synergetic advantages (Davis & 
Thomas, 1993). Hence, focal firms that operate within the ecosystem with higher levels of 
technology complexity are more likely to generate superior value from their ecosystems than 
those with low levels of technology ecosystem complexity.  
Likewise, because of knowledge sharing and learning resulting from increased actor 
complexity, focal firms that operate within ecosystems with higher levels of actor complexity 
are more capable of coordinating the ecosystem/licensed technology, which in turn, enhances 
their chances of creating superior value from their ecosystems (Autio & Thomas, 2014; Rong 
& Shi, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015).  
In addition, we also argue that technology and actor ecosystem complexity jointly augment the 
performance effect of the focal firm. While the focal firm’s technology ecosystem complexity 
enhances its performance due to the richness of the technological interconnectivity 
((interdependent among partner technologies) (Rivkin, 2000)), actor complexity serves as the 
channel through which these advantages are realised. A focal firm that operates within an 
ecosystem with high levels of technology complexity would generally require a higher level of 
actor complexity to coordinate the ecosystem technology. Hence, the focal firm’s technology 
and actor complexity jointly improve its performance significantly. 
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We test our arguments using the licensing and ecosystem activities of chipless firms operating 
within the semiconductor industry from 1985 to 2005. Chipless firms are highly specialized 
firms and  do not engage in any manufacturing but mainly create value from their technology 
through licensing and ecosystem formation (Linden & Somaya, 2003, Moore, 1993). The 
degree of technology complexity and actor complexity within chipless firm ecosystems varies 
from one chipless firm ecosystem to another. Hence, chipless firms provide us with a valuable 
setting to examine the effect that the focal firm’s technology and actor ecosystem complexity 
have on its value creation. 
Our study makes a number of contributions. First, it examines a particular type of ecosystem 
resulting from the licensing of technology.  By so doing, it contributes to the empirical literature 
on the interplay between licensing, ecosystem formation and firms’ performance (Davis, 2001; 
Kollmer & Dowling, 2004). Second, it contributes to the ecosystem literature by introducing 
the notion of complexity in the analyses of interdependences among partners. It conceptualises 
the architecture of focal firm ecosystems into technology and actor and highlights how 
interactions among the different architectural components can help us better explain who 
benefits more from their ecosystem. Finally, our study  complements the actor-centric approach 
(e.g. Autio & Thomas, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015; Iansiti & Levien, 2004;; Rong & Shi, 2014) 
and activity or technology-centric view (e.g., Adner, 2006, 2013; Adner & Kapoor 2010; 
Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016), which so far have been studied separately, by examining focal 
licensors’ performance from both the technological and the actor perspective. 
6.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development  
6.3.1. Components of Ecosystems 
In technology management literature, an ecosystem is referred to as a network of 
interconnected firms that interact to take the focal technology to end users (Moore, 1993; 
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Adner, 2017). Ecosystems generally vary in terms of their scope, size, shape, structure, the 
number of partners and the nature of the relationships between them (Williamson & De Meyer, 
2012). Some ecosystems evolve through serendipity (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), while others 
emerge from self-organisation (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2016). However, most ecosystems are 
created by a “focal or lead firm’’ (Jacobides et al., 2015; Iansiti & Levien, 2004). As the 
orchestrator of the ecosystem, the focal firm generally sets the rules and provides the platform 
or architecture under which the ecosystem operates (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
In the licensing context, a licensor can catalyse the development of an ecosystem by licensing 
its technology to partners, who may operate in the same industry or different industry settings. 
Although the licensor’s partners may have different business models and technologies 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2007), they are linked together by the licensor’s architecture. 
Because of the commonality in their architectural base and the interdependence between the 
licensor and licensees, they are embedded in a network of interconnected and interdependent 
firms (Adner & Kapoor 2010; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016). 
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Baldwin (2014), the architecture of an ecosystem 
constitutes a technological structure and an actor/social structure. The technological structure 
describes the design elements of the licensor technology and specifies how the focal technology 
could be linked to other firm technologies (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). It defines the interface 
between the licensor’s and licensee (s)’ technologies and the procedures or technical tasks 
required licensees to incorporate the licensed technology into their production structure. The 
design elements typically constitute blueprints of the technology and are generally conveyed 
through pictures, diagrams, and words. Thus, to bring the design elements together and to carry 
out the task specified in the technological structure, social interactions must occur between the 
licensing partners. These social interactions create what is called the social/actor structure of 
the ecosystem architecture (Baldwin, 2014), which enables knowledge and resources to flow 
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between actors (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Knowledge sharing among actors’ harnesses learning 
through knowledge recombination (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and assists the assimilation of 
the licensed technology. Hence, the actor structure facilitates the building and coordination of 
the technological structure of the ecosystem. Although the actor structure is sometimes 
considered as an integral part of the technological architecture, the technological and actor 
structures are conceptually different, and each plays a distinctive role in the functionality of 
the ecosystem (Baldwin, 2014). The two structures complement each other and together 
contribute to the overall performance of the ecosystem (Arthur, 2009). 
6.3.2. Architectural Approach to Value Logic 
The theoretical ecosystem literature has evolved in four main streams: (1) value creation, (2) 
value capturing, (3) actor-centric – the network theory application approach and (4) 
technology/activities centric – the structuralist approach (Autio & Thomas, 2014; Adner, 
2017). Although these streams of literature have significantly enhanced our understanding of 
the ecosystem, they fall short of fully accounting for the contributions that the key architectural 
components that constitute the ecosystem make to the focal firm’s performance.  
When considering prior works on the focal firm’s performance, the value creation and value-
capturing stream offer complementary insights into the rationale for differentials in the 
performance of focal firms. The value creation stream has focused on understanding the 
strategies that focal firms institute to encourage partners to join their ecosystems and the 
cooperative dynamics within ecosystems (Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2016). This stream has explained the rationale for heterogeneity in focal firms’ performance 
based on the incentives that focal firms offer partners to participate in their ecosystems 
(Jacobides, Cennamo & Gawer, 2015), the timing of entry (Adner & Kapoor, 2010), knowledge 
and capabilities sharing (Jacobides et al., 2016) and strategic and organisational alignments 
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between partners (Hannah et al., 2016).  The key insight from this stream is that an increase in 
the number of partners that the focal firm interacts with significantly contributes to its 
performance. 
On the other hand, the value capturing stream has sought to understand how ecosystem 
orchestrators, also known as ‘keystones’ (Iansiti & Levin, 2004) or ‘kingpins’ (Jacobides et al., 
2015), emerge and how they capture a disproportionate amount of value from their ecosystem 
through exploiting their dominant position. The stream highlights that heterogeneity in focal 
firms’ performance is shaped by the levels of control (bargaining position vis-à-vis their  
partners) that have over their partner (Jacobides et al., 2015; Jacobides & MacDuffie, 2013). 
Although these streams have offered rich insights into how and why some focal firms are more 
successful than others are, they do not incorporate in their analysis degree of interactions of 
architectural components in focal firms’ ecosystems and the implications that this may have on 
their value creation and value appropriation. Heterogeneity in the amount of value that focal 
firms generate from their ecosystems may influenced by not just how they motivate partners to 
join their ecosystem (alignment of incentives), but also the ease with which the partners 
technologies interconnects and the flow of activities within their ecosystem (Adner, 2017). 
Interactions among actors (actor complexity) facilitate the coordination of partners’ 
technologies and enable the focal technology to reach a large number of customers quickly. 
Further, the ease with which the licensed technology interconnects with those of partner 
technologies provides reassurance to partners that they will extract value from the licensed 
technology, which can play an important role in attracting other firms to join the ecosystem. 
Thus, the level of focal firms’ technology and actor complexity can affect their bargaining 
power and position within their ecosystems (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
Originating from the networking discipline, the actor-centric approach regards firms as 
independent social actors and focuses on the nature of the relationships among them (Autio & 
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Thomas, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015; Jacobides et al., 2016). This stream emphasises access 
and openness between actors and how social relationships among actors create opportunities 
and constraints. Social interactions facilitate strategic alignments and enable partners to deal 
with coordination challenges that arise when partners’ strategic incentives are not aligned 
(Adner 2017; Autio & Thomas, 2014). They may also encourage partners to act favourably vis-
à-vis the focal firm and contribute positively to its value creation (Jacobides et al., 2016). The 
last perspective, the ecosystem as a structure, explores the set of activities that need to occur 
for the focal value proposition to reach the end user (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). This activity-
focused stream places more emphasis on the flow of activities among partners and on the 
position of the focal firm vis-à-vis to partners where coordination challenges occur within the 
ecosystem. The alignment of activities and the coordination of partners’ technologies is seen 
as a key to unlocking value creation (Adner, 2017; Adner & Kapoor, 2010). 
However, as we can see, the last two streams focus on the role of relationship building, co- 
specialisation and coordination among partners' activities but do not consider the role that the 
architecture of the ecosystem plays in shaping focal firms' performance. These streams tend to 
assume that the amount of value that focal licensors generate from cooperating with partners 
is the same regardless of the number and magnitude of technological and actor interactions 
within their ecosystems. Within an ecosystem, the focal firm’s technology only creates value 
when it interconnects seamlessly with those of partners. Interactions among a large and diverse 
set of actors' harness learning and facilitate coordination of partner technologies. In this sense, 
the amount of value that focal licensors generate from their ecosystem is contingent on the 
level of technology complexity and actor complexity within their ecosystems. In this study, we 
focus on these key contingencies, which we consider as important sources of heterogeneity in 
focal firms’ performance. 
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6.3.3. Technology Ecosystem Complexity 
Our theoretical predictions are based on the aggregate complexity (Kauffman, 1993; Simon, 
1963), which is concern with how individual elements of a system work in concert to create a 
system with complex behaviour. The benefits of a complex system results from the fact that 
interactions between components within the system leads to improvement that enables the 
system to mitigate constraints imposed by any of the components. Here we consider the 
ecosystem as a complex system, in which the focal firm and partners are components of the 
system. Focal firm ecosystems may be subject to varying degrees of complexity dependent on the 
number of unique components interacting within the ecosystem (Kauffman, 1993). The greater the 
number of unique components interacting within the focal firm ecosystem, the greater the 
complexity of its ecosystem. From an architectural perspective, whereby the ecosystem is 
partitioned into technology and actor, licensing within an ecosystem setting constitutes the 
focal licensor technology interacting with those of partners (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Movery 
et al., 1985). The focal firm technology ecosystem complexity increases when its technology 
interacts with a large and diverse number of partner technologies, which creates a rich 
technological interconnectivity (Kauffman, 1993). Greater levels of technological complexity 
solidify the link between the partner technologies and reinforces the focal licensor's 
architectural structure. This offers the licensor greater control over its technology and drives 
the emergence of what Ethiraj (2007) describes as strategic bottlenecks. Strategic bottlenecks 
occur when barriers are erected around critical components or when a firm controls the critical 
components (licensing partners) where the value is accrued (Jacobides et al., 2006). The 
formation of strategic bottlenecks makes it more difficult for rival firms to access the focal 
licensor’s partners, thus enables the focal firm to continue to interact with a large pool of 
partners. This increases the likelihood of the focal firm or its technology to reach a large 
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number of customers and also enhances the potential to gain valuable information for new 
product development (Ethiraj, 2007; Baldwin, 2014). 
Research and empirical evidence from different industry contexts seem to provide some 
support for these arguments. For example, Ethiraj and Posen (2013), in their study of the PC 
ecosystem, reveal that firms that control complex architectural ecosystem create more patents 
and generate a higher amount of value from their ecosystem. In line with Ethiraj and Posen’s 
(2013) study, Jacobides et al., (2015) also find that in the automotive industry, original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) automaker firms, which control complex R&D architecture, 
generate more amount of value from their ecosystem compared to those with less complex 
architectural structure. Similarly, Lavie (2007) in his study of networks in the US software 
industry also shows that focal firms whose partner technologies are strongly linked to the focal 
technology generate a superior value from their network than those with less integrated 
partners. 
In addition to the advantages of strategic bottlenecks, evolutionary economists have also shown 
that technological complexity can serve as a barrier to imitation (Bresnahan et al., 2002; Rivkin, 
2000). Imitation is considered one of the primary factors that prevent licensors from creating 
value from licensing (Cava et al., 1983; Teece, 1989). Rich technological interconnectivity 
makes it much more difficult for would-be copycats to decipher the exact configuration of the 
licensor's technology (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016). Rivkin (2000) illustrates that while it may 
be easy to imitate isolated activities, competitors will find it much more difficult to understand 
and imitate an entire system of mutually enhancing components without some errors. In a 
similar vein, Milgrom and Roberts (1995), in their empirical study of fit and complementarity 
demonstrate that rich interactions among a firm's activities and resources curb would be 
imitators' ability to copy the firm's practices effectively. The authors attribute the inability of 
rivals to copy the firm's activities in part to complex complementarities among its practices. 
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Although these studies are based on the firm's internal activities, the findings also apply to 
loosely and tightly coupled systems such as the ecosystem (Glassman, 1973; Weick, 1976), 
since the barriers to imitation are based on the underlying logic of complexity resulting from 
rich interconnectivity between subcomponents. 
Furthermore, increased technological complexity may also enhance the licensor’s ability to 
derive more value from its technology because of switching costs. Switching costs occur when 
licensees whose technologies are highly interwoven within a focal licensor’s technology want 
to switch to another licensor; they must de-integrate their technologies from that of the focal 
licensor’s system and integrate them into a rival system. Unlearning an old system and learning 
a new system is an expensive and time-consuming process. The network externalities created 
by the focal licensor’s technology ecosystem complexity increases switching costs (Farrell & 
Saloner, 1986), rendering substitution an expensive proposition (Williamson & De Meyer, 
2012). The difficulties for partners to switch quickly to complementary systems when their 
technologies are interwoven within a complex system of technologies enables the focal licensor 
to continue to interact with a large number of partners (Williamson & De Meyer, 2012), which 
in turn enhances its exploitative and explorative potential. 
In contrast, when the licensor's technology interacts with a limited number and less diverse set 
of partner technologies or operates in a less technologically complex ecosystem setting, the 
linkages among partner technologies are relatively weak. As a result of weak bonds between 
partner technologies, rival firms can easily access the licensor partners, and licensees can 
quickly switch to other complementary systems, which reduces the capacity for the focal 
licensor to generate superior value from its technology. 
In summary, higher levels of the focal firm technological complexity make it more difficult for 
rivals access to the licensor's partners and to imitate its technology. Increased technological 
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complexity also increases the cost for licensees to switch to complementary systems, thus 
enhancing the licensor's ability to generate superior value from licensing. Based on the above 
arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 1: The higher the focal licensor's technology ecosystem complexity, the higher the 
likelihood it will create more value from its ecosystem. 
6.3.4. Actor Ecosystem Complexity 
In technological licensing, the potential outcome of a licensing deal is contingent on the ease 
with which the licensee (s) can incorporate the licensed technology into its production structure 
(Motohashi, 2008). When a licensor licenses its technology to partners, for the licensor 
technology to create value, it must work seamlessly with those of partners (Iyer et al., 2006; 
Walter, 2012). There must be some degree of interactions between the licensor and licensees 
to facilitate the flow of information and knowledge sharing between them, which helps the 
coordination of the licensed technology (Cohen & Levinhal, 1990; Coleman, 1990). 
Generally, when licensors license technology to licensees, they do not just supply tools, 
software and maintenance systems to licensees but also provide technical support in the form 
of making their technical team available to licensing partners (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996). 
Interactions between licensing partners allow knowledge to flow backwards and forwards 
between them (Grant, 1996). Knowledge sharing between licensing partners opens up new 
potential for learning and enables the licensor to gain vital knowledge and develop new ways 
on how to reconfigure the licensed technology (Zahra & George, 2002). However, the quality 
knowledge gained varies depending on the number and diversity of licensors partners 
(Sampson, 2007).  
When an actor interacts with a large and diverse set of actors or operates in a more complex 
ecosystem setting, it gains new knowledge and perspectives from multiple sources. Exposure 
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to a diverse pool of knowledge broadens the range of ideas from which the licensor can tap 
new insight from, enhancing its ability to develop more reliable processes and routines (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1987). The development of more innovative routines makes the focal licensor 
more efficient in coordinating the licensed technology (Rothaemel & Thursby, 2005), which 
in turn reduces the time needed for its partners to internalise its technology (Pisano et al., 1988) 
and enables the focal technology to reach a large number of customers quickly.  
In addition to the advantages of developing more reliable internal routines, when a licensor 
operates in a more complex actor ecosystem setting (interacts with a wide range of different 
actors), it is exposed to new ways of reasoning and develops unique communication skills, 
which makes the licensor more competent in dealing with a broad range of licensees (Sampson, 
2007). In technology licensing ‘‘the not invented here'' syndrome, which  refers to the internal 
barriers that firms face when they attempt to incorporate a licensed technology into their 
manufacturing structure is considered one of the factors that prevent licensors from generating 
a large share of value from licensing (Caves et al., 1983). The ability of the focal licensor to 
communicate effectively with a large set of partners can enable to deal not just with the ‘not 
invented here syndrome' issues but also to overcome adoption issues prevalent in technology 
licensing (Ahuja & Katila, 2003). In ecosystem settings, adoption is of particularly importance 
as firms’ benefit more when a critical mass of other firms adopts their technology. The 
licensor’s ability to communicate effectively with partners can stimulate co-investment and 
encourage partners to act cooperatively, enhancing potential for the focal licensor to create 
more value from its ecosystem.  
In contrast, when a licensor operates in a less complex actor ecosystem setting, critical 
information about the licensed technology is shared only with a few and a similar set of actors. 
Some scholars have argued that under such circumstances, licensees may easily assimilate the 
licensor’s knowledge because of the similarity in their knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 
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1989). However, in the licensing context, where the principal goal for the focal licensor to 
interact with other actors to gain valuable knowledge, interacting with a limited and less diverse 
set of partners may contribute very little in terms of new knowledge as a significant amount of 
partners' knowledge may already be known by the licensor ((Ahuja & Katila, 2003). In contrast, 
when a licensor operates in a more complex actor setting, it is more likely to access a broad 
pool of knowledge, which facilitates the development of reliable routines and processes, which 
in turn enhances its ability to create superior value from its ecosystem. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the focal licensor's actor ecosystem complexity, the higher the 
likelihood it will create more value from its ecosystem. 
6.3.5. The Joint Effect of Technology and Actor Complexity 
While focal firms' technology ecosystem complexity, specifically the number and diversity of 
technologies within their ecosystems, enhance their performance due to the richness of the 
technological interconnectivity (Rivkin, 2000), actor ecosystem complexity could serve as a 
mean through which these advantages are realised. Higherr levels of the focal technology 
ecosystem complexity reinforce its technological architecture and drive the emergence of 
strategic bottlenecks. The formation of strategic bottlenecks makes it more difficult for rival 
licensors to access the focal licensor’s partners ((Ethiraj, 2007; Jacobides et al., 2006; Hannah 
& Eisenhardt, 2015). Higher levels of technology complexity may also serve as a barrier to 
entry by raising the cost of imitating the focal firm’s technology and the cost that partners incur 
for switching to complementary systems (Willamson & De Meyer, 2012), thus enhancing the 
focal licensor’s ability to create superior value from its ecosystem. 
However, the ease with which partner technologies link together within an ecosystem may be 
assisted by the ecosystem actor’s complexity. A licensor that operates in an ecosystem with 
high levels of technology complexity would require more efficient routines and skills to 
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facilitate the interoperability of the ecosystem technology. Increased levels of the focal firm’s 
actor complexity allow access unique knowledge and information from multiple sources. 
Access to novel information broadens the licensor’s problem-solving arenas and enables the 
formation of more reliable innovative routines (Ahuja & Katila, 2003). The development of 
more efficient routines facilitates the interoperability and coordination of the licensor and 
licensees’ technology. Thus, higher level of the focal firm’s actor ecosystem complexity 
enhances the chances of a focal technology that integrated within a complex technological to 
reach a large number of customers quickly, increasing the potential for the focal licensor to 
create superior value from its technology. 
A good illustration of how higher levels of the focal firm’s technology and actor ecosystem 
complexity lead to greater value creation can be seen with Arm Limited, a leading intellectual 
supplier in the semiconductor industry. Arm’s ecosystem constitutes more than 1100 partners 
originating from a broad range of industry and market settings (https://www. 
arm.com/company). Because of the number and diversity of technologies and actors within 
Arm’s ecosystem, the firm has been able to benefit from stickiness resulting from rich 
technological interconnectivity and gained access to a vast pool of resources and knowledge, 
which has enabled the firm to develop more cutting-edge technology quickly and cheaply. 
Arm's high level of technology and actor ecosystem complexity is considered as one of the 
main reasons why the firm has been hugely successful in the competitive semiconductor 
industry (Willamson & De Meyer, 2012). 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the levels the focal firm actor ecosystem complexity, the higher the 
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6.4. Methodology  
6.4.1. Research Setting 
The empirical setting for this research is Chipless firms operating within the semiconductor 
industry. We selected this setting for the following reasons. First, the semiconductor industry 
is considered the epitome of a complex industry in which ecosystems are pronounced 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). It is characterised by short product lifecycles with high 
levels of research and development (West, 2002) and patenting and innovation activities (Hall 
& Ziedonis, 2001), which require firms to cooperate and compete in order to create and capture 
value from their technology (Adner & Kapour, 2010). The formation of ecosystems enables 
the focal technology to interact with those of partner, enhancing the overall value generated 
from the focal technology (Adner, 2017; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2016).  
In addition to this competitive dynamic, in the last three decades, the semiconductor industry 
has also witnessed a significant shift from vertical integration to vertical disintegration (Macher 









et al., 2007), leading to an increased level of specialisation. Chipless firms are specialised firms 
at the forefront of the development of highly efficient microchips based on low power and high 
performance technology. Their technologies are essential core elements of connected devices 
such as mobile phones, tablet computers, flat screen monitors and smart television sets and 
play a significant role in the sophisticated car and aircraft industry and the internet of things.  
Furthermore, chipless firms are principal licensors in the semiconductor industry that do not 
engage in any manufacturing but mainly create value from their technology through licensing 
and ecosystem formation (Moore, 1996; Davie, 2010). Ecosystem formation enables their 
technologies to interact with those of partners technologies, and within each focal firm, 
ecosystem actors interact to facilitate the coordination of the licensed technology. The degree 
of actors and technological complexity within chipless firm ecosystems varies considerably 
from one focal firm ecosystem to another. Hence, chipless firms provide us with a valuable 
setting in which to examine the impact that the focal firm’s technology and actor ecosystem 
complexity have on value creation.  
6.4.2. Data and Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we assembled licensing and patenting data of chipless firms operating 
in the semiconductor industry from 1985 to 2005. We used patenting data to measure licensors’ 
or focal firms’ value creation, their technology ecosystem complexity and partners’ pre- 
ecosystem innovativeness, whereas licensing information was mainly used to capture focal 
licensor’s actor ecosystem complexity and to measure some control variables of the research 
(more details on the rationales for using patent and licensing data are discussed later in the 
operationalisation of variables). We collected chipless firms' data over a 21-year period, from 
1985 to 2005. We started our data collection from 1985 because a large number of chipless 
firms entered the semiconductor industry in the late 1980s. This was facilitated by the 
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introduction of Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology, which made 
it easier for a large number of chips to be inexpensively placed on a single chip (Garnsey et al., 
2008). The miniaturisation of chips enabled the creation of what is called in the industry a 
system on chip - SOC (Linden & Somaya, 2000). The SOC movement led to a significant shift 
in the industry from vertical integration to vertical specialisation (Macher et al., 2007) and 
facilitated the entry of Chipless firms. We ended our data collection in 2005 because the 
licensing and alliances' coverage in our primary data source – the SDC Thompson Reuter 
database is less comprehensive after this date (Lahiri, & Narayanan, 2013). Constraining our 
study period to these dates enabled us to collect appropriate and reliable data to test our 
hypotheses. 
To generate our sample firms, we adopt the following procedure. First, we retrieved licensing 
deals of firms operating within the broader electronic industry (SIC 36) from the Thompson 
Reuter Platinum - SDC Strategic Alliance and Licensing database. This database is considered 
as one of the most comprehensive data sources for large-scale empirical studies and has been 
widely used in the alliance; ecosystem and licensing literature with reliable results (see Anand 
& Khanna, 2000; Kim & Vonortas, 2006; Sampson, 2007 and Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2010 
for most recent commentaries). 
From this data extraction, we selected licensor firms, whose main line of business was 
described in the licensing agreement as semiconductors and related devices (SIC 3674). From 
the list of semiconductor firms, we focused on the licensing agreements signed by Chipless 
firms. According Linden and Somaya (2003) firms in the semiconductor industry use two main 
organisational governance modes to create and capture value from their innovations: integrated 
device manufacturers (IDMs) and networked firms (IP suppliers, fabless, foundries, EDA 
software suppliers). IDMs are firms that engage in the entire value chain designing and 
manufacturing integrated circuits in house using very limited licensing or external resources. 
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Although IDMs may engage in some licensing, they mainly bring external technology through 
mergers and acquisitions (Linden & Somaya, 2003).   
Networked firms on the other hand  either outsource (fabless model) or license (chipless model) 
their technologies to third parties. Chipless firms are  networked firms that design technology 
and license the right of their IP blocks to other firms. Their partners use chipless firms’ 
technology  alongside their technology to develop advanced consumer electronics products ( 
manufacture the products using their fab (manufacturing facilities) or external manufacturers 
– foundries). Chipless are considered as principal licensors in the semiconductor industry and 
license their technology broadly to partners operating within and outside the semiconductor. 
Through their broad licensing strategy, they form ecosystems, which depending on the number 
and diversity of technology and actors they create varying levels of value from their 
ecosystems. We identified a chipless firm by checking on its website if it is exclusively 
mentioned that the firm is a chipless firm. We also searched news wires and archival sources 
on the internet for the firm’s history, paying specific attention to its business model to confirm 
its status. Firms whose status could not be determined from both their website and other sources 
were deleted from the dataset. Our final sample comprised 115 chipless firm ecosystems that 
engaged in 465 licensing agreements from 1985 to 2005. 
Second, we compiled patent information for each chipless firm and its partners in our sample. 
The patenting data was retrieved from the patent databases compiled by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER). NBER databases contain patent information from the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office (EPO), and other key 
patent jurisdictions in the world such as Japan, China, South Korea, and Australia. The NBER 
databases provide information on the total number of patents granted to a firm - ultimate parent 
including those of all its subsidiaries. They also report the number of citation counts made and 
received by each patent, its technological class, and subclass, as well as a wealth of other 
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relevant information (For a detailed description of the databases, see 
http://eml.berkeley.edu//~bhhall/patents.html). 
For our study, we mainly used the database containing patents information from the USTPO 
only, which is consistent with other large-scale studies on licensing and ecosystem formation 
(e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2006, 2010). Drawing patenting 
information from only the USPTO is considered appropriate for the following reasons. First, 
because of the sheer size of the US market and the strength of its patent regime (Almeida, 1996; 
Lim, 2004), most semiconductor firms are likely to register patent with the regime in order to 
stay competitive in the marketplace (Hall & Zienonis, 2001). Second, different patent 
jurisdictions in the world use different standards and methods to assign patents to innovators. 
Using patents from a single regime reduces the likelihood of biases and inconsistency that 
could result from using patents from different jurisdictions. 
Finally, we collected data for our control variables (the licensor's and licensees' size, age and 
status) from Compustat, DataStream, NBER, Amadeus, LinkedIn, and Bloomberg. We also 
consulted the firms' websites, annual accounts and other web and business directories in cases 
where we could not find reliable data from the above databases. 
6.4.3. Operationalisation of Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, the licensor’s or focal firm’s value creation is measured using its 
citations weighted patent counts. Measuring the firm value creation using its patenting activity 
is considered appropriate for the following reason. First, patents are closely correlated with 
sales growth (Scherer, 2007), new products development (Comanor & Scherer, 1969), 
profitability, research and development intensity (Griliches, 1990) and literature based 
invention counts (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Second, patents capture better the collaborative 
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aspects of the ecosystem settings (Sampson, 2007). In the ecosystem, the performance of the 
firm depends not only on its actions but also on those of partners (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). We 
can easily track and capture the contribution of partners to the focal firm performance from 
patents than other economic and financial measures such as sales growth, profitability, and new 
product development (Lahiri & Narayanan, 2013; Griliches, 1990). Thus, in collaborative 
settings, patents are considered more reliable tools for measuring the focal firm’s value 
creation.  
Following prior work by Ahuja and Katila (2000) and Narin et al. (1987), we measure the value 
that a focal licensor/firm creates from its ecosystem by first counting the number of patents 
granted to the licensor within five years post the observed licensing deal. Then, for the granted 
patents, we count the number of forward citations received within the timeframe. We add a 
weight to each patent as research suggests that firms that create superior values from patents 
are cited more (Sampson, 2007; Jaffe et al., 1993). In addition, we use a five-year window to 
operationalise the variable because empirical evidence also suggests that when firms license 
technology it takes around 3-5years to create value from their technology and that patents that 
are not cited within the timeframe are less likely to be cited again (Jaffe et al., 1993). Finally, 
we multiplied the patent count figures by the total number of citations received by the granted 
patents.  
6.4.3.1. Independent Variables 
Licensor technology ecosystem complexity 
Following studies from the complexity theory tradition (Kauffman, 1993, Rivkin, 2000, Ethiraj 
& Levinthal, 2004), we capture the focal firm’s technology ecosystem complexity from the 
number and the diversity of technologies within its ecosystem. We measure the focal firm’s 
technology complexity from the number of its patents and similarities/differences in licensing 
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partners' patent classes. On the NBER database, each patent is categorised under a specific 
technology class. Through the patent technologies classes, we can capture the similarities in 
partners' technologies within an ecosystem as well as technological differences among them 
(Jaffe et al., 1993). Licensing partner technologies are considered similar when their patents 
are allocated to the same patent technological class and vice versa (Jaffe et al., 1993). 
To construct the licensor's technology ecosystem complexity, we first generated the licensing 
pair patent portfolios five years after they engaged in a licensing deal. Then we computed the 
distribution of the licensing pair patents across different technological classes year by year 
using the multidimensional vector applied by Sampson, (2007). The multidimensional vector 
takes the form (Fi) = (Fi1… Fis), where Fis symbolises the number of patents allocated to partner 
firm i in patent class s (Sampson, 2007). Diversity of partner firm technologies is then: 
  Technological diversity =   (Fi)        =                 1        -            (FiFj1) 
                                                                              √ (FjFi1) (FjFj1) 
Where i ≠ j.  The technological diversity varies on a continuum from 0 to 1 with a value of 1 
representing the highest possible level of diversity between partners (for more details on the 
operationalisation of the vector, see Sampson, (2007)).  
Next, we multiply the average value of the multidimensional vector (technological diversity) 
with the total number of the focal firm patents to get the technological complexity of its 
ecosystem. 
Licensor actor ecosystem complexity 
Similar to technology ecosystem complexity, actor ecosystem complexity relates to the number 
of unique actors in the licensor ecosystem, which affects the richness of partner interactions in 
its ecosystem (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Kauffman, 1993). We captured the focal actor 
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ecosystem complexity from the licensor's licensing records and the nature of the relationships 
among licensing partners in its ecosystem. The number of licensees with that the focal licensor 
interacts with and the nature of the licensing deals (technological agreement) they engage in 
(cross or unilateral licensing) can serve as an indicator of the degree of interactions among 
actors (Gulati, 1995). In high-tech settings such as the semiconductor industry, firms generally 
use cross-licensing and unilateral licensing to exchange technology and the licensing type they 
use in exchanging technology can influence the level of interactions between partners. Because 
of its bilateral or reciprocal nature, cross licensing offers the focal licensor a more significant 
opportunity to interact with partners than unilateral licensing (Gallasso, 2012). For the above 
reason, we assigned a higher weighting (4) when licensing partners engaged in cross licensing, 
and a lower weighting (2) when they use unilateral licensing.  
As a multidimensional variable, we computed the focal firm complexity using the following 
procedures. First, we counted the number of unique partners that the licensor interacts with 
within five years post the observed licensing deal. Then, we multiplied the number of partners 
with the sum of the number of the cross and unilateral licensing deal that they engaged within 
the timeframe. Thus, the licensor actor ecosystem complexity is measured as the sum of the 
number of different partners and number of cross and unilateral licensing deals among them. 
6.4.3.2. Control Variables 
Licensor pre – ecosystem patents.  
To control for factors that may affect the value that the firm creates from its ecosystem, we 
include variables that capture the firm and partners’ inputs before they engage in the ecosystem. 
The firm’s pre-patenting activities are used to capture its inputs as past research suggests that 
the firm’s prior knowledge has a significant impact on the value it creates in the future (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). A firm that has superior capabilities is likely to continue to generate more 
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patents or maintain its stock of knowledge over time (Katila & Abuja, (2003). Following 
studies by Katila & Abuja (2003) and Cloodt et al. (2006), we measured the licensor’s pre – 
patent stocks as the number of patents assigned to the firm within five years before the observed 
licensing deal 
Partner pre – ecosystem patents 
Because inputs into the ecosystem include not only the focal firm’s inputs but also its partner 
inputs, we also included partner pre- ecosystem capabilities (Sampson, 2007). Although the 
licensor may not own its partner resources, it can easily access them through interacting with 
partners. Similar to the licensor’s pre – ecosystem value creation, we measured partner’s pre – 
ecosystem patents as the number of patents obtained by partners five years prior to the observed 
licensing deal. 
Firm and partner size 
As a standard indicator in performance studies, we also controlled for the firm size as research 
indicates that larger firms are more likely to possess greater resources and generate more 
patents from their ecosystem than smaller firms (Scherer, 1986). We measured the firm size as 
the total number of employees employed by the firm at the observed time. 
Firm and partner age 
We also controlled for the firm’s age, as prior research shows that older firms generally possess 
a higher stocks of knowledge/resources (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003), which they can use to 
generate more patents from their ecosystem. We measured the firm’s age as the time that 





We also controlled for the public/private status of partners within the focal licensor’s ecosystem 
as research highlights that the relational benefits that a focal firm accrue from partners may 
vary depending on whether its partners are privately or publicly owned firms (Lavie, 2007). 
Publicly traded firms are often seen as key influencers in the industry, and their association 
with an ecosystem can encourage other firms to join or adopt the focal technology. We captured 
this variable using a dummy, which takes a value of 1 when a partner is a publicly traded firm 
and 0 otherwise 
Location variables 
In the licensing and ecosystem literature, the inability for the licensor to find suitable partners 
for its technology may inhibit its ability to create an ecosystem (Caves et al., 1993; Zuniga & 
Guellec, 2008; Kani & Motohashi, 2012). The licensor can easily license its technology or 
enters into the ecosystem with partners that are geographically closed to the licensor (Zuniga 
& Guellec, 2008). To account for cross-country and geographical heterogeneity in focal firm 
ecosystem activities, we constructed five regional licensing partners’ distribution dummies; 
‘USA’, ‘Europe’, ‘Japan and South Korea’, ‘Other developed nations’, and ‘Fast East Asia and 
the rest of the world’. Based on the firm parent headquarters, we classified the licensing partner 
into one of the five regional dummies.  
6.5. Statistical Analysis  
The objective of our empirical analysis is to explore how the focal firm technology and actor 
ecosystem complexity affects the amount of value it generates from its ecosystem. Although 
the unit of analysis is the ecosystem, our dependent variable is the firm’s citation weighted 
patent counts, comprises of multiple observations for the firm over time. As a result of these 
structural features in our data and the fact that our independent variable is a count (only non-
negative integer) variable, we used the Panel negative binomial model to analyse our data. 
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Other count specification models such as the Poisson regression model could have been used 
to analyse the data but were not deemed suitable because of overdispersion resulting from 
excess zero in the dependent variable.  
For our analysis, we used the random effects panel specification rather than the fixed effects 
panel specification. This is because our interest is in the variation of performance between focal 
licensors (Baltagi, 2005) and our key independent variables (technology and actor complexity) 
do not vary within focal firms. Random effects specification accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity and firm-specific error terms and is deemed more appropriate than the fixed 
effects. We carried out our analysis using the random effects panel negative binomial procedure 
in STATA 15. 
--------- Insert Tables 6.1 and 6.2 about here -------- 
6.6. Findings 
Table 6.1 represents the descriptive statistics of all the variables, which includes the means, 
standard deviations and bivariate correlations between all the explanatory variables. In general, 
the correlation coefficients among the independent variables are low except for a few variables 
that deserve our attention. First, the focal firm size is correlated with its pre-ecosystem creation 
(0.5195) and the partner size variable is correlated with the partner pre-ecosystem creation 
(0.5168). However, robustness tests indicate that our findings are consistent and unaffected by 
the moderate correlations among these variables. Furthermore, the mean-variance inflation 
factor (VIF) score for all of the independent variables is around 3.43, which is far below the 
threshold value of 10 for multicollinearity to be considered an issue (Cohen et al., 2003). 
Table 6.2 reports the random effects panel negative binomial regression results. For the 
analysis, we followed a hierarchical approach, whereby we introduced the control variables 
first and then the independent variables in the subsequent models. Model (1), our baseline 
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model, contains only the control variables. In models (2) and (3), we introduced the focal firms' 
technology and actor ecosystem complexity respectively to assess its effect on the focal firm 
value creation. In model (4), we incorporated the focal firm’s technology, and actor complexity 
onto control variables, while in model (5), we introduced the interaction term to test the joint 
effects on the focal firm value creation. We discussed the findings of our hypotheses based on 
the full model (model 5) as changes in model fit statistics (Dx2) show that adding our 
explanatory variables significantly improve the models fit over the baseline model (1). We 
summarised our findings as follows. 
First, in hypothesis 1, we proposed that when a focal licensor operates within an ecosystem 
with higher levels of technology ecosystem complexity, it is more likely to generate superior 
value from its ecosystem. This hypothesis is supported in model 2 & 5 with a positive 
coefficient and statistically significant p-value. 
Second, in hypothesis 2, we predicted that focal firms that operate within ecosystems with 
higher levels of actor complexity ecosystem are more likely to generate superior value from 
their ecosystem. The positive coefficient and statistically significant p-value in model 3 & 5 
supports the hypothesised relationship. 
Third, in hypothesis 3, we predicted that the joint effect of the focal firm technology and actor 
complexity amplify its performance in terms of value creation. The interaction term in model 
5 has a positive coefficient (β = 0.00234) and a highly statistically significant p-value (p < 
0.0001).  The changes in model fit (Dx2) statistic between model 5 & 4 indicate that adding 
the interaction term significantly enhanced the fitness of the models (i.e., Dx2 (5-4) = 12.45, 
df = 3, p < 0. 01), leading full support to hypothesis 3. 
Besides our key explanatory variables, the findings of our control variables are also worth 
reporting. In line with the underlying theories, our findings highlight that the focal firm and 
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partner pre-ecosystem capabilities have a positive impact on the value the focal firm creates 
from its ecosystem and this finding is consistent throughout the models. However, although 
both variables (the focal firm and partner pre-ecosystem capabilities) positively affect the focal 
licensor performance, the focal firm pre-ecosystem resources seems to have a more significant 
effect (β = 0.0003, p < 0.001) than licensees’/partners’ pre-ecosystem innovativeness (β = 
0.0008) and (p < 0.01). A possible interpretation for this result is that rather than just the 
capabilities that partners bring to the ecosystem, the focal firm’s ability to exploit capabilities 
play a more critical role in the amount of value it creates from its ecosystem.  
The focal firm partner size is also seems to have a positive and significant effect on the focal 
firm’s performance. This finding indicates that the focal firm’s technology and actor ecosystem 
complexity is enhanced when their partners are larger firms than when they are smaller firms.  
In addition, our findings also show that partners’ location matters to the focal firm’s value 
creation. The location variable -USA – where most of the ecosystem partners are located seems 
to be consistently positive and significant in all the models. It highlights that the closer the 
geographical proximity among partners the easier it is for them to share resources, which in 
turn enhances the focal firm’s ability to create value from its ecosystem.   
6.6.1. Robustness Tests 
We carried out a number of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, since 
we measured our dependent variable (forward citation weighted patent count) using a 5year 
moving window. We explored alternative specifications using a 4 and 6-years window. In 
additional, we also explored alternative models using other performance measures - simple 
patent counts and backward citation counts - that have been used in prior studies to measure 
the firm’s performance or value creation. The overall outcomes from these models are 
consistent with those reported in our findings, which reinforces our predictions. 
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Second, to compute the focal firm’s actor ecosystem complexity, we assigned different weights 
to the licensing type that the focal firm uses to exchange technology (unilateral licensing = 2 
and cross licensing = 4). We also run robustness checks using different weighted values (1 for 
unilateral licensing & 3 for cross licensing), and the outcomes from these models indicate that 
our empirical results are not sensitive to the weighted value used. 
Third, given the moderate correlation coefficients between the focal firm’s size and its pre-
ecosystem resources (0.5195) and the partner’s size variable  and the partner pre-ecosystem 
resources (0.5168), our findings may be influenced multicollinearity. To check that 
multicollinearity has not influenced our results, we, first, mean centred the variables and 
created a grand variable for both set of variables and run new models. In addition, we checked 
the mean-variance inflation factor (VIF) score for the variables. The VIF, for all of the 
independent variables, is around 3.43, which is far below the critical value of 10 for 
multicollinearity to be considered an issue (Belsley, 1980; Cohen et al., 2003). The results from 
these robustness tests indicated that our findings were consistent and unaffected by correlations 
among these variables. 
Finally, we also check the amplification effects (interaction between technology complexity 
and actor complexity) on the focal firms’ performance using their marginal effects. The results 
of the marginal effects indicate the interaction term contributes more to the focal firm’s 
performance than the individual effect of the focal technology and actor ecosystem complexity, 
which ascertains the hypothesised relationship that the interactions between the focal firm 
technology and actor complexity augment value firm creation. For brevity, the robustness 
results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request. 
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6.7. Discussion and Conclusions  
Despite the recent surge in the number of studies on the ecosystem strategies of firms, our 
understanding of why some ecosystem orchestrators outperform others remain incomplete 
(Adner, 2017). Prior studies have traditionally explained the performance of focal firms from 
the perspective of either the structural aspect (flow of activities) of the ecosystem (structuralist 
perspective) or the relational embeddedness of partners within the ecosystem (actor-centric 
perspective). In this study, we provide an alternative explanation for heterogeneity value 
creation of focal firms by using a simple framework that highlights the roles of architectural 
components of the ecosystem.  
Our key theoretical and empirical contributions lie in conceptualising the ecosystem 
architectural in terms of the technology and actor ecosystem complexity and how this 
characterisation explains which focal firms will create superior value from their ecosystems. 
On the one hand, technological bonds between the focal firm technology and those of partners 
augment the technology complexity of its ecosystem and offer the focal firms with synergetic 
advantages in R & D and production. On the other hand, the focal firm actor ecosystem 
complexity harnesses within its ecosystem and facilitates its ability to coordinate the ecosystem 
technology. The magnitude of the focal firm actor and technological ecosystem complexity 
augment the amount of value it creates from its ecosystems significantly.  
The architectural approach we put forward in this study complements both the structuralist and 
actor-centric approaches. It enriches our understanding of the structural aspects of ecosystems 
and their contribution to superior performance. Traditionally, scholars with a structuralist view 
of the ecosystem have emphasised the importance of managing interdependency among partner 
inputs and outputs and how this may affect the focal firm’s ability to create value from its 
ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). By distinguishing the components within an ecosystem 
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into technology and actor, this study offers an additional lens for understanding how the 
coordination of activities within an ecosystem contributes to the focal firm’s value creation. In 
line with our hypotheses, this study reveals that higher levels of the focal firm’s technology 
complexity reinforces the architecture of its ecosystem and drives the emergence of strategic 
bottlenecks, which in turn enhances its ability to create superior value from its ecosystem. This 
finding is consistent with prior works such as those of Ethiraj (2007), Adner & Kapoor (2010), 
and Ethiraj & Posen (2013), who find that controlling bottlenecks – key components where 
value is accrued can significantly enhance the focal firm performance. Our findings add to 
these studies by showing that rich technological interconnectivity among partner technologies 
within ecosystem offers the focal firm greater control over its technology and makes it much 
more difficult for rival firms to access its partners. This finding also supports Jacobides et al.’s 
(2014) argument that controlling strategic bottlenecks that resulting from supply limitation, 
when reinforced with architectural control and legal protection such as patents significantly, 
enhances the focal licensor ability to create value from its ecosystem.  
In addition, this study advances the actor-centric perspective of the ecosystem literature (Rong 
& Shi, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2015) by considering not just how the attributes of the focal 
partner but also how the type of licensing deal it uses to exchange technology influences its 
performance. In particular, the findings suggest when a focal firm interacts with a large and 
diverse set of partners its gains new knowledge and perspectives from multiple sources. 
Exposure to a diverse pool of knowledge spurs creativity and make the focal licensor more 
efficient in coordinating the licensed technology (Cohen & Levinthal, 1987; Pisano et al., 
1988). 
Finally, the findings also indicate that the focal firm’s technology complexity and actor 
complexity jointly augments its performance. This finding highlights that the focal firm’s 
ability to reap superior benefits from its ecosystems depends not just on the alignment of 
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technologies/inputs within its ecosystem, but also on the degree of interactions among actors 
in the ecosystem. For the above reasons, perhaps, some prior studies (e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 
(2010), Boudreau. (2010), which emphasise the effects of the flow of activities (technologies) 
within the ecosystem on the focal firm performance without fully accounting for the role of 
actor interactions, might over report the contribution of technological alignment on the focal 
firm’s performance. Similarly, other studies (e.g., Autio and Thomas, (2014), Jacobides et al., 
(2015), which consider actor interactions as a key contingency for value creation, but ignore 
the role of technological alignment, may not be discerning the adverse effect that the focal 
firm’s inability to coordinate the licensed technology may have on its performance. Our current 
study juxtaposes the technology and actor aspects of the ecosystem, thus avoiding such under 
or over-specification regarding the degree to which technology and actor interactions may have 
on the focal firm’s performance. 
This study also has some important managerial implications. Our findings suggest that focal 
firms should build their architectural capabilities, as these alongside their patents’ and other 
organisational resources can enable them to create superior value from their ecosystems. This 
study indicates that when attracting partners, ecosystem managers should consider their partner 
attributes in terms of the nature of their technologies as ecosystem orchestrators turn to perform 
better when technologies within their ecosystems originate from a broad and diverse set 
partners. 
In addition, the characteristics of actors that the focal firm interacts with and the type of the 
agreement used in collaborating with partners should be well thought as this has a tremendous 
implication on the focal firm’s value creation. The findings highlight that the focal firm’s 
ability to create value from its ecosystem depends heavily on the quality of interactions and 
degree of learning within its ecosystems. Focal firms that operate in ecosystems with higher 
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levels of actor ecosystem complexity tend to enjoy superior learning, which in turn enhances 
their value creation. 
Despite the theoretical and managerial contributions, this research also has many shortcomings 
that serve a basis for future research. First, this research is operationalised within a single 
industry setting, which means that the findings cannot be easily generalised. The ecosystems 
examined in this study originate from the licensing activities of chipless firms operating within 
the cumulative semiconductor industry. Although the drivers of performance in this industry 
may broadly apply in other high-tech settings, the ecosystem dynamics in less cumulative 
industry settings such as the pharmaceutical and chemical industry may be slightly different to 
those in the cumulative industry, and orchestrators may face different coordination challenges 
in these industries. Broadening the scope of this study to other high-tech industry settings may 
provide us with useful insights into the effect that the focal firm ecosystem complexity may 
have on its performance. 
Second, in this study, we characterise the complexity of the focal firm ecosystem based on two 
components – technology and actor. However, besides these two principal components, other 
factors such as the level of technological change and uncertainty regarding the demand for the 
focal technology may affect how partners interact within the ecosystem. Further research could 
address how these factors influence the complexity of the ecosystem and hence the focal firm’s 
performance. 
Another possible weakness of this research relates to the fact that in our theorisation we assume 
that partners within the ecosystem always behave cooperatively, which may not often be the 
case. Researchers could also examine how the competitive actions of partners within the 
ecosystem may affect the focal firm’s ecosystem complexity and the implication that such 









Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
 
Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1.Technology 
    ecosystem       
   complexity  
1.0000            
2. Actor      ecosystem 
    complexity 
0.0237 1.0000           
3.Interaction 
   Techn comp *  
   actor comp                
0.1979* 0.3170* 1.0000          
4. Licensor pre-  
     ecosystem 
     patents           
-0.0463 0.0198 0.0271 1.0000         
5. Partners pre- 
    ecosystem     
     patent       
-0.1454* 0.0876 0.0274 -0.0000 1.0000        
6.  Licensor size 
 
-0.0115 -0.0460 -0.0369 0.5159* 0.0664 1.0000       
7.   Partners size 
 
-0.2599* -0.0691 -0.1083* -0.0283 0.5168* -0.0446 1.0000      
8.   Licensor age 
 
-0.1240* -0.0710 -0.0689 0.2707* 0.380* 0.2380* 0.0538 1.0000     
9.   Partners age 
 
-0.1959* -0.0305 -0.0606 -0.0586 -0.41680 -0.1391* 0.5945*   0.0431 1.0000    
10. Partners status 
 
-0.2312* 0.0141 -0.0408 -0.1283* -0.1535* -0.1553* 0.2476* 0.0061 .03250* 1.000   
11.USA 
 
-0.0092 -0.1351* -0.1418* -0.0032 -0.0718 -0.0296 -0.1452* 0.0099 -0.2034* -0.0628 1.000  
12.EUROPE 
 
0.0726 0.1121* 0.1139* -0.0211 0.0066 -0.0153 0.0032 -0.1090   -0.0030 0.0530 -0.1041* 1.000 
Mean 
 
.638232 131.877 86.7371 89.3903 1374.436 3235.59 70972.8 18.25765 57.28316 0.846939 0.410714 0.15306 
Standard Deviation  
 







Standard errors are in parentheses. † P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001 
Table 6-2: Random Effects Panel Negative Binomial Estimates for Technology Complexity 
and Actor Complexity on Focal Firm Performance 
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Jap & S. Korea     Include  Include Include 
clIeeeeee 
 Include Include Include    Include 
Others Dev. Nation Include Include Includ  Include Include 
Far East Asia Include Include Include Include Include 
Rest of World Include Include Include Include Include 
Number of obs 465 465 465 465 465 
Log likelihood -4196.38 -4177.08 -4190.48 -4177.06 -4167.31 
Df 14 18 16 20 24 
Wald chi square 87.55*** 126.27*** 97.06*** 126.04*** 148.84*** 
Models   
































(4) – (3) 
12.342*** 
(4) – (1) 
38.68*** 




7.  INNOVATION PERFORMANCE: THE EFFECT OF THE 
QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
NETWORK TIES 
7.1. Abstract  
This research examines the effects of the quantity and quality of network ties on firms' 
innovation performance. It addresses the theoretical and empirical puzzle why firms with 
similar patterns in their direct and indirect network ties may exhibit heterogeneous innovation 
performance outcomes. Using licensing and patenting data of firms operating in the 
semiconductor industry, we find that both the quantity and quality of direct ties of the firm have 
a positive impact on their innovation performance, but the quality of ties seems to have a more 
significant effect than the quantity of these ties. Our findings further show that the effect of the 
quality of ties is more significant at the level of direct ties than at the level of indirect ties. Our 
research adds new insights to the body of literature exploring the implications of the quantity 








Keywords: Networks, direct and indirect ties, quality and quantity ties, innovation performance 
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7.2. Introduction  
There is a growing recognition in the network literature that the position of firms in their 
networks of direct and indirect ties to other firms convey them with different advantages 
(Ahuja, 2000b; Paruchuri, 2010; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Powel et al., 1996; Salma & Savies-
Laura,, 2005; Shan et al, 1994; Singh et al., 2016; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Because direct ties 
serve as pools of resources and knowledge (Tortoriello et al., 2014) and indirect ties as pipes 
through which knowledge flow in networks (Podolny, 2001), connecting to a large number of 
partners enable firms to access a large quantity of new resources and knowledge, which they 
can recombine and reconfigure to innovate (Fleming, 2001; Rodan & Galunic, 2004; Mors 
2010). For example, in his study of the chemical industry, Ahuja (2000b) finds that the number 
of a firm's direct and indirect ties significantly improved its innovation performance. For a 
sample of Canadian biotechnology firms, Salma and Savies – Laure (2005) establish that firms 
that are connected to a large number of indirect ties are more innovative than those with a small 
number of indirect partners. 
Interestingly, Gulati et al. (2011) argue that many of the studies that have examined the 
implications of network ties on innovation performance have primarily concentrated on the 
structural features of networks such as the position and centrality of firms. While the quantity 
of resources that firms accrue from the different parts of their networks impact their innovation 
performance, the quality of resources is to be seen as another important facets of inter-firm 
networks (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). 
Studying the effects that the quantity of external resources has on innovation performance 
without accounting for the quality these resources, does not provide us with a full picture of 
how network ties affects innovation performance (Gulati; 2007; Gulati et al., 2011; Sarkar, 
Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). 
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Gulati et al. (2011) in their conceptualisation of the underlying mechanisms driving 
performance within networks argue that the quality of partners' resources (richness of 
resources) enables firms to identify complementarity (potential synergies) between their 
resources and those of partners, thus enhancing their innovative potentials. Sarkar, Aulakh, and 
Madhok (2009) also suggest that firms with similar positions in networks, in terms of the 
quantity of their ties may accrue heterogeneous levels of network external resources due to 
variances in the quality of these resources. In other words, the quality of resources that firms 
accrue from their partners may distinguish firms that are otherwise structurally equivalent, i.e., 
– occupy similar network positions (Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). However, the focus of most 
of these studies has mainly been theoretical, and scholars have not systematically measured the 
quality of ties at the inter-firm network level. 
In this study, we empirically explore how the quantity and quality of resource that firms access 
from the different parts of their networks affect their innovation performance. We examine the 
effects of the quantity and quality of ties of firms on their innovation performance using patent 
data and licensing agreements signed between firms operating within the semiconductor 
industry. Firms often license in and out technology from multiple partners, partners that 
themselves also act as licensors and licensees to others, and as such find themselves situated 
within a network of relationships. Through these networks firms learn to innovate and capture 
value from external technology (Hall & Ziendonis, 2001). Depending on the number direct and 
indirect of partners in their networks and the quality or richness of their resources, firms exhibit 
heterogeneous innovation outcomes. Our research indicates that both the quantity and quality 
of direct ties have a positive and significant impact on innovation performance, but the quality 
of ties seems to have a more significant effect than the quantity of ties per se. Our findings 
further show that the effect of the quality of ties is more significant at the level of direct ties 
than at the level of indirect ties. As such, our research indicates that firms that occupying the 
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same network position may exhibit different innovative outcomes based on the quality of their 
partners' resources. Accordingly, our research adds new insights to the body of literature 
exploring the implications of the quantity and quality of direct and indirect partners' resources 
on innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000b; Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; 
Salma & Savies-Laura, 2005; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). 
7.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
7.3.1. Licensing and Network Formation  
The alliance and network literatures are replete with the view that the network in which the 
firm is embedded is an important source of competitive advantage (Ahuja, 2000b; Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2000; Kim & Lee, 2007; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000; Podolny, 2001;  Zaheer 
& Bell, 2000). This assertion is based on understanding that valuable resources do not only 
reside within the firm’s boundary but can also be accessed through ties to other organisations 
(Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 1990; Kim & Lee, 2007; Podolny, 2001). In that content firms use 
many mechanisms such as mergers & acquisitions, alliances, R&D collaborations and also 
licensing that is considered as one of the most important mechanisms that firms use to share 
and to access externally developed resources (Grindley & Teece, 1989; Leone & Reichstein, 
2012).  
Although licensing of technology entails the transfer of technology from the licensor (owner 
of technology) to the licensee (s) (buyer of technology), it also enables firms' to access relevant 
partners' resources, skills, knowledge, and capabilities. Firms often license in and out 
technology from multiple partners (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Arora et al., 2003; Hagedoorn et 
al., 2008) and based on their network of partners and partners of their partners (direct and 
indirect ties) they build networks (Freeman & Hagedoorn, 1994; Ahuja, 2000b). From their 
direct ties network of partners, firms access resources, knowledge, and capabilities (Powel et 
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al., 1996) and also gain valuable information about the state of art of technologies in their 
industry from their indirect network ties (Gnyawalli & Madhaven, 2001; Powell, 1990; Powell 
et al., 1996). Since innovation results from the recombination and reconfiguration of multiple 
resources, networks play a crucial role in harnessing the capabilities of firms to develop new 
products, technologies and serve new markets. In this light, as a mechanism that facilitates 
learning and the formation of networks, licensing can be conceived as a springboard for 
enhancing innovative capabilities (Grant, 1996; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Powell et al., 1996; 
Tsai & Wang, 2009).   
7.3.2. Network Resources and Their Origins  
The emerging research on networks suggests that network resources constitute resources that 
are accessible to a firm through its ties with partners (Jensen, 2003; Gulati et al., 2011; Lavie, 
2006; Singh et al., 2016; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). According to this recent stream of literature, 
network resources can be conceptualised into two main types, i.e – tangible and intangible 
resources (Ahuja, 2000b; Hansen, 1992;  Nonaka, 1994; Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005; Singh 
et al., 2016) that  can be  accessed from different locations of the network (Paruchuri, 2010; 
Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005; Singh et al., 2016). Tangible resources constitute resources 
such as partners’ intellectual property (e.g., - patents), tools and instruction manuals, financial 
assets, distribution and marketing channels, and personnel. These resources are mainly 
accessed through partners that the firm is directly connected to, that is, through a dyadic ego-
alter relationship or the firm’s direct ties (Ahuja, 2000b; Salman & Laure-Savies, 2005; Singh 
et al., 2016).  
On the other hand, intangible resources, including resources such as knowledge, information, 
and skills, are gained through social interactions between and among network partners. 
Intangible resources are tacit and non-codifiable and play an important role in the integration 
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and assimilation of tangible resources (Singh et al., 2016; Rodan & Galunic, 2004).  They are 
impacted by the indirect relationship of a firm with other firms through its primary partners 
(Podolny, 2001; Tortoriello et al., 2014), described in the network parlance as friends of friends 
or indirect ties (Ahuja, 2000b; Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005; Singh et al., 2016). Indirect ties 
enable firms to access knowledge not just held by their direct partners but also held by their 
partners-partners’ (Freeman, 1991; Singh et al., 2016). As channelling devices, indirect ties 
enable firms to access new and useful knowledge flowing through networks (Leonard-Barton, 
1984; Powell et al., 1996; Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005; Singh et al., 2016). Because 
innovation is conceived as a combination of diverse resources, knowledge, and skills 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; Fleming, 2001), both direct and indirect ties can be significant 
sources of innovation (Ahuja, 2000b; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Salman & Savies- Laure, 
2005).  
In this light, both direct ties and indirect ties are expected to have an impact on firms’ 
innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000), as they influence the amount and sort of capabilities 
(quantity and quality) that they access from their network of partners and also their ability to 
recombine and reconfigure externally acquired capabilities. Although prior research has 
examined the effects of firms’ ties on innovation performance, most of these studies have 
exclusively focused on either the effects of the quantity (number) of direct ties (dyadic 
interactions) (Rodan & Galinic, 2004; Mor, 2010), or the effects of quantity of indirect ties 
(Gulati, 1995; Salman & Savies-Laure, 2005). For instance, Ahuja (2000b) and Singh et al., 
(2016), do explore the implications of the quantity of resources and knowledge that firms 
accrue from their direct and direct ties, but do not examine the role of the quality or richness 
of partner resources as a predictor of innovation performance. 
Some prior research, however, suggests although the quantity direct and indirect ties contribute 
to performance innovation of firms, the quality of these ties is also an important facets of 
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networks (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009; 
Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). This entails that to understand the role of network ties on 
innovation, research has to examine not just the implications of the quantity (number) of direct 
ties and indirect ties but also how the quality/richness of resources that direct and indirect 
partner possess influences their innovation performance. In this study, we examine the effects 
of the quantity of direct and indirect ties alongside the quality of these ties on innovation 
performance.  By so doing, we deepen the understanding of the heterogeneity in innovation 
performance of firms that occupy rather similar network positions in terms of their direct and 
indirect ties. 
7.3.3. Direct Ties and Innovation Performance 
Through direct ties, firms can access both tangible resources ( Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 1990;  
Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Podolny, 2001; Lee, 2007; Stuart et al., 1999; Salman & Saives-
laure, 2005, 2005) that when recombined with firms’ internal capabilities can positively 
enhance their innovativeness (Fleming, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kim & Lee, 2007; 
Levin et al., 1987;  Powel et al., 1996; Venkatraman & Lee, 2003).  
However, the potential benefit that firms accrue from their networks of direct contacts may 
vary depending on the location/position they occupy within inter-firm networks (Powell, 
1990), different structural positions (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati.1995) offer them access to different 
set of resources and capabilities (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Koput & Smith 
– Doer, 1996; Tsai & Wang, 2007). Highly centrally positioned firms are more likely to have 
access to a large pool of external resources as centrality has been shown to be positively 
associated with the availability of information (Bonacich, 1987; Gulati, 1995; Podolny, 2001; 
Nerkar & Parachuri, 2005). As innovation results from the recombination of new and existing 
resources (Levin et al., 1987; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Fleming, 2001), firms that have access 
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to a large pool of resources are more likely to generate more cutting edge innovations 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2001). 
A number of prior studies provide supporting evidence that more centrally positioned firms 
generate more significant benefits from their network of direct ties than less central firms do. 
For example, Tsai (2000 and 2002) shows that network centrality increases firm’s innovative 
potential. Ahuja (2000) also shows that firms that occupy a more central position are more 
innovative when measured by the number of patents and new products generated. In line with 
the above studies, Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) and Hagedoorn et al., (2016) 
indicate that the number of partners of new biotechnology firms’ partners at founding is 
positively related to their performance measured by the multiple indicators, such as – revenues, 
R&D spending, and patent generation.    
Furthermore, since ties to other organisations are seen as pipes through which information 
flows within networks, more centrally positioned firms are more likely to be aware of 
development in their networks (Podolny, 1993). They can also easily communicate and 
promote their technology to a large pool of firms, which enhance the chances for their 
technology to reach a large number of players and increases the likelihood for their technology 
to become the standard in an industry (Katz & Shapiro, 1986). Firms whose technology is 
industry driver are more likely to gain new information from a broad range of customers, which 
they can use to generate new products and technologies (Podolny, 1993; Stuart et al., 1993). 
Hence, given the vast amount of resources and knowledge spill-overs and externalities resulting 
from connecting with a large number of partners, more centrally positioned firms are more 
likely to outperform those occupying less central positions (Freeman, 1991; Pologny, 1993; 
Bonacich, 1997; Baum et al., 2000; Ahuja, 2000b). In line with the above literature, licensees 
that license in technologies from many partners can be viewed as occupying more central 
207 
 
positions. More centrally positioned licensees have access to a large pool of technologies with 
which they can experiment and generate more novel products and technologies. This suggests 
that more central positioned licensees are more likely to benefit in terms of innovation 
performance through externally acquired technology than less central positioned licensees. 
Hence: 
H1a: The more firms (licensees) are centrally positioned in a network of direct ties, the higher 
their innovation performance. 
In addition to the number of partners from which firms license in new technologies, the 
innovation performance of firms may also be affected by the quality of the source of the 
licensed technologies (Lavie, 2006; Gulati et al., 2011). Firms accrue differential benefits from 
their network of direct ties based on the attribute of their partners (Lavie, 2006; Madhavan & 
Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). More specifically, Gulati et al. (2011) argue 
that firms occupying similar central positions may achieve different innovation performances 
because of the differences in the characteristic of their direct partners. The attributes of a firm’s 
partners strongly influence the quality of resources and the inherent value a firm can accrue 
from its direct networks ties (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017).  
The notion of the quality of ties relates to technologies and resources of a firm’s partners are 
reconfigured (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati et al., 2011). From an innovation perspective, the benefits 
of the quality of firms’ ties or richness of partners’ resources arise from learning options and 
the possible recombination that firms can generate from partners’ resources (Gulati, 1998; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990). According to Fleming (2001) and Fleming & Sorenson (2001), 
access to partners with high-quality resources augments the potential for firms to find more 
relevant knowledge. Thus, firms that have access to a set of partners with superior 
technological capabilities are more likely to develop breakthrough innovations (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1989), which are novel to the market and difficult to copy by competitors (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
In the context of licensing, high-quality technologies refer to sophisticated technologies, 
cutting-edge technologies (Hagedoorn et al., 2008). Firms (licensees) that have access to 
partners with highly sophisticated technologies are more likely to find relevant knowledge 
sources through their partners. This increases the likelihood they can generate new products or 
processes (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Nerkar & Parachuri, 2005), and enhance their 
innovativeness (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
In addition, firms that are tied to partners with more sophisticated technologies can easily find 
complementarity between their technologies and those of partners through effective 
triangulations (Podolny, 2001; Gulati et al., 2011). By collaborating with partners with high-
quality resources, licensees can verify the value of one partner’s technology by consulting with 
other partners (Podolny, 2001; Singh, 2005), which may be more difficult for licensees that are 
tied to partners with low-quality technologies. The possibility of cross-checking partners’ 
technology against other high-quality technologies enhances firms’ learning ability and 
increases their innovative potentials (Stuart et al., 1999; Singh, 2005; Nerkar & Parchuri, 2005; 
Lavie, 2006).   
Given the evidence from the above literature, firms (licensees) that are tied to partners with 
high-quality resources are more likely to generate more innovative ideas than those that are 
connected to partners with lower - quality resources. The former enjoys more advantages from 
their position due to new insights they can derive from their partners' resources. Hence: 




7.3.4. Indirect Ties and Innovation Performance    
While occupying a central position and receiving rich resources from direct ties are expected 
have a positive impact on innovation performance, firms’ indirect ties may also be significant 
sources of innovation (Ahuja, 2000b; Salman & Savies-Laure, 2005). Firms’ indirect ties are 
generally referred to as their partners’ partners (Gulati. 1995; Sorenson et al., 2006). Indirect 
ties can serve communication channels through which firms access knowledge of their 
partners’- partners (Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005). Through indirect ties, firms’ can access 
knowledge that is new or unfamiliar to them (Gulati, 1995; Davis, 2004), as firms may have a 
good understanding of their partners’ knowledge base but may be unfamiliar with the 
knowledge base of their partners’ partners. The number of a firm’s indirect ties increases the 
pool of new knowledge from which it can derive new insights. Thus, being well located within 
a network with indirect ties situates the firm favourably to access a large quantity of new and 
useful knowledge (Sorenson et al., 2006; Salman & Savies-Laure, 2005), and provides the firm 
with many innovation benefits (Ahuja, 2000b; Powell et al., 1996).  
As an information gathering device (Leonard-Barton, 1984; Freeman, 1991; Powell et al., 
1996; Salman & Savies- Laure, 2005), indirect network ties enable firms to gather information 
and to access knowledge about a range of activities which their partners’ partners engage in, 
which  enables them to be in tune with what is going on in the industry (Roger & Larsen, 1984; 
Sorenson et al., 2006)    
Indirect ties can also serve as a valuable source of combinatory knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Singh et al., 2016), useful in recombining internal and externally acquired knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Combinatory knowledge is generally gained through experience 
(learning by doing) or from interactions with network partners (Argote & Guo, 2010). 
Interactions between partners enable firms to share their experience and knowledge they 
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accrued from their interactions with other partners and with each other (Gulati & Garguilo, 
1999). Firms that interacts with a large number of other firms are more likely to have routines 
and processes in place for coordinating their network activities (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Argote 
& Ingram, 2000). They are more likely to possess more significant experience in recombining 
externally acquired knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2001).  
In the context of licensing, when licensees acquired technology from licensors in order for 
licensees to integrate the licensed technology, the must be some degrees of communicating 
between them. Communication between the licensing partners' enhances licensee's licensing 
experience, which in turn, facilitates its abilities to integrate the licensed technology. Firms that 
themselves license in technology or interact with other firms are more likely to have processes 
and routines in place for reconfiguring and recombining externally acquired knowledge. When 
these firms act as licensors and interact with their partners, they are more likely to pass useful 
knowledge, insights, experience, routines, and processes to their partners (Tortoriello et al., 
2014; Singh et al., 2016). Thus, firms (licensees) which are linked to partners that are 
themselves are connected to many other firms’ partners are more centrally positioned in a 
network with indirect ties. These licensees are more likely to access a larger pool of new and 
combinatory knowledge, which in turn, increases their propensity to recombine and reconfigure 
externally acquired knowledge and improve their innovation performance (Hansen, 2002; 
Sorenson, Rivkin, & Fleming, 2006). Hence: 
H2a: The more firms (licensees) are centrally positioned at the network of indirect ties the 
higher their innovation performance.  
The degree to which focal firms benefit from indirect ties, however, may also be influenced by 
the quality of their indirect partners’ resources (Lavie, 2006; Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & 
Prescott, 2017). The quality of firms' indirect ties may affect the value of these ties as the 
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inherent value that firms accrue from their indirect ties depends on the attributes of their 
partners-partners' resources (Gulati et al., 2011).  Firms that are tied to partners whose partners 
possess higher quality resources are more likely to find potential synergies and/or 
complementarities between their resources and those of their partners than firms whose indirect 
ties possess lower quality resources (Lavie, 2006; Gulati et al., 2011).  
From a licensing perspective, licensees that have indirect ties to higher quality partners, i.e.  
partners’ partners that possess more sophisticated technologies, are likely to enjoy more 
benefits from their network of indirect ties than those whose partners’ partners have a lower 
quality, i.e. indirect ties with a less sophisticated knowledge base. Hence: 
H2b. The higher the quality of firms' (licensees’) indirect ties, the higher their innovation 
performance. 
7.4. Method and Data 
7.4.1. Research Setting 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of firms (licensees) operating within the semiconductor 
industry (SIC 3674). We study  firms operating in the semiconductor industry because the 
industry is considered a complex industry whereby technological development builds on prior 
knowledge (Teece & Grindley, 1987; Hall & Ziendonis, 2001; Linden & Somaya, 2003). In 
this context, in order to innovate, firms have to gain access to other firms’ (partners) 
technology, and licensing is seen as an essential component of technological development 
(Teece & Grindley, 1987). Technology licensing facilitates the emergence of networks (Powell 
et al., 1996) and it is through these networks that firms innovate (Hall & Ziendonis, 2001; 
Linden & Somaya, 2003). Licensees occupy varying positions within their networks and 
depending on the number and quality of their direct and indirect network ties; they access 
differential levels of knowledge, information and resources. 
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In addition, because we measured firms’ innovation performance using their patenting 
frequency, this requires us to select an industry where patents are a meaningful indicator for 
new inventions. Firms in the semiconductor industry routinely and systematically patent their 
invention and patents are seen as an efficient mechanism for protecting and generating value 
from innovation (Stuart, 2000; Hall & Ziendonis, 2001; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011). Thus, 
using firms operating within the semiconductor industry provides an appropriate setting to test 
the implications that the quantity and quality of direct and indirect ties have on innovation 
performance.  
7.4.2. Data and Sample 
We assembled data on the licensing and patenting activities of focal firms and their partners. 
Patent data was used to measure the innovation performance of firms and their pre-network 
innovativeness, whereas licensing information is mainly used to capture firm networks and to 
measure some control variables (the rationale for using patenting and licensing data is 
explained in the operationalisation of variables below) 
We collected longitudinal data of the patenting and licensing frequency of firms. The panel 
used in the analysis contains yearly licensing data for the period of 1985 to 2005 and patenting 
data from 1980 to 2010, reflecting a five-year lead and lag period between licensing and 
patenting data. We employ a five-year lead and lag period in order to provide enough time for 
all firms’ patents to go through the patent examination process and to collect the forward 
citation counts for granted patents and measure firms’ pre-network innovativeness. Prior 
research suggests that when firms license in technology, it takes 3 to 5 years for them to develop 
new patents (Jaffe et al., 1993). Research also indicates that patents generally take 3 to 5 years 
to be granted (Griliches, 1990) and a patent is normally cited within 5 to 7 years (Trajtenberg, 
1987; Griliches, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993), thus using a 5-year’s lead and lag period provides 
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sufficient time to collate the forward citation records for all the sample firms’ patents and their 
level of innovativeness before engaging in networks. 
We collected licensing data of focal firms and their partners from Securities Data Company 
(SDC) Thomson Reuter database. The database is considered as one of the most comprehensive 
data sources for large base empirical studies (e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; Phelps, 2003, 
Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011) and has been widely used in the licensing, alliances and 
networks literatures with reliable results (Ahuja, 2000b; Sampson, 2007; Hagedoorn et al., 
2008; Parachuri, 2010; Singh et al., 2016). The database provides information on the name of 
licensing partners participating in the licensing arrangement, their public status, industry 
affiliations and countries in which they are headquartered. It also provides a brief description 
of the purpose of the licensing agreement, type of technologies involved in the licensing deal 
and primary SIC code of the engaging parties. We constructed each firm’s network by 
collecting licensing agreements signed between the firm and its partners and built a firm-firm 
network with firms serving as nodes and licensing agreements as ties through which resources, 
information and knowledge flow within networks. Following prescriptions from prior literature 
for establishing network boundaries (Laumann et al., 1993; Schilling & Phelps, 2007), we 
restricted firm networks to licensing deals that occurred within the semiconductor industry. 
Recent network studies have also used similar network construction criteria (e.g., Rowley, 
Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Phelps, 2010; Parachuri, 2010; Singh 
et al., 2016). Further, because our hypotheses require us to test for heterogeneity between focal 
firms, we selected only firms that have at least two or more licensing partners during the 
timeframe of the study and used the random effect specifications to account for these selection 
criteria as explained in the statistical technique section below. From these data sampling 
procedures, we obtained a sample of 64 firms engaging in 342 licensing deals.  
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Next, we compiled patents information for each sample firm and its partners. We retrieved 
firms’ patent data from the patent databases compiled by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). NBER databases contain patent information from the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office (EPO), and other key patent 
jurisdictions in the world, such as Japan, China, South Korea, and Australia. The databases 
provide information on the total number of patents granted to a firm - ultimate parent including 
those of all its subsidiaries. They also report the number of citation counts made and received 
by each patent, its technological class, and subclass, as well as a wealth of other important 
information (for a detailed description of the databases, see 
http://eml.berkeley.edu//~bhhall/patents.html).  For the current study, we mainly used the 
database containing patents information from the USTPO only. This is consistent with other 
large-scale studies on the effects of network ties on firms’ innovativeness (Ahuja, 2000b; 
Parachuri, 2010; Phelps, 2010; Singh et al., 2016). Drawing patenting information from only 
the USPTO is considered appropriate for the following reasons. First, because of the sheer size 
of the US market and the strength of its patent regime (Almeida, 1996; Lim, 2004), in order to 
stay competitive in the industry, semiconductor firms are more likely to patent their inventions 
with that regime (Hall & Ziendonis, 2007). Second, since different patent jurisdictions in the 
world use different standards and methods to assign patents to firms, using patents from a single 
regime reduces the likelihood of biases (inconsistency and comparability) in the independent 
variable that can result from using patents from different jurisdictions (Stuart & Podolny, 1996; 
Stuart, 1998; Ahuja, 2000b).  
Finally, we collected data for the control variables (firms and partner’s size, age and status) 
from Compustat, DataStream, NBER, Amadeus, LinkedIn, and Bloomberg. We also consulted 
firm websites, annual accounts, and other web and business directories in cases where we could 
not find reliable data from the above databases.  
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7.4.3. Operationalisation of Variables 
7.4.3.1. Dependent Variable 
We measure the firm innovation performance using its citations weighted patent counts (Ahuja, 
2000b; Phelps, 2010; Sampson, 2007). This measure has been extensively used in prior 
network and alliance studies to analyse the implications of network ties on firms’ innovation 
outputs (Ahuja, 2000b; Katila & Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011; Parachuri, 2010; Phelps, 2003; 
2010; Nerkar & Parachuri, 2005; Singh et al., 2016). Patents are a valid and robust indicator of 
innovations (Griliches, 1990). They represent a codifiable portion of firm’s technical (tangible) 
knowledge (Griliches, 1990; Trajtenburg, 1987), and have been shown to correlate with its tacit 
(intangible) knowledge (Brouwer & Kleinkneckt, 1998; Phelps, 2010).   
Following prior work by Sampson (2007) and Phelps, (2010), we constructed the innovation 
performance of each firm by first counting the number of patents granted to the firm within 
five years after the observed licensing deal. Then, for each of the firm patents, we count the 
number of forward citations received within the timeframe. A five-year window is used to 
operationalise the variable because research suggest when firms engage in alliances it takes 3-
5 years for them to develop new patents. Prior research also shows that patents are generally 
cited within a five-year window, and patents that are not cited within this timeframe are less 
likely to be cited at a  later date (Jaffe et al., 1993).  
7.4.3.2. Independent Variables  
Direct ties - centrality (Hypothesis 1a) refers to direct contacts (firms) that are directly linked 
to the focal firm, that is, those that are within a path distance of 1 in the firm's network 
(Freeman, 1979). In prior literature, the firm's network centrality has been operationalised 
using many different measures such as degree centrality, closeness and betweenness centrality 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). As the most used centrality measure, we operationalised the 
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quantity of the firm's direct ties using its degree centrality. Following Freeman (1979) and 
Wasserman and Faust (1994), we measure a firm 's degree centrality as the total number of 
unique partners that a firm licenses technology from during the observed time t. 
The quality of direct ties (Hypothesis 1b) to partners is strongly linked to the sophistication of 
its partners’ technological resources (Gulati et al., 2011). Following Lavie (2006) and Singh et 
al. (2016), we measure the richness of the firms’ direct ties as the total the citation counts of at 
firm’s direct partners’ patents. 
Indirect ties centrality (Hypothesis 2a) represent the extent to which a firm direct partners are 
linked to other partners, that is, the number of that firm’s partners-partners’ (Ahuja, 2000b; 
Moran, 2005; Singh et al., 2016). The firm’s indirect ties have commonly been captured at the 
ego – alters - alters or whole network level (Burt, 1992a; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Podolny & 
Baron, 1997). Following Freeman (1979) and Wasserman and Faust (1994), we measure a 
firm’s indirect ties degree centrality as the total number of unique partners that a firm’s 
partners’- partners engage in licensing deals with at the observation year t.  
Similar to the quality or richness of direct ties, we measured the quality of the firms’ indirect 
ties (Hypothesis 2b) as the total the citation counts of a firm’s partners-partners’ patents.  
7.4.3.3. Control Variables 
To isolate the effects of the explanatory variables, we controlled for a number of factors at the 
firm and partner level that may influence the innovative performance of firms.    
Focal firms’ pre-network innovativeness accounts for the level of that firm’s innovativeness 
before engaging in a licensing deal as prior research suggests that the knowledge that firms 
accumulate in the past may have a significant impact on their degree of innovativeness in the 
future (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Firms with a high level of innovativeness are likely to 
continue to generate more patents or maintain their stock of knowledge over time (Katila & 
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Abuja, 2003). Following studies by Katila & Abuja (2003), and Cloodt et al. (2006), we 
measure the firm pre-network innovativeness as the number of patents assigned to the firm 
within five years before the observed licensing deal.   
Partners’ pre-network innovativeness  is relevant as a control variable, as research shows that 
the amount of prior knowledge that partners bring to the network may also influence the focal 
firm’s innovation performance (Sampson, 2007). Although the focal firm does not own its 
partners’ resources, it can access them through its ties to partners. Similar to firms’ pre– 
innovative network potentials, we measured partners’ pre–network innovativeness as the 
number of patents obtained by the firm partners within five years before the observed licensing 
deal.  
As a standard indicator in performance studies, we also controlled for firms’ size as research 
indicates that larger firms are more likely to possess greater resources, which enable them to 
generate more patents than smaller firms (Scherer, 1986). We measured the firm size as the 
total number of employees employed by the firm at the observed time t. 
We also control for firms age, as prior research shows that older firms are more likely to possess 
a higher stock of knowledge than younger firms (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). This can influence 
the number of patents that they generate from their network resources. We measure the firm 
age as the time that elapsed from the date it was incorporated to the date of the observed 
licensing deal. 
The public/private status of a firm partners within its network  is relevant, as research highlights 
that the relational benefits that focal firms accrue from network partners may vary depending 
on whether their partners are privately or publicly owned (Lavie, 2007). Publicly traded firms 
are often seen as key influencers in the industry, and their association with a particular network 
can encourage other firms to join or adopt the focal firm’s technology. We captured this 
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variable using a dummy, which takes a value of 1 when a partner is a publicly traded firm and 
0 otherwise. 
Finally, the licensing literature mentions the difficulties that firms face in finding suitable 
partners for their technology, which may constrain their ability in forming or engaging in 
networks (Caves et al., 1993; Kani & Motohashi, 2012; Zuniga & Guellec, 2008). The 
geographical location where the firm is situated may influence its abilities to join a network(s) 
(Ahuja, 2000b). To control for cross-country heterogeneity and geographical explanations for 
firms’ network activities, we constructed a global network partner distribution dummies. We 
partitioned network partners into geographical regions and constructed five global, regional 
dummies. Each dummy captures the proportion of the focal firm and partners in a given region. 
We used the location of the firm’s parent headquarter to classify the firm and network partner 
into one of the following five regions: ‘USA,' ‘Europe,' ‘Japan and South Korea,' ‘Other 
developed nations,' and ‘Far East Asia and the rest of the world.' 
7.5. Statistical Analysis  
Our dependent variable is the annual firms’ citation weighted patent counts and the data for the 
explanatory variables comprises of multiple observations per firm over time. As a result of 
these structural features and the fact that our dependent variable is a count (only non-negative 
integer) variable, we used a panel negative binomial model to analyse our data. Other count 
specification models such as a Poisson regression models could have been used to analyse the 
data but were not deemed suitable because of overdispersion in the dependent variable 
(resulting from excess zero in the independent variable).  
For our analysis, we used the random effects panel specification rather than the fixed effects as 
the key explanatory variables (the quantity and quality of direct and indirect ties) do not vary 
within firms in the same network and our interest is in the variations in performance between 
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focal firms (Baltagi, 2005). Under these conditions, the random effect specification accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity, as it incorporates a firm’s specific error term and is deemed more 
appropriate than the fixed effect. Our analysis uses the random effects panel negative binomial 
(xtnbreg) procedure in Stata15.  
7.6. Findings  
Table 7.1 represents the descriptive statistics, which includes the means, standard deviations 
and bivariate correlations between all the explanatory variables. In general, the correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables are very low except for a few variables that 
deserve our attention. First, the quantity of direct ties – centrality measure is relatively highly 
correlated with the number of indirect ties (0.5976) and the partner size variable is also 
correlated with the partner age (0.5137). However, multicollinearity does not seem to present 
any problem to the analysis, as the mean-variance inflation factor (VIF) score for all of the 
independent variables is around 4.43, which is far below the critical value of 10. The robustness 
tests indicate that our findings are consistent and unaffected by the high correlations among 
these variables. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert tables 7.1 and 7.2 about here 
                                                ----------------------------------------- 
In table 7.2, we report the results of random effects panel negative binomial regression. For the 
analysis, we followed a hierarchical approach, whereby we introduced the control variables 
first and then the independent variables in the subsequent models. Model (1), our baseline 
model, contains only the control variables. In models (2) and (3), we added the centrality and 
richness of direct ties measure to assess the effects of direct ties. In model (4) and (5) we 
220 
 
introduced the centrality of indirect ties and quality of indirect ties, while in model (6), we 
incorporated all of the independent variables along with the control variables.  
For direct ties, as predicted, hypothesis 1a is supported in models 2 and 6. In each of these 
models, direct ties centrality exhibited a positive and statistically significant effect on firms' 
innovation performance. Hypothesis 1b is also supported, see models 3 and 6. The positive 
coefficients and statistically significant p values in models 3 and 6 lend support to the 
hypothesis that the quality of firms’ direct ties has a significant and positive effect on their 
subsequent innovation performance.  
For indirect ties, see hypothesis 2a, we proposed that the more a firm is centrally located in its 
network of indirect ties, the higher its innovation performance. This hypothesis is supported in 
model 4 with a positive and statistically significant p-value but becomes insignificant in the 
full model 6. In hypothesis 2b, we proposed that the richness of indirect ties has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the innovation performance of firms. The estimated positive 
coefficient of the quality of indirect ties in models 5 and 6 lends support to this hypothesis.  
We performed likelihood ratios tests to examine whether adding our independent variables 
significantly improved the explanatory power of the models over the baseline model 1 with 
only the control variables. The resulting chi-squares Δχ2 are statistically significant indicating 
that adding the key independent variables significantly improves the explanatory power of the 
model. Model 6 includes both the centrality and quality of direct and indirect ties. Comparing 
the p-values in model 6 indicates that the effects of the quality of direct ties (p < 0.0001) are 
statistically more significant than the effect of the quantity of direct ties (p < 0.05). Similarly, 
at the indirect ties level, unlike the quantity of indirect ties, the quality of indirect ties (p < 0.05) 
seems to have a statistically significant effect on innovation. The findings further indicate that 
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the effect of the quality of ties is more significant at the direct ties level (p < 0.0001) than at 
the indirect ties level (p < 0.05).  
Some findings on our control variables are also worth reporting. In line with prior research, our 
findings highlight that the size of firms has a positive and significant impact on innovation 
performance and this is consistent throughout the models. This indicates that the focal firms’ 
innovation performance increases with the size of the firm. Our findings also show that focal 
firms and their partners’ pre-network have a negative and significant effect on innovations 
innovation performance. Although both variables have a significantly negative impact on 
innovation performance, focal firms’ pre-network innovativeness seems to have a stronger 
effect (β = 0.0001 and p < 0.001) than partners’ pre-network innovativeness (β = 0.0009 & p 
< 0.01). This suggests that, rather than just using the capabilities that firms access from 
partners, their ability to recombine and reconfigure these capabilities plays a more important 
role in increasing in their innovation performance. In addition, our findings indicates that 
partners’ location also matters to the focal firm’s innovation performance. The location variable 
USA, where most of the network partners are located, seems to be consistently positive and 
significant in all the models. This highlights that the closer the geographical proximity among 
partners, at the global scale, the easier it is for them to access and share resources, which 
subsequently enhances their innovation performance.  
7.6.1. Robustness Tests     
We carried out a number of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, while 
we measured our dependent variable using five-year moving windows and we believe that it is 
a reasonable proxy for innovation performance, we also tested a number of alternative 
specifications to check that our results are not influenced by the selected timeframe. We 
measured the dependent variable using 4 and 6 - year windows. Additionally, we explored 
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alternative models using other performance measures, patent counts and total citation counts 
(backward and forward citations), that have been used in the prior literature to measure firms’ 
innovation performance. The overall outcomes from these models were largely consistent with 
those reported in our findings, which reinforces our predictions. 
Second, we hypothesised in this study that the quantity and quality of ties enhanced firms’ 
innovation performance, however, both innovation and network ties may be influenced by 
unobserved factors of firms. This entails that endogeneity may be an issue in this study. 
Although our statistical approach controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, we also tested for 
the implication of endogeneity by first of all isolating the effects of the quantity and quality of 
direct and indirect ties using firms' prior innovativeness (Schiling & Phelps, 2007; Phelps, 
2010). Then, we used the approach proposed by Reagan and McEvily (2007) to establish 
exogeneity for cooperation in the network context. The results for these alternative analyses 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main findings. 
Finally, given the high intercorrelation between the quantity of direct ties and the number of 
indirect ties (0.5976) and the partner size variable with the partner age (0.5137), 
multicollinearity may have influenced our findings. We checked the effect that 
multicollinearity might have on our results by first of all mean centring these variables. Then 
we created a grand variable for both set of variables and ran the different models. In addition, 
we checked the mean-variance inflation factor (VIF) score for all explanatory variables. The 
VIF for all the independent variables is around 3.43, which is far below the critical value of 10 
(Belsley, 1980; Cohen et al., 2003). The results from these robustness tests indicate that our 
findings are consistent and unaffected by correlations among these variables. 
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7.7. Discussion and Conclusions  
To understand how network ties affect innovation performance, prior literature has mostly 
concentrated on the effects of the quantity or number of direct ties and indirect ties (Ahuja, 
2000b; Parachuri, 2010; Mor, 2010; Salman & Savies-Laure, 2005; Singh et al., 2012). While 
the quantity of resources that firms accrue from direct and indirect ties contribute to their 
innovation, the quality of the resources is also an important facet regarding the impact of 
networks (Gulati et al., 2011; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). 
Studying the benefits of the quantity of resources that firms accrue from the network of partners 
without accounting for attributes or quality of these resources cannot sufficiently explain 
innovation (performance) differential (Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009).  
Our results suggest that firms benefit from both the quantity and quality of their direct and 
indirect ties and that the nature of these benefits varies significantly depending on the quality 
of their partners’ resource. Our research also indicates that the quality of resources possessed 
by partner firms that firms access through direct ties have a stronger impact on their innovation 
performance than the quantity of resources in terms of the number of direct ties. Similarly, the 
quality of resources that firms can access through indirect ties has stronger impact on their 
innovation performance than the benefits they accrue from the quantity of partners’ resources 
through indirect ties. These findings lend support to the ideas that firms occupying the same 
structural position may benefit differently from their network centrality depending on the 
attributes of partners that they are connected to (Gulati et al., 2011). 
The theoretical implications of these findings suggest the need to simultaneously explore the 
effects of the quantity and quality of resources. Thus, our study contributes to the recent body 
of literature that explore the roles that the attributes of partners or the quality of network 
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resources has on firms' (innovation) performance (Gulati, 2007; Gulati et al., 2011; Lavie, 
2006;  Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Madhavan et al., 2008; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). 
In addition, our study contributes to both the social capital perspective and social 
embeddedness stream of the network literature (Granovetter, 1985, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; 1997; 
Gulati, 1997; Lavie, 2007). It explores the effects of centrality, a structural feature of network, 
alongside the quality of ties to partners, a relational aspect of network (Gulati et al., 2011) and 
hence it goes beyond the dominant logic in most prior studies that have exclusively relied upon 
either the structural (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1988; Burt, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Adler & Kwon, 
2002) or relational embeddedness perspective in studying the effect of network ties. By 
simultaneously considering the structural, relational, and actor attributes as determinants of 
innovation performance, our study offers additional insights into the role of network ties on 
firms’ performance.  
Finally, our research enriches the extant literature by showing that the number of partners from 
which firms' license technology, the quality of their partners’ resources and the ability to 
reconfigure and recombine this technology through their own innovative capabilities contribute 
significantly to their innovation performance. 
Besides these theoretical and empirical contributions, our findings also have some interesting  
managerial implications. When firms act as licensees, they should not only focus on creating a 
broad portfolio of licensing agreements with a diversity of licensors. It is crucial for them to 
connect to licensors that are able to give them access to cutting-edge technologies. In addition, 
in this context, to increase innovation performance, the quality of partners is more important 
than their quantity. The quality of licensing partners is also apparent in the impact of the quality 
of a firm’s indirect partners, i.e. the quality of the licensing partners of your own partners. In 
essence, this suggests that managers should not just connect to a large number of licensing 
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partners to get access to a variety of technological insights but should strategically evaluate the 
technological capabilities of both their direct and indirect partners as this enhances the quality 
of resources they can accrue from their broader licensing network and improve their innovation 
performance. 
As with all empirical studies, this study also has several limitations, which provide potential 
avenues for future research. First, the findings of this study are based on the patenting and 
licensing data of firms operating within the semiconductor industry. The implications of market 
and technological dynamics within the semiconductor industry may vary from those of other 
high-tech industries, such as pharmaceutical, chemical, and telecommunication industries and 
industries that are characterized as medium or low-tech. Further studies are needed to 
investigate whether our findings are also relevant in a much wider variety of industry settings.  
The second limitation of this study is the use of patent data as a measure of innovation. As it is 
well known in the literature, not all innovations are patented, and some innovations are not 
patented for strategic reasons (Trajtenberg, 1987; Griliches, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993). Future 
studies could use other kinds of innovation data related to new product and process 
development and to the actual market success of new products. Qualitative data could also be 
used as this could provide us with more insights into social interactions between partners and 
the implications that this may have on innovation outcomes. 
Next, in this study, we presented and explored the effects of two key aspects of networks 
(centrality and quality of ties) on firms' innovation performance. However, we did not explore 
the substitution effects at either the direct ties or the indirect ties level. Different combinations 
of the quantity and quality of ties at the direct and indirect ties level may lead to different 
innovation performance outcomes. Future research could examine the substitution effects 
between the quantity and quality of network ties as this could provide additional insights into 
the effects that network ties have on innovation.  
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Despite these limitations, this study makes a number of contributions to our understanding 
of the effects of network ties on innovation performance. By showing that firms occupying 
similar network positions may exhibit different innovation performance outcomes depending 
on the quality of their direct and indirect partners’ resources, this paper contributes to the 
research on networks, alliances, and innovation. we hope that this study will spur further 
research exploring the  combined effects of the quantity and quality of network ties and the 






Table 7-1: Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Direct ties 
centrality 
1.0000             
Quality of 
direct ties 
0.4437* 1.0000            
Indirect ties 
centrality 
 0.5976* 0.2340* 1.0000           
Quality of 
indirect ties 
0.3578 0.23476 0.4114* 10000          
Firms pre-
network 
innovativeness           
0.0216 0.0050 0.0304 0.0145 1.0000         
Partners pre-
network 
innovativeness           
0.3975* 0.3961* 0.3565* 0.2345*  0.0288                
                        
1.0000        
Firms size 0.2346* -0.0268 0.0712 0.3453 0.4334* -0.0654 1.0000       
Partners size 0.2346* 0.3776* 0.2070* 0.0123 0.0143 0.4591* -0.0204    1.0000      
Firms age 0.0167 0.0070 -0.0038 0.0043* 0.3654* -0.0618 0.3030* 0.0767 1.0000     
Partners age 0.2608* 0.2131* 0.2436* 0.1456 -0.0066 0.3356* -0.0924 0.5137* 0.0009 1.0000    
Partners status -0.0289 0.0595 -0.0214 0.0874 -0.1038 -0.0081 0.0329 0.1270* 0.0460   0.1295* 1.0000   
USA 0.0123 0.1885* -0.0556 0.1944 *          -0.0535 0.0094 0.0040 -0.0497 -0.0748 0.1631* 0.0157 1.0000  
EUROPE -0.0968 -0.0422 -0.0850 -0.1234             -0.0228 -0.0357 -0.0293 -0.0081 0.1840* 0.0560 0.0267 -0.0802 1.0000 
Mean 3.6859 101362 11.735 322790 2226.6 2147.4 100962 2552.2 70.467 33.401 19.462 0.3388 0.0124 
Standard 
Deviation 






Standard errors are in parentheses. † P < 0.10; * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001 
 
 
Table 7-2: Random Effects Panel Negative Binomial Estimates for Direct Ties and Indirect 
Ties on Focal Firms Innovative Performance 
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-0.7566
(1.250) 
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-0.4132       
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Jap & S. Korea Include Include    Include Include    Include  Include     
Others Dev. Nation Include Include Include Include Include Include 
Far East Asia Include Include Include Include Include Include 
Rest of World Include Include Include Include Include Include 
Number of obs    342       342 342 342 342 342 
Log-likelihood -3966.84 -3949.41 -3923.35 -3922.61 -3922.24 -3921.51 
Wald chi-square 72.51*** 108.24*** 108.77*** 109.06*** 109.47*** 298.59*** 
Models   
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This thesis has dealt with one of the most critical management issues of our time, that is, 
collaboration among firms. In recent years, increasing pace in technological development and 
interdependence among firms and their activities have led to an increase in collaboration among 
firms. Collaboration involves the sharing and exchange of resources and capabilities among 
partners, at times even between competitors, which entails new requirements for the 
management of firms’ activities. 
The thesis has examined the collaboration strategy of firms from three critical perspectives – 
technological sharing (licensing), ecosystems and networks. In each perspective, it has 
responded to a pressing question in the areas of research, thus advancing our understanding of 
how licensing (technological sharing) through networks and ecosystems shape organisational 
outcomes. 
From a licensing perspective (study 1/chapter 5 of this thesis), it provides empirical evidence 
on the conditions under which firms prefer to exchange their technology through cross and 
unilateral licensing. It investigates the firms’ licensing preference from both the characteristics 
of the firm and those of its partners. As a result of far-reaching influences of diversification, 
the thesis argues that market diversification may be a more informative determinant for a firm’s 
licensing preference than the firm size that has been examined in the prior literature. A large 
firm may operate only in a single market and technological space, whereas operating in 
multiple markets and multiple technological spaces enhance firms’ learning potential enabling 
them to develop more critical assets, which in turn, strengthens their bargaining position and 
competitive advantages. 
The finding shows that at the firm level, firms or licensors’ licensing preference is shaped by 
the capabilities that firms accrue from operating in multiple markets and multiple technological 
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spaces, and the imperative to capitalise on the benefits of these capabilities determines firms’ 
licensing preference. This finding suggests that because more diversified firms possess more 
capabilities (patents) they tend to prefer cross licensing as this licensing type offers them the 
opportunity to access and share advanced knowledge of partners enhancing their ability to 
benefit from their technology. Less diversified firms may prefer unilateral licensing because 
they lack the technological competencies and patent stocks required for cross licensing. 
At the pair level, the finding reveals that the licensing preference of firms is based on the 
magnitude of the competitive risks that they face from licensing their technology to partners. 
When licensors operate in fewer markets and technological spaces than licensees do, the former 
tend to prefer to engage in cross licensing rather than unilateral licensing. The finding suggests 
that because increasing market and technological diversification significantly enhances a firm's 
learning and absorptive potential when less diverse licensors are faced with more diversified 
licensees; they are more likely to prefer the licensing type that will shield them from the risk 
of increasing competition. This finding is consistent with prior licensing studies from the 
competitive perspective (Arora et al., 2003; Fosturi, 2006; Siebert & Von Graevenitz, 2012), 
which show that with increasing competition firms tend to be more cautious in their licensing 
decision and they tend to prefer the licensing type that will guard them against the adverse 
effects of increased competition. 
The findings from this study also show that as distinctive focal activities, the experience that 
firms’ possess in cross and unilateral licensing influences their licensing preference. The 
finding suggests that the development of reliable routines and processes facilitates the ease 
with which licensors can orchestrate a specific licensing type and significantly increases their 
preference to use that type of licensing agreement in the future. 
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Lastly, the findings also indicate that the size of the licensor vis-à-vis its licensing partner may 
be a more important predictor for the licensor’s licensing preference than the licensor size. The 
results suggest that licensors’ licensing preference is influenced not just by the resources that 
they possess but also by the degree of competition that they would face from using a particular 
licensing type. 
For managers, based on the licensor characteristics and licensing pair differential 
characteristics uncovered in this study, the findings suggest that by selecting the appropriate 
licensing agreement IP managers can optimise the amount of values they can capture from their 
technology. The findings also suggest that based on their capabilities firms should select the 
licensing type that would enable them to capitalise on these resources. It demonstrates that 
licensors should factor in how diversified they are relative to their partners in their licensing 
decision. When licensors operate in fewer markets and technological spaces than licensees, 
licensors face a higher risk in the partnership and should select the licensing type that would 
shield them from the adverse effect of increasing competition in the marketplace. 
From an ecosystem perspective (study 2/chapter 6), the thesis provides an alternative 
explanation for heterogeneity in focal firms or ecosystem orchestrators’ performance, which 
hinges on the roles of the architectural components of the ecosystem. By distinguishing the 
components within an ecosystem into technology and actors, this study offers an additional 
lens for understanding how interaction among actors (cooperation) and the coordination of 
technologies (coordination of activities) within ecosystems contribute to performance 
outcomes. It argues that the degree of technological interconnectedness (technology 
complexity) and the level of actors’ interactions (actor complexity) within ecosystems 
influence the amount of value that firms generate in their ecosystems. In line with these 
hypotheses, this study reveals that increased level of technology and actor ecosystem 
complexity enhances the amount of value that firms accrue from their ecosystem. The findings 
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suggest that increased level of technology complexity reinforces the architecture of focal firms’ 
technology and leads to the emergence of bottlenecks. It supports the view that controlling 
strategic bottlenecks that result from supply limitation – when reinforced with architectural 
control and legal protection such as patents – enhances focal licensors’ capacity to generate 
value from ecosystems. The findings also suggest that when actors interact with a large and 
diverse set of actors (increased actor ecosystem complexity) because of increased knowledge 
that focal actor gained from the interaction, they are more efficient in coordinating the 
ecosystem technology thus enhancing their ability to generate superiority from their ecosystem. 
Finally, the findings also indicate that the focal firm’s technology complexity and actor 
complexity jointly augment the focal firms’ performance. This finding illustrates that focal 
firms' ability to reap superior benefits from their ecosystems may depend not just on the 
alignment of technologies within their ecosystem, but also on the degree of interactions among 
actors in the ecosystem 
These findings have important implications for the ecosystem literature. Unlike prior studies 
that have traditionally explained the performance of focal firms from either the structural 
properties of the ecosystem (structuralist perspective) or the relational embeddedness of actors 
within the ecosystem (actor-centric perspective), the architectural approach proposed in this 
thesis complements both the structural and actor-centric approaches. The findings add to the 
structural approach by showing that rich interconnectivity among partner technologies offers 
the focal firm greater control over its technology and makes it much more difficult for rival 
firms to access its partners (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Ethiraj, 2007; Ethiraj & Posen, 2013). It 
also advances the actor-centric perspective of the ecosystem literature (Jacobides et al.,2015; 
Rong & Shi, 2014;) by considering not just how the attributes of partner firms contribute to 
focal firms' value creation but also how the licensing deal in which they engaged (mechanism) 
influences the degree of interaction within their ecosystem and performance. 
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For managers, the findings suggest that when constituting their ecosystems, managers should 
consider the attributes of their partners in terms of the number and diversity of actors and 
technologies as ecosystem orchestrators tend to perform better when the technologies and 
actors within their ecosystems originate from a broad and diverse range of industry settings. 
From the last perspective, networks – study 3/chapter7 - the thesis provides empirical evidence 
on how the effects of the quantity and the quality of direct and indirect network ties affect firms' 
innovative performance. This study aligns with prior literature on the relational aspect of 
networks and argues that while the number of resources that firms accrue from direct and 
indirect ties contributes to innovation, the source of these resources also matters. The findings 
indicate that the quality of resources and capabilities that firms access from direct ties and 
indirect ties have a much stronger impact on their innovative performance than the quantity of 
resources. The results suggest that while connecting to a large number of partners enables firms 
to access a large quantity of resources, the quality of partners’ resources enables them to find 
complementarity between their resources, enhancing their innovation potential. 
These findings have important theoretical implications for the literature on network ties and 
innovative performance. First, they contribute to the recent body of literature exploring the 
roles of partners’ attributes or the quality of network resources on firms’ innovation 
performance (Gulati et al., 2011; Lavie, 2006; Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Madhavan et al., 
2008; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). The findings lend support to the idea that firms 
occupying the same structural position may benefit differently from their network centrality 
depending on the attributes of partners to which they are connected (Gulati et al., 2011; 
Madhavan & Prescott, 2017; Sarkar, Aulakh & Madhok, 2009). In addition, the findings also 
contribute to both the social capital perspective (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
1988; Portes, 1988; Putnam, 1993;) and social embeddedness stream of network literature 
(Granovetter, 1985, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; 1997) as the study explores the effects of centrality – a 
233 
 
structural aspect of network – jointly with the quality of ties to partners, a relational aspect of 
network (Gulati et al., 2011). 
For managers, these findings suggest that they should not simply connect to too many partners 
but should strategically evaluate the capabilities of partners before collaborating with them as 
firms that are connected to partners with more cutting-edge technologies accrue more 
significant benefits from their networks than those that are connected to partners with fewer 
quality technologies. 
8.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The three empirical studies constituting this thesis are subject to several common limitations, 
which could serve as possible avenues for future research. The first limitation of this thesis 
relates to its research setting. The three studies of the thesis are all operationalised within a 
single industry (semiconductor industry), which implies that the findings may not be easily 
generalised. Although the theories and hypotheses developed in the studies may not depend on 
the distinctive features of the semiconductor industry, we are conscious of the fact that the 
characteristics of firms in other high-tech industries such as pharmaceutical, chemical and 
telecommunications industries may vary significantly from those of semiconductor industry. 
A natural way forward to deal with the issue of generalisation is for researchers to broaden the 
scope of these studies by incorporating data from other high-tech industries. 
The second limitation of this thesis is its use of patent data as a measure of innovative 
performance. Not all innovations are patented, and some innovations are not patented for 
strategic reasons (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993; Trajtenberg, 1987). Patents may therefore 
not account for all firm innovation outputs. In addition, patents do vary across industries (Hall 
et al., 1986). Although in this thesis patent data are collected from the semiconductor industry 
– an industry with a high level of patenting and R&D activity – which minimises sectorial 
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differences in patenting activities, patent counts are still an imperfect measure of innovation 
(Hall et al., 1986). Future studies could use other kinds of performance data such as financial 
ratio-based measures – profitability, return on equity, return on investments and sales growth 
– and economic or market-based measures – new product generations, market entry and failure 
rates. Qualitative data could also be used as this could provide more insight into the 
collaborative strategies of firms and its implications on innovation outcomes. 
The last limitation of this thesis relates to the sources of data. The findings of this thesis are 
based on licensing and patenting data collected from the SDC Thompson Reuter and NBER 
databases, respectively. The licensing data on SDC databases are compiled from alliances that 
are publicly announced by the alliance parties, and are therefore highly skewed towards 
alliances in the US and the Western world. This means that data of alliances that are not 
publicly published as well as alliances elsewhere may be lacking, which may provide a 
distorted picture of the number of alliances that occurred during the sample period. In addition, 
the patent data used in this thesis originates only from the USPTO in the NBER database. 
Although using patents from a single regime may reduce issues of comparability, reliability 
and consistency resulting from using patent data from many different jurisdictions, it may also 
lead to bias, especially towards non-Western firms. Thus, researchers may seek appropriate 
methods and mechanisms to calibrate patents from different jurisdictions as this may enable 
the measurement of innovative performance in a more reliable manner enhancing the quality 
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